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Foreword 
I n responding to the political and military challenges of the Cold War, and the urge to explore and exploit outer space, the United States developed a capable fleet of space transportation 
systems for carrying cargo and people into space, and for ensuring a credible strategic nu-
clear deterrent. These systems are owned and managed by the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration, the Department of Defense, and private industry. In recent years, increasing 
federal budget constraints, commercial competition from foreign launch firms, and a desire to con-
tinue an ambitious space program have created pressures within the United States to reduce the 
costs of access to space. Significantly lower space transportation costs would make the U.S. space 
industry more commercially competitive, foster the expansion and creation of new space markets, 
and ensure access to space for government payloads and manned missions. 
This report, prepared for the House Committee on Science, is the first in a broad assessment of 
the health and future prospects of the U.S. space transportation technology and industrial base. The 
report focuses on the Clinton Administration's National Space Transportation Policy, which was 
released last fall. It examines administration policy in light of the implementation plans prepared 
by NASA, DOD, and the Transportation and Commerce Departments. As the report notes, the new 
policy brings a welcome measure of order to the sometimes chaotic structure of U.S. space trans-
portation activities. The policy also emphasizes the important contribution private industry can 
make to the direction and development of U.S. space transportation capabilities. However, an 
analysis of the policy and implementation plans also raises some issues that might be of interest to 
Congress as it debates space transportation legislation, oversight, and funding. These issues in-
volve decisions on NASA and DOD development programs, the use of foreign launch vehicles and 
components, the conversion of excess long-range ballistic missiles for use as launch vehicles, and 
the new role of the private sector in space transportation research and development decisionmak-
ing. This report also identifies two issues omitted from the Administration's policy: the preserva-
tion of long-range ballistic missile capabilities after final production in 2005, and the perspective 
of lower industrial tier firms toward national space transportation policy. 
In undertaking this effort, the Office of Technology Assessment sought the contributions of a 
wide spectrum of knowledgeable individuals and organizations. Some provided information, oth-
ers reviewed drafts. OTA gratefully acknowledges their contributions of time and intellectual ef-
fort. OTA also appreciates the help of NASA and the Defense, Transportation, and Commerce 
Departments. As with all OTA reports, the content of this report is the sole responsibility of OTA 
and does not necessarily represent the views of our advisors or reviewers. 
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As the year 2001 approaches, visions of annular space sta-tions and tourist flights to the Moon remain science fic-tion. With fewer than six years until the new millennium, 
the U.S. space transportation technology and industrial 
base is faced with a number of challenges, and some opportuni-
ties. 1 
The federal government has been the primary customer for 
space transportation services since the early days of rocketry. Re-
cent efforts to reduce the federal budget deficit, cut the national 
debt, and shift development responsibilities to the private sector, 
however, have limited government funding for new space trans-
portation technologies and missions. Similarly, the end of the 
Cold War has led to a reexamination of defense and national secu-
rity spending on space missions and long-range ballistic missiles. 
Meanwhile, European, Russian, and Chinese launch providers 
have captured more than 60 percent of the global commercial 
launch market for medium launch vehicies (MLVs). At the same 
time, entrepreneurs in the telecommunication, navigational, and 
remote sensing satellite industries predict an increasing need for 
launch services to establish and maintain large constellations of 
new satellites. 
I Space transportation in this report refers to vehicles able to carry payloads or passen-
gers to orbit. Space transportation systems may be expendable launch vehicles (ELV s), 
partially or fully reusable launch vehicles (RLV s), and long-range ballistic missiles. Cur-
rently, the U.S. Space Shuttle is the world's only operational RLV. This report does not 
address suborbital launch systems or transportation systems designed primarily to move 
payload or passengers between or beyond Earth orbits. 
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11 
21 Summary 
To address these challenges and opportunities, 
on August 5, 1994, the White House announced 
the National Space Transportation Policy 
(NSTP), developed by the National Science and 
Technology Council and approved by President 
Clinton.2 The Clinton Administration's four fun-
damental objectives for the NSTP were to estab-
lish new national policy regarding: 
1. federal space transportation spending, con-
sistent with current budget constraints and the 
opportunities presented by emerging technol-
ogies; 
2. federal agencies' use of foreign launch systems 
and components; 
3. federal agencies' use of excess ballistic missile 
assets for space launch, to prevent adverse im-
pacts on the U.S. commercial space launch in-
dustry; and 
4. an expanded private sector role in the federal 
space transportation research and development 
(R&D) decisionmaking process.3 
This report examines the new policy and the 
implementation plans of the Department of De-
fense (DOD), the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA), and the Departments of 
Transportation (DOT) and Commerce (DOC) in 
the context of these four fundamental objectives. 
The report raises issues for Congress to consider 
as it debates the funding, oversight, and legisla-
tive requirements of the new space transportation 
policy. General findings, issues for Congress, and 
critical decision points identified in the report are 
summarized below. The main body of the report 
provides background on the fundamental objec-
tives and examines each issue for Congress in 
detail. 
GENERAL FINDINGS 
I Lack of Consensus on 
U.S. Space Policy Goals 
The U.S. space transportation technology and in-
dustrial base is in a period of tumult and uncertain-
ty brought about by the end of the Cold War, a 
constrained fiscal environment, and a pending 
shift in responsibilities from the public to the pri-
vate sector. Even more than ordinary times, such a 
period demands clear intermediate and long-term 
goals, strong Presidential leadership, and the 
formation of a national consensus among the 
executive branch, Congress, industry, and the 
public. 
The NSTP states that "assuring reliable and af-
fordable access to space through U.S. space trans-
portation capabilities is a fundamental goal of the 
U.S. space program."4 Most observers agree that 
reducing costs and improving reliability are im-
portant objectives for the U.S. space program. Re-
liable, affordable access to space is a necessary 
part of the nation's infrastructure for achieving 
broader space goals. 
The policy implies that lowering the cost of ac-
cess to space will allow the United States to do 
whatever it wants in space. It may be difficult to 
achieve lower launch costs, however, without a 
clearly articulated, long-term plan supported by 
adequate funding, especially when the govern-
ment is asking industry to make significant invest-
ments in ambitious new space transportation 
development programs. Indeed, the Office of 
Technology Assessment (OTA) previously noted 
that "until the nation chooses what it wants to ac-
complish in space, and what the U.S. taxpayer is 
2 Presidential Decision Directive NSTC-4. Most, ifnot all, the text of this internal policy was released publicly in The White House, Office of 
Science and Technology Policy, "National Space Transportation Policy," Fact Sheet, Washington, DC, Aug. 5, 1994. See appendix for complete 
text. 
3 The White House, Office of Science and Technology Policy, "Statement on National Space Transportation Policy," Washington, DC, Aug. 
5, 1994. See appendix for complete text. 
4 The White House Office, Office of Science and Technology Policy, op. cit., footnote 2, Intro. 
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The Administration has outlined some broad 
national space goals, such as achieving the In-
ternational Space Station. It has not made clear, 
however, how specifIc goals relate to each other. It 
has not issued, for example, an overall space 
policy to replace the 1989 space policy of the Bush 
Administration. Without a clear articulation of 
space policy and how it relates to the broader na-
tional agenda, it may be diffIcult for both industry 
and government to pursue space transportation 
goals with vigor. 
As the experience of the last decade has shown, 
even if the Administration were to delineate clear 
and specifIc national space goals, industry offI-
cials might still be reluctant to commit corporate 
resources to new space transportation ventures 
without strong congressional support. This sup-
port, in tum, depends on the ability of Members of 
Congress to bridge jurisdictional divisions and 
reach a consensus on how to buttress national 
space goals. 
I Living Within Severe 
Budget Constraints 
Fiscal constraints imposed by the budget defIcit, 
the federal debt, competition from other pro-
grams, and a desire to reduce government spend-
ing have forced DOD and NASA to cut back on 
space transportation programs, and to attempt to 
fund more creatively those programs that remain 
(e.g., through public-private partnerships). Both 
DOD and NASA state that they can meet their cur-
rent space goals, but many government and indus-
try offIcials are skeptical. These offIcials point out 
the previous commitments to new space trans-
portation systems that failed to produce operation-
al vehicles despite less severe budget constraints 
(e.g., the National Launch System, the Advanced 
Launch System, the Air Force Space Lifter, the 
Shuttle C, the Shuttle II, and the National Aero-
space Plane). The V.S. government could afford 
to fund fully new space transportation systems, 
but it has currently placed its spending priorities 
elsewhere. In the absence of more government 
spending, the government and industry will have 
to sustain a commitment to new ways of doing 
business if the challenges and opportunities con-
fronting V.S. space transportation are to be met. 
I Government Demand Dominates 
the Space Transportation Market 
Since the advent of the space age, the V.S. govern-
ment has played a large and critical role in shaping 
the domestic space transportation technology and 
industrial base. The V.S. government created the 
base to build long-range ballistic missiles and 
place men on the Moon. The V.S. government and 
industry remain tightly entwined through R&D 
and procurement contracts, federal regulations, 
and the need for licenses, despite the rise of com-
mercial space launch markets. 
For at least the next decade, V.S. national secu-
rity and civil demands for space transportation 
will continue to dominate the domestic industry. 
Even the most optimistic growth projections for 
the global commercial market do not forecast a 
signifIcant shift away from the government with-
out major changes in the marketplace (e.g., the de-
velopment of a dramatically less-expensive space 
transportation system or the discovery of a com-
mercially lucrative space activity). Moreover, 
some launch providers are reluctant to take the 
steps necessary to make their launch operations 
5 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Access to Space: The Future of u.s. Space Transportation Systems, OTA-ISC-41S 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 1990), p. 21. 
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more commercially price-competitive, because 
the changes might conflict with government re-
quirements or the government might demand sim-
ilar savings. 
I Current Capabilities Can Meet 
National Security Requirements 
The national security community currently re-
quires a domestic capability to launch payloads 
into orbit. The existing fleet oflaunch vehicles can 
continue to meet this requirement for the foresee-
able future. DOD's major new development pro-
gram, the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle 
(EELV), is intended to reduce DOD space trans-
portation costs, rather than ensure continued ac-
cess to space. The EEL V program attempts to 
maximize cost savings by replacing DOD's cur-
rent stable of MLVs and heavy launch vehicles 
(HLVs), procured from several vendors, with a 
unified family of vehicles that share many com-
mon components and launch infrastructure and 
are built by a single launch provider. One conse-
quence of this consolidation, however, is that a 
systemic failure in one vehicle might ground the 
entire family of vehicles along with its national se-
curity payloads. 
I Competing Interests Make 
Common Strategy Difficult 
While all members of the space transportation 
technology and industrial base see a critical need 
to reduce the cost of space transportation, their 
differing interests make it difficult to agree on a 
common space transportation development strate-
gy. National security space transportation deci-
sions are largely driven by the need to reduce 
expensive HLV launch costs through the EELV 
program. NASA hopes to replace its aging Space 
Shuttle fleet with a new, low-cost reusable launch 
vehicle (RLV) in the high MLV class that would 
carry crews and cargo to and from the Internation-
al Space Station. Most industry representatives 
want to focus development dollars on a smaller, 
reusable ML V, designed to recapture lost commer-
cial market share worldwide, while small launch 
vehicle (SLV) producers and selected space scien-
tists want to maintain U.S. leadership in SLVs. 
Recognizing and balancing these competing 
interests is critical to the success of a truly national 
space policy. The NSTP and its implementation 
plans are careful to ensure that DOD and NASA 
needs are met, but are less diligent about meeting 
the needs of the private sector. 
ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 
The following section summarizes OTA's discus-
sion of issues that may be of interest to Congress 
as it debates the future of U.S. space transporta-
tion. These issues are divided among the Clinton 
Administration's four fundamental objectives for 
the NSTP and correspond directly to the main 
body of the report. 
I Fundamental Objective #1 : 
Space Transportation Funding 
and the Division of Responsibilities 
The NSTP attempts to set government spending 
priorities for current and future space transporta-
tion systems by assigning specific roles and func-
tions to designated departments and agencies. By 
placing DOD in charge of expendable launch ve-
hicle (ELV) development and NASA in charge of 
continued Space Shuttle operation and RLV de-
velopment, the Administration has taken a step 
toward reducing conflicts and redundancies with-
in government space transportation development 
programs. 
DOD currently spends roughly $1.6 billion 
(about 84 percent) of its $1.9-billion space trans-
portation budget on its HLV program, the Titan 
IV, while NASA spends just over $4 billion per 
year on Space Shuttle modifications and opera-
tions. Each organization has individually initiated 
a set of programs to address the budgetary diffi-
culties posed by these high costs (see table S-l). 
An added dimension to the current effort to de-
velop new space transportation systems is the role 
of the private sector-both in decisionmaking and 
DOD 
NASA 
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TABLE S-1: DOD and NASA Development Programs and Procurements 
program 
Existing ELV 
upgrades 
Evolved Expend-
able Launch 
Vehicle (EELV) 
Space Shuttle 
upgrades 
Med-Lite 
DC-XA 
X-33 
X-34 
Supporting RLV 
technology 
demonstration 
Description 
Upgrades to the current fleet of 
launch systems and supporting 
infrastructure. 
A new, single family of MLVs and 
HLVs based on an evolutionary 
redesign of one or more existing 
ELVs. 
System improvements and replace-
ment of aging subsystems and com-
ponents. 
A launch system with capacity falling 
between existing SLVs and MLVs. 
Upgrades to the DC-X (a vertical-
takeoff/vertical-Ianding, sub-scale, ful-
ly reusable, single-stage-to-orbit 
technology demonstrator) with more 
advanced components. 
A sub-scale advanced technology 
demonstrator that will be, at a mini-
mum, an autonomous, suborbital, 
experimental, single-stage-to-orbit 
RLV. 
A partially reusable demonstration 
vehicle for small payloads. 
Development and validation of 
propulsion, structural, and operations 
technologies. 
Objective 
Keep the existing ELV fleet flying safely and 
reliably. Achieve significant, short-term payoffs 
where possible. 
Lower overall cost of access to space for 
DOD, especially for heavy payloads, by 
using common subsystems, components, and 
infrastructure. 
Keep the Space Shuttle flying safely and 
reliably. 
Acquire a less expensive vehicle to serve 
future planetary exploration mission require-
ments. 
Demonstrate system operability by testing new 
components and the integrated system in a 
realistic flight environment. 
By 2000, prove the concept of a fully reusable 
single-stage-to-orbit space transportation sys-
tem in the high MLV class by demonstrating 
key technology, operations, and reliability in an 
integrated flight vehicle. Encourage private 
investment in a commercial follow-on RLV by 
reducing the technical risks of SSTO. 
Investigate technologies that may be incorpo-
rated into future RLVs. Demonstrate stream-
lined management of joint industry-government 
development effort. Address commercial and 
U.S. government need for an inexpensive SLV. 
Progressively integrate and flight-demonstrate 
these technologies on three experimental test 
vehicles (DC-XA, X-33, and X-34) in order to 1) 
mature technologies required for a next-gen-
eration launch system, 2) demonstrate the ca-
pability to achieve low development and 
operational costs, and rapid launch turn-
arounds, and 3) reduce technical risk to en-
courage private investment in the commercial 
development and operation of next-generation 
systems. 
SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1995. 
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financing. This has important implications on the 
nature of space transportation development pro-
grams and raises an entirely new set of consider-
ations that must be taken into account when 
evaluating development programs proposed by 
both DOD and NASA. 
IE-linin Divided responsibility and 
interagency coordination 
The NSTP divides the government's primary 
responsibilities for space transportation between 
DOD and NASA. If existing space transportation 
assets and those under development are to be man-
aged in a manner conducive to all interests, this di-
vision of responsibility will increase the need for 
both organizations to coordinate with one another, 
as well as with the private sector. 
That DOD and NASA will adequately account 
for the interests of all parties is not a certainty, es-
pecially as funds available for space transporta-
tion diminish. Conflicts over how to approach the 
development of new space transportation systems 
will undoubtedly arise. At present, it appears that 
resolution of these conflicts will be achieved via 
negotiations between DOD and NASA on a case-
by-case basis, possibly with some mediation by a 
third party within the executive branch. Such ne-
gotiations may succeed in satisfying both DOD 
and NASA, but could fail to account for the inter-
ests of all relevant parties, especially those in the 
private sector. 
Such negotiations could also lead to program-
matic redundancies. In the absence of central au-
thority or leadership, DOD and NASA may 
discount potential redundancies and simply con-
tinue to promote those projects that best address 
their own organizational requirements. As a re-
sult, hard space transportation policy choices may 
go unmade. 
Many analysts and policymakers have pro-
posed a central authority as a way to better account 
for all interests and avoid programmatic redun-
dancies. In the Bush Administration, for example, 
Vice President Quayle was given considerable au-
thority over space transportation policy. It is not 
clear, however, that the imposition of a central au-
thority has remedied these problems in the past, or 
that it will necessarily do so in the future. Given 
the considerable bureaucratic and political weight 
of DOD and NASA, competing organizational in-
terests could potentially override the wishes of a 
central authority. Furthermore, existing legal and 
organizational obstacles may prevent the level of 
interagency and private sector coordination 
sought by a central authority. 
The recent controversy between DOD and 
NASA over NASA's Med-Lite procurement may 
be emblematic of this latter problem. This contro-
versy illustrates how interagency coordination 
can be precluded by current law, divergent inter-
pretations of that law, and competing organiza-
tional interests. Therefore, although the NSTP 
calls on DOD and NASA to "combine their [ELV] 
requirements into single procurements when such 
procurements would result in cost savings or are 
otherwise advantageous to the government," 
achieving this level of interagency coordination 
may prove extremely difficult. 
'tlinJlM Potential conflicts and redundancies 
DOD and NASA have collectively proposed a 
sizable portfolio of new space transportation 
technology development programs. While this 
multitrack approach may reduce the overall risk of 
pursuing new space transportation systems, it may 
also lead to potential conflicts and redundancies 
and higher overall costs. For example, develop-
ment of a commercially competitive EELV by 
DOD could undercut NASA's effort to commer-
cialize a follow-on to the X-33 by reducing the in-
centive for private investors to fund a technically 
risky RLV. 
If a low-cost RLV is developed, nonetheless, it 
may be difficult for the EELV program to achieve 
the long-term cost reduction targets set by DOD. 
At a minimum, the RLV will compete with the 
EELV for payloads, possibly attracting payloads 
away from the EELV. Were this to occur, it would 
reduce savings generated by the EEL V program 
by offsetting or potentially outweighing any gains 
in production volume created by commonality 
within the EELV family. 
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A for NASA's dual-track RLV development 
t
s y the Agency believes that early X-34 test 
stra eg , 
fl· hts could positively affect X-33 development Ig . f . hn I by steering it toward or away rom certam tec 0-
ogies. Moreover, proponents note that the X-34 
could generate significant benefits for the govern-
ment, industry, and consumers of space-based ser-
vices if its target of threefold cost reductions for 
launching small payloads are achieved. 
Critics, however, have suggested canceling the 
X-34 program, arguing that it is geared toward de-
veloping an operational vehicle, not an exper-
imental vehicle, and that its cancellation would 
not affect the technological success of the X-33 
program. 
There are other potential conflicts and redun-
dancies. In particular, DOD officials are con-
cerned that the Med-Lite vehicle might eventually 
compete with the EELV for medium payloads, 
thereby threatening the ability of the EELV pro-
gram to achieve maximum launch cost reductions 
for DOD. In addition, NASA has proposed to 
phase in any newly developed RLV follow-on to 
the X-33 between 2005 and 2012 while continu-
ing to fly the Space Shuttle in support of the In-
ternational Space Station. 
niiu,tj HLVs drive the EELV program 
DOD currently spends $1.6 billion of its 
$1.9-billion space transportation budget on its 
HLV program. Therefore, DOD has geared the 
EEL V program toward achieving significant HLV 
cost reductions. DOD's focus on HLV cost reduc-
tions, however, ignores the need of U.S. launch 
providers to develop a commercially competitive 
launch vehicle in the hotly contested MLV mar-
ket. While the EELV program may reduce MLV 
costs by as much as 10 percent, such a cost reduc-
tion would probably not help the EELV manufac-
turer recapture a significant portion of the global 
market for launch services. And without an in-
creased share of the available market, DOD will 
receive little, if any, additional price reductions 
generated by larger production volumes. 
On the other hand, the European Space 
Agency's (ESA's) development of the heavy-lift 
Ariane 5 suggests that significant HLV cost reduc-
tions may be commercially attractive. It is unlike-
ly, however, that the heavy-lift EELV will be 
inexpensive enough to compete with the Ariane 5, 
even if it achieves a 40 percent cost reduction over 
the Titan IV. 
niiUVI RLV development 
NASA has pointed to its RLV development 
strategy as one example of its "new way of doing 
business." Outside of NASA, however, some have 
expressed concern over NASA's proposed RLV 
development strategy. In particular, industry offi-
cials are concerned that property and data rights 
issues, as well as the uncertainty surrounding the 
distribution of core RLV technology development 
funds, may slow or prevent RLV commercializa-
tion. 
Other analysts and policymakers believe the 
X-33 program should be structured differently. 
Some critics have argued that the X-33 is being 
designed in the shadow cast by future require-
ments for the International Space Station, and that 
it would be better if NASA opted to fund fully an 
X-33 program that focuses solely on demonstrat-
ing single-stage-to-orbit (SSTO) technology. 
NASA officials believe the X-33 does focus on 
demonstrating SSTO technology, but contend that 
industry investment is appropriate because the 
successful development of a low-cost, commer-
cial RLV will significantly improve the competi-
tiveness of the U.S. space transportation industry, 
and because government space budgets are declin-
ing. 
Others critics of the X-33 program structure 
have suggested a competitive fly-off among com-
peting X-33 concepts, a strategy in which NASA 
has expressed some interest. Proponents of a fly-
off believe that it would decrease the possibility of 
choosing the "wrong" technology and increase the 
likelihood of retaining competition in the domes-
tic launch vehicle industry. Critics note, however, 
that a fly-off strategy would require larger near-
term budgets than currently planned. 
Another concern surrounding RL V develop-
ment has been the role of DOD payloads and 
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whether or not they will be used during the early 
testing of a commercial RLV. NASA and its com-
mercial partners will need a sufficient number of 
payloads to both prove the reliability of RLV 
technology and attract potential investors. DOD 
officials, however, do not wish to repeat their neg-
ative experiences with the Space Shuttle and are, 
therefore, hesitant to contribute DOD payloads to 
the RLV until it is proven. Unless NASA and its 
industry partners can entice other payloads to fly 
aboard an RLV, DOD's reluctance could potential-
ly drive up the price oflaunching payloads on the 
RLV. 
Iti#lJjtj SSTO? 
SSTO development entails significant techni-
cal risks. NASA has proposed a phased SSTO 
technology maturation program that periodically 
pauses along the way to determine the prudence of 
continuing. In the event the pursuit of SSTO is ter-
minated at any point, NASA suggests that other 
RLV concepts (e.g., two-stages-to-orbit or TSTO 
systems) can then be considered and that new 
RLV efforts could possibly draw on past SSTO 
technology development efforts. 
Some analysts and policymakers have taken is-
sue with this approach, arguing that it grants too 
much upfront attention to the SSTO concept. 
They note that pursuing another RLV concept 
such as TSTO after investing significant resources 
in SSTO risks a suboptimal result that does not 
achieve the desired level of cost reductions. 
Also, there has been some concern that NASA 
has not adequately defined its criteria for judging 
the success of the X-33 program. NASA, in con-
junction with the Office of Science and Technolo-
gy Policy and the Office of Management and 
Budget, has established criteria to support deci-
sions in 1996 and 2000. Nevertheless, some ana-
lysts and policymakers are concerned that these 
criteria are insufficient and suggest that NASA 
provide Congress with a set of specific intermedi-
ate criteria for evaluating the success of the X-33 
program on an annual basis. Such a requirement 
may, however, slow the development process. 
Finally, although NASA has claimed that it 
must pursue block upgrades to the Space Shuttle if 
the government or industry decides in 2000 to for-
go development of a commercial RLV follow-on 
to the X -33, there are other alternatives. For exam-
ple, NASA could decide to extend SSTO develop-
ment efforts, initiate TSTO development efforts, 
support development of a commercial TSTO, pur-
sue block upgrades to the Space Shuttle, commis-
sion a new space transportation study, or 
reconsider alternative options already examined 
in past studies. Which alternative NASA chooses 
in coordination with its industry partners will de-
pend on the progress made during the X-33 pro-
gram, as well as the commercial prospects of an 
RLV. 
Iti#IJJlI Space Shuttle-beyond 2000 
As noted, NASA may decide in 2000 to pursue 
block upgrades to the Space Shuttle in order to en-
sure safe operations until 2020. Discussions with 
both NASA and industry officials reveal, how-
ever, that little planning for this possibility and 
little investigation into whether or not the indus-
trial base will be able to support these upgrades are 
currently being done by NASA. 
In its implementation plan, NASA has pro-
posed replacing the existing solid rocket boosters 
(SRBs) with Liquid Fly Back Boosters (LFBBs) 
between 2007 and 2010. NASA claims that 
LFBBs would increase Shuttle safety, payload 
performance, and launch probability, and would 
also reduce annual Shuttle operating costs 
compared with SRBs. The implementation plan 
does not, however, outline any contingencies to 
address the significant impact that replacing 
SRBs with LFBBs might have on the solid rocket 
motor industry and the nation's continued ability 
to produce long-range ballistic missiles. 
Finally, there remains the prospect of another 
Space Shuttle accident that results in the loss of an 
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. Such a loss would have major repercus-OrbIter. 
. fior both the Space Shuttle and X-33 pro-Sions 
grams. 
I Fundamental Objective #2: 
U.S. Use of Foreign Launch 
Systems and Components 
The NSTP encourages federal agencies to take ad-
vantage of foreign technologies in U.S. space 
transportation systems. It also limits the flight of 
U.S. government payloads to U.S. space trans-
portation systems, in effect removing U.S. gov-
ernment payloads from the available international 
marketplace for launch services. In this, it follows 
past policy. In addition, the policy allows the 
launch of government payloads on foreign launch 
vehicles if they are made available on a no-ex-
change-of-funds basis and if they support coop-
erative scientific programs. 
$140#4 The use of foreign launch technology 
The use of foreign technologies in U.S. space 
transportation systems may improve the efficien-
cies of U.S. launch systems, assist U.S. access to 
space, and improve U.S. competitiveness in the 
international space transportation market. With 
the important exception of the Space Shuttle and 
its main engines, the United States has done rela-
tively little launch system R&D since the 1960s. 
The use of foreign technologies in U.S. space 
transportation systems could reduce the amount of 
R&D now required of U.S. firms in efforts to im-
prove the performance and reduce the costs of 
U.S. systems. Russian launch vehicles and related 
systems (particularly propulsion) have significant 
potential for commercial use. Russian hardware 
and space transportation skills can fill important 
gaps in U.S. capabilities. The United States might 
benefit from European space transportation 
technologies as well. 
On the other hand, U.S. national security inter-
ests demand that the United States maintain a vi-
able national launch capability and technology 
base. The use of foreign technologies might re-
duce the incentives for maintaining the domestic 
R&D that underlies that technology base. 
The simple purchase of either vehicles or 
launch services appears to be less attractive than 
joint ventures, co-production of vehicles and/or 
systems, and analogous business arrangements, as 
ways of harmonizing these differing interests. For 
example, Aerojet and Pratt and Whitney, both 
U.S. manufacturers of liquid-fueled engines, are 
exploring ways in which to capitalize on the use of 
Russian liquid-fueled engines in U.S. vehicles.6 
U .S.launch operations experts have expressed in-
terest in Russian and European methods to reduce 
operations costs. In its implementation plan, DOD 
has expressed openness to the use of foreign 
technologies in U.S. launch vehicles, but only un-
der conditions that would protect the supply of 
critical components should foreign sources be-
come unavailable. Each proposed technology in-
sertion would be judged on a case-by-case basis. 
Methods to protect component supply, such as 
stockpiling critical components or duplicating 
production lines in the United States would likely 
result in higher costs to the government, but might 
ensure that the United States will be able to fulfill 
its space-related national security needs in times 
of crisis. Officials of Arianespace have offered to 
sell the Ariane 5, or license rights to build it, to ser-
vice U.S. HLV needs. Such an arrangement could 
substantially reduce the costs of building and op-
erating a U.S. HLV.1 However, building a vehicle 
under license might inhibit the development of 
new U.S. technology that could be used to im-
prove the U.S. MLV fleet. 
Experts disagree over the extent to which coop-
eration with the Russian government and industry 
on space projects would affect U.S. competitive-
6 Michael A. Domheim, "Aerojet Imports Trod NK-33 Rocket Engine," Aviation Week and Space Technology, Oct. 25, 1993, p. 29; and 
Jeffrey M. Lenorovitz, "Pratt Signs Accord with NPO Energomash," Aviation Week and Space Technology, Nov. 2, 1992, pp. 25-26. 
7 Ben Ionatta and Cheri Privor, "Arianespace's EELV Proposal Finds Little Favor," Space News, Apr. 10, 1995, p. 3. 
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ness and the retention of U.S. jobs. Some industry 
officials, for example, express concern that the 
United States could lose employment in the 
launch services industry if Russian technology 
were used extensively in U.S. launch systems. 
Others have argued that skillful incorporation of 
Russian technologies in U.S. systems could save 
taxpayer dollars in publicly funded programs like 
the International Space Station and boost U.S. in-
ternational competitiveness in commercial pro-
grams. Greater competitiveness might generate 
new jobs in space transportation and space-related 
fields, partially or fully offsetting job losses due to 
the use of foreign technology. 
Second-, third-, and fourth-tier launch system 
equipment suppliers appear to be most vulnerable 
to the extensive use of Russian technology in U.S. 
launch systems, especially those that now supply 
subsystems and parts for U.S. propulsion systems. 
Loss of critical skills in the lower tiers of the space 
transportation industrial base may, in some 
instances, adversely affect the nation's ability to 
maintain assured domestic access to space and re-
constitute production of long-range ballistic mis-
siles. Nevertheless, reducing the cost of access to 
space may well lead to more aerospace jobs as a 
whole. 
Some observers worry that given the precarious 
state of the Russian economy and government, 
Russian equipment suppliers may not be able to 
sustain their ability to produce space goods and 
services.8 Russian firms, recently privatized and 
undergoing massive restructuring, have experi-
enced difficulties in moving to a demand-driven, 
market-oriented economy. Concern over the fu-
ture ability of Russian firms to perform could be 
eased, in part, if Russian firms successfully dem-
onstrate that they can produce goods and services 
on time and within the terms of cooperative con-
tracts with the U.S. government and industry. The 
existing cooperative activities between NASA 
and the Russian Space Agency, especially with re-
gard to construction and operation of the Interna-
tional Space Station, will provide considerable 
insight into the long-term viability of the Russian 
space transportation industry.9 
The NSTP also allows the use offoreign launch 
systems to carry U.S. instruments and spacecraft 
on ano-exchange-of-funds basis when supporting 
cooperative programs with other countries. Ex-
amples of such cooperative use of non-U.S. 
launchers include the shipment of U.S. equipment 
to the Russian Mir space station aboard a Russian 
Spektr spacecraft launched on a Russian Proton 
launch vehicle in May 1995, and the earlier launch 
of the TOPEXIPoseidon spacecraft on an Ariane 4 
in 1992. Such use can sharply reduce U.S. costs 
for science programs and may facilitate some 
projects that might otherwise not be flown, but 
could deprive U.S. launch providers of a few 
launch opportunities. The launching country 
gains by receiving access to data generated by the 
U.S.-built, or jointly built, instrument or space-
craft. 
It.iiY#.iM International trade in launch services 
In keeping with broader U.S. international 
trade principles, the NSTP seeks to achieve free 
and fair trade in launch services. However, as a re-
sult of the close connections between defense and 
launch system technologies, and the desire to 
achieve or retain autonomy in launch services, all 
spacefaring nations subsidize their launch ser-
vices industry to some extent. Because the eco-
nomic structure of each country is different, it is 
difficult to determine the true extent of the subsidy 
each extends to its launch industry. In addition, 
each spacefaring country generally reserves gov-
ernment payloads for its own launch systems. For 
example, in keeping with past U.S. policies, the 
NSTP requires that U.S. government payloads fly 
8 Judyth L. Twigg, "The Russian Space Program: What Lies Ahead?" Space Policy 1 O( 1): 19-31, 1994. 
9 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, U.S.-Russian Cooperation in Space, OTA-ISS-61S (Washington, DC: U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, April 1995). 
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£SA developed the Ariane l~unch system in the 
late 1970s. Specifically deSIgned to carry pay-
loads to geosynchronous Earth orbit (GEO), and 
marketed by the European corporation Ariane-
space, the Ariane s~stem was designed. an? built 
on the premise that It would capture a sIgmficant 
share of the available world market in commercial 
payload launch services. Since the loss of the 
Space Shuttle Challenger in January 1986, Arian-
espace has garnered a dominant share of the in-
ternational commercial payload market. lO 
During the late 1980s, China and Russia (then 
the Soviet Union) began to offer launch services 
on the international market, increasing the com-
petitive pressure on the U.S. commercial launch 
services industry. Faced with growing competi-
tion in launch services, increasing concern that 
launch systems built in non-market economies 
would unfairly compete with U.S. launch sys-
tems, and pressure from U.S. satellite manufactur-
ers to allow the launch of U.S.-built satellites on 
Chinese and Russian launch systems, the United 
States sought and obtained launch service agree-
ments with China and Russia. 
In addition to setting limits on the total number 
of Chinese and Russian launches within a speci-
fied period, the agreements attempt to establish 
rules by which the market will operate. The 
United States is able to exert influence over trade 
in launch services because it sells more satellites 
on the international market than any other country. 
Russia and China have signed trade agreements 
because the United States could severely restrict 
the international sale of U.S.-manufactured satel-
lites launched on other countries' vehicles. The 
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) is 
the U.S. agent in negotiating these agreements. 
U.S. satellite manufacturers have begun to 
pressure the USTR to relax or do away with the ex-
isting restrictions on the number of Russian com-
mercial launches allowed between now and the 
end of the century. They have been joined by U.S. 
partners of Russian launch companies, which 
would profit from relaxed restrictions. Existing 
and planned partnerships between U.S. and Rus-
sian companies are likely to complicate U.S. con-
siderations of these agreements, making it much 
more difficult to assess overall benefits and draw-
backs of changes in the agreements. 11 Relaxation 
of the U.S.-Russia agreement would make the 
launch services market more competitive. It might 
also undercut the ability of U.S. launch service 
providers to compete and indirectly raise the costs 
of space transportation services to the federal gov-
ernment. 
Arianespace, which now commands the largest 
share of the commercial launch services market, 
may be more affected by a relaxation of the U .S.-
Russia launch services agreement than U.S. firms. 
Although a relaxation of the agreement would in-
crease the competitive pressures on U.S. launch 
companies not now associated with Russian com-
panies (such as McDonnell Douglas, which mar-
kets the Delta ML V, and Orbital Sciences, which 
markets the Pegasus and Taurus SLVs), those com-
panies launch payloads for the U.S. government 
and therefore would retain a strong core market for 
launch services. Lockheed Martin, which markets 
the Atlas ELV, also markets the Russian Proton 
IOPri 
or to the loss of Challenger, NASA actively marketed commercial launch services on the government-owned and -operated Space 
~huttle. In August 1986, President Reagan issued a policy directive limiting the use of the Shuttle to payloads that required the unique capabili-
ties of the Shuttle. 
II C . C 
ralg ovault, "Russian Proton Challenges Ariane," Aviation Week and Space Technology, Apr. 24, 1995, pp. 40-43. 
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through LKE International. Lockheed Martin in-
tends to use the two vehicles to back each other up, 
should one be temporarily removed from service 
to correct a system failure. 
,tiimt.m Technology transfer and foreign 
policy objectives 
Cooperative ventures risk transferring domes-
tic technologies that could be used to strengthen 
a competitor's position in the international aero-
space market and to assist belligerent countries in 
developing the means of delivering weapons of 
mass destruction (nuclear, chemical, and biologi-
cal weapons). Experts disagree over how effective 
means to prevent such transfer can really be, but 
present policy clearly moves toward loosening 
trade restrictions. For example, many items hav-
ing to do with satellites and satellite technology 
have been moved from the U.S. Munitions List 
onto the Commerce Control List, effectively mak-
ing it easier to trade in those items. Further loosen-
ing of restrictions could result in improved U.S. 
trade in space transportation technologies. On the 
other hand, the United States must also remain 
sensitive to the potential proliferation of missile-
related technologies. 12 
U.S. cooperative agreements with other coun-
tries must conform with related U.S. obligations 
and treaties, such as technology transfer policies 
and the Missile Technology Control Regime 
(MTCR), which was developed in 1987 to limit 
proliferation oflong-range delivery systems capa-
ble of delivering weapons of mass destruction. 
Admittance to the U.S. satellite market has be-
come a tool in encouraging adherence by China, 
Russia, and Ukraine to the MTCR. Russia and 
Ukraine have agreed to join the MTCR. The Clin-
ton Administration believes that helping the Rus-
sian civilian space program stay as healthy as 
possible and capable of retaining its experts will 
reduce global proliferation of missile technology. 
China has declined to join the MTCR, but has 
agreed to abide by its restrictions. However, the 
United States has raised several issues of noncom-
pliance with Chinese officials. On October 4, 
1994, the United States and China agreed to "work 
together to promote missile nonproliferation 
through a step-by-step approach to resolve differ-
ences over missile exports."13 The United States 
could levy sanctions against the Chinese launch 
company, including prohibition of satellite 
launches, if the United States found that the entity 
was selling missile-related technology to a coun-
try that did not previously possess such tech-
nology. 
I Fundamental Objective #3: 
The Use of Excess Ballistic Missiles 
The NSTP reserves use of excess ballistic missiles 
for government payloads only, and only when 
their use results in cost savings to the government 
over the use of commercial launch services. Ex-
cess ballistic missiles can be used by the govern-
ment for engineering tests and suborbital flights, 
but orbital flights that might compete with private 
launch services must satisfy tough conditions be-
fore they are allowed. 
Some 650 long-range ballistic missiles will be 
made available by U.S. adherence to the first Stra-
tegic Arms Reduction Talks treaty alone. These 
missiles, and others to be retired under other trea-
ties, could be used to launch government and com-
mercial satellites into orbit. Even if the missiles 
themselves are not used, parts of the missiles and 
the tooling for building those parts could be useful 
to industry. 
12 U.s. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Export Controls and Nonproliferation Policy, OTA-ISS-596 (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, May 1994). 
13 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, "Joint United States-People's Republic of China Statement on Missile Proliferation," 
Fact Sheet, Oct. 4, 1994. 
The National Space Transportation Policy: Issues for Congress 113 
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I;te8tIOn? " '1" t" Clinton AdministratIOn ~ po ICY ~on mues 
1be h Administration's pollcy of oghtly re-*B~ bll" " 
saricling the use of excess 10nthg-rangakie" a thlSOC 
misSiles. Some analysts ~gue at m ng ese 
misSiles more widely avaIlable for use as space 
)aunch systems would not only save much needed 
government resources, but could also demonstrate 
the viability of new markets for SLY s. Others ar-
gue however, that although such a scheme might 
sav; the taxpayers money in the short term, it 
might also dnve cornrnerci~l SLY ve~dors from 
the market, leaving the U.S. mdustry wIth no SLY 
producers in the long term. " 
There is a lack of data on how much It would 
cost to convert surplus ballistic missiles for new 
payloads, how useful these missiles might be for 
more delicate payloads, and how SLY providers 
might maintain their ability to develop new sys-
tems should converted ballistic missiles be priced 
below current SLVs. Those questions must be an-
swered before the debate on how to use excess bal-
listic missiles can be resolved. 
E-iil)#lM Russian excess ballistic missiles 
In contrast to American policy regarding sur-
plus missiles assets, former Soviet Union firms 
are promoting a number of converted interconti-
nental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-
launched ballistic missiles for an assortment of 
commercial duties. Two already on the market are 
the Start-1 and the Rokot, derived from the SS-25 
and SS-19 ICBMs, respectively. 
Russia's use of its excess ballistic missiles as 
SLY s has not yet proven to be a viable commercial 
strategy. If Russia is successful in marketing its 
surplus ballistic missiles, however, U.S. SLY 
launch service providers will face international 
competition from Russian excess ballistic mis-
siles, while the U.S. government will receive none 
of the benefits of selling its stockpiles. 
I Fundamental Objective #4: 
The Private Sector Role in 
Space Transportation Decisionmaking 
The private sector is expected to playa crucial role 
in accomplishing many of the space transportation 
goals set forth in the NSTP and the supporting im-
plementation plans. It is, for example, designated 
to be a source of: 1) significant funding in a fiscal-
ly constrained budget environment; 2) expertise to 
manage space launch activities more efficiently; 
and 3) innovative ideas and products in the design 
and development of future space transportation 
systems. Placing greater reliance on the private 
sector is in keeping with general trends that em-
phasize reducing government's responsibilities in 
areas in which the private sector might reasonably 
be expected to provide the desired goods and ser-
vices. 
But the private sector is not a monolithic entity 
with a single coherent view of space transporta-
tion needs or the goals outlined in the NSTP. 
While the principal prime contractors for space 
transportation are in general agreement on many 
aspects of the Clinton Administration's space 
transportation policy, they have different views 
about the implications of particular elements of 
policy. Additionally, some subtier firms are skep-
tical about the potential for the government to 
achieve the goals of the NSTP. 
The willingness and, indeed, the ability of pri-
vate sector firms to fulfill the roles suggested in 
the national space transportation planning docu-
ments depend in many instances on factors that 
possess a great deal of uncertainty and are difficult 
to estimate accurately (e.g., the size and character 
of the future commercial space transportation 
market) and that are highly dependent on actions 
by the government (e.g., the nature of any govern-
ment-industry partnership). These facts raise sev-
eral issues that Congress might wish to consider in 
evaluating the role that the private sector plays in 
implementing the Administration's policy. 
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1/.."$-11).4 Will the estimated market support 
policy goals? 
In the absence of a major increase in the govern-
ment's space transportation budget, private sector 
investment is viewed as essential for the develop-
ment and production of an RLV follow-on to the 
X-33 possessing the characteristics desired by 
NASA. But any private sector investment de-
pends on the potential for sufficient return on that 
investment to make it attractive. The assessment 
of the size, character, availability, and relationship 
(potential overlap) of future space transportation 
markets is therefore critical to industry's attitude 
toward new launch vehicle development pro-
grams and government cost-sharing arrange-
ments. 
The current industry assessment of the space 
transportation market appears to be that the poten-
tial market for commercial payloads in the MLV 
class is by itself insufficient to entice enough pri-
vate sector investment to build a future RLV capa-
ble of meeting NASA's needs. 
Current analysis indicates that the government 
is likely to continue to be the largest single market 
for U.S. space transportation for at least the next 
10 to 15 years. Expansion of the commercial mar-
ket in areas such as communications and earth ob-
servation is probable, but the size and rapidity of 
such expansion is uncertain. A number of poten-
tial new markets, such as space manufacturing and 
tourism, are on the horizon, but the size and speed 
of development of these markets are uncertain. 
This uncertainty about future markets inhibits pri-
vate sector investment. 
Industry analysis indicates that the potential 
commercial market for small payloads may be 
sufficient to attract enough private sector invest-
ment to develop vehicles to meet both commercial 
and government needs for small payloads. The 
willingness offirms to invest in the X-34 program 
supports this conclusion. 
U.S. industry sees little commercial need for 
heavy lift and views this as principally a govern-
ment market. The private sector is unlikely to put 
much of its own funds in this area without strong 
government support. Some observers note, how-
ever, that Arianespace plans to replace its me-
dium-lift Ariane 4 with the heavy-lift Ariane 5. 
Such assessments imply that if the government 
desires an RL V replacement for the Space Shuttle, 
it will have to provide a significant amount of the 
funding---either through a direct development 
and procurement process or through some form of 
guaranteed business. 
It"$-1U¥t1M The nature of the government-
industry space transportation partnership 
The NSTP and implementation plans stress the 
need for closer government-industry coopera-
tion-what NASA terms a partnership. Govern-
ment planners believe that a more important role 
for industry in decisionmaking is essential if in-
dustry is going to be asked to help finance much 
of the production of a future medium-to-heavy-lift 
RLV. There are, however, a number of questions 
about the nature of any new government-industry 
relationship and the possible implications of clos-
er ties between the government and any particular 
firm. 
There appear to be a number of advantages to 
closer cooperation between government and in-
dustry. One is a potentially more efficient and less 
costly management structure. Another benefit is 
more effective use of the nation's public and pri-
vate sector space transportation industry's techni-
cal expertise and facilities. But closer cooperation 
raises serious questions about who decides what 
research topics to pursue, which efforts will be 
funded, who will own the technical data rights re-
sulting from this partnership, and how these rights 
might be transferred if such transfer appears to 
benefit the government. These questions and 
many others will have to be addressed if a partner-
ship is to be successful. 
Each government organization appears to have 
different expectations for the government-indus-
try relationship. The designated advocates of in-
creased commercial participation are the DOT and 
DOC, but with little money and small staffs, these 
two Departments are likely to playa limited role. 
NASA needs private sector investment to build a 
new RLV. It is, therefore, interested in policies 
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that will provide support f~r industry, as well as 
. ntives for industry to Invest. It has stream-
r-c:d its program management, changed funding ~es, and made its research staff available to in-
dustry. 
DOD, in contrast to NASA, does not have the 
same perceived need for a new space launch ve-
hicle to perform its missions. Its current capabili-
ties are more costly and less flexible than desired, 
but they perform well enough to meet the Depart-
ment's fundamental mission requirements. DOD 
therefore appears less concerned about develop-
ing a close partnership with industry than is 
NASA. 
IM4Uili Risk management-striking the 
proper balance 
Uncertainties about the future space transporta-
tion markets increase the need for private sector 
firms to protect any investment against losses. 
With estimates on the cost of development and 
production of a future medium-to-heavy-lift RLV 
ranging from $6 billion to $20 billion, many in in-
dustry are supporting the concept of anchor tenan-
cy (e.g., committing the federal government to 
purchase an agreed upon amount of launch ser-
vices from commercial firms) as a means of en-
couraging industry to invest in RLV development 
and production. By providing a guaranteed mar-
ket for a specific period, anchor tenancy would re-
duce investment risk for the private sector during 
the formation of a more robust commercial mar-
ket. A recent example of a commercial anchor ten-
ancy is McDonnell Douglas' agreement to 
develop a Delta III ELV in exchange for a commit-
ment by Hughes Telecommunications and Space 
Co. to purchase 10 future launches. 
There are a number of issues that must be ad-
dressed. One is that a program based on anchor 
tenancy might be considered a "lease-purchase" 
arrangement. This could make the arrangement 
problematic because current government account-
ing rules require that such an arrangement be re-
corded in the budget as if the government 
purchases the assets outright. The discounted val-
ue of the expected costs of space launch services 
would be recorded as budget authority when the 
contract was signed. Outlays would be recorded 
(scored) in proportion to the construction activity 
on the launchers, as if the government were build-
ing the system. 
Other observers argue that there is a need for 
new thinking in anchor tenancy, particularly when 
the government is slated to be less involved in the 
development of goods and services that might 
come from the private sector. They argue that an-
chor tenancy might be successfully used if the sit-
uation is one in which there is little technological 
risk, the contractor is taking the risk of perfor-
mance, the contractor is financing the project, and 
the contractor has design control. Competitive 
bidding to help establish the market assessment Of 
risk is also important. 
Several industry representatives have argued 
that the basis for an anchor tenancy arrangement 
needs to be established by April 1996, when in-
dustry must begin to commit significant funds to-
ward the development of the X-33 technology 
demonstrator. Without this commitment, industry 
may still participate in the X-33 program, but will 
probably reduce its share of the investment. 
Industry also argues that termination liability 
(e.g., requiring the government to compensate in-
dustry should the government cancel a launch 
contract for its own convenience) is essential for 
reducing the risk to the private sector of entering 
into a long-term launch service agreement with 
the government. Skeptics have argued that such 
arrangements amount to providing a "risk-free" 
environment for U.S. business. Still, termination 
liability usually does not provide for loss of future 
revenue, only for money already spent. Thus firms 
continue to risk the loss of future returns on the 
money invested and bear the opportunity cost of 
not having invested the money elsewhere, even if 
compensation for funds already spent is guaran-
teed. 
l£.iilJ=tM'nfrastructure 
Many analysts argue that significant launch 
cost savings might be realized through changes in 
launch operations and infrastructure. Some have 
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gested building new, more generic launch faci-Is~~ s MatlY analysts indicate that important Itie . . . 
1 nch cost reductions are unlikely unless launch 
au rationS engineers and facility managers have a 
ope ter role in the design of future launch sys-
greas 14 Efficient launch operations are key com-tenl . & • 
·tive advantages lor both Ananespace and ~~~sia. A future RLV may have a completely dif-
£ ent lautlch infrastructure than that ofELVs. 
er Because of the importance of the impact of 
1 ch serVices and infrastructure to long-term aun · 1 .. government costs an . chommercIa ~omlPetlt1ve-
s Congress may WIS to pay partiCU ar atten-
neS , ... h fi 1 k d tion to activIties 10 t ese 0 ten over 00 e. areas. 
Q estions of how future space transportatIOn sys-
tI s will operate and how such operations will 
tern . . . h 
e moneY 10 comparIson WIt current opera-
saY b k . h . tions migbt e ey oversig tIssues. 
m-un,d Accommodating commercial needs 
Many in industry express concern over the ex-
t to wbich development of new space trans-
teJlrtation systems will be influenced by rigid 
po ernmeOt space launch and payload require-
govnts radler than by accommodation of com-me ...
mercial space transportatIOn competitiveness 
siderati0ns. For example, although NASA has 
con. d d tructured ItS program management an ma e a 
resmber of procedural changes that can aid devel-
nu ment itS program may still be best structured to 
oPoduc~ aO RLV that will serve the U.S. govern-
pr nt's space transportation needs fIrst-rather ~:n producing a commercially viable vehicle that 
'11 also meet government needs. 
WI Part of we problem is the NASA requirement to 
any creWs to and from the International Space 
~ tion. Ailother part of the problem is the inabil-
. ta to defipe what might be commercially viable. ~1 me industry representatives have noted, for ex-
;ple the peed to design commercial vehicles to 
rye fue GEO market. This might result in very 
~~fferent designs from those optimized for 
NASA's International Space Station rmSSlon. 
These issues will need to be resolved if the pro-
grams are to meet their objectives. 
I Additional Issues for Congress 
Two important issues were not addressed by either 
the NSTP or its implementation plans, but warrant 
consideration by Congress. These are the pres-
ervation of long-range ballistic missile capabili-
ties and the status of the lower tiers of the space 
transportation technology and industrial base. 
lI-i-iOO,.. Preservation of long-range ballistic 
missile capabilities 
The U.S. Navy plans to procure the last long-
range ballistic missile in the strategic nuclear arse-
nal in 2005. No plans currently exist to produce 
any additional missiles after that time. Without 
producing missiles, however, the United States' 
ability and capacity to design and produce long-
range ballistic missiles will deteriorate unless sig-
nifIcant efforts are made to preserve them. 
Both the U.S. Air Force and the Navy have 
preservation programs underway, but they are 
limited to a small set of critical components. Solid 
rocket motor technology may be particularly 
threatened. At present, all U.S. long-range ballis-
tic missiles use solid rocket motors. If both the 
EEL V and RLV designs use only liquid-fueled en-
gines, and if liquid-fueled boosters replace the 
Space Shuttle's solid rocket motors, the market 
for large solid rocket motors in the United States 
may all but disappear. 
lI-i-iUU The invisible lower industrial tiers 
Current policy focuses on the large prime con-
tractors, but there is more to the U.S. space trans-
portation industry than just those fIrms. Hundreds 
of smaller fIrms provide subsystems and compo-
nents, to the extent that about 50 cents of every 
procurement dollar flows down to these lower ti-
ers of the industry. 
14 See u.s. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Reducing Launch Operations Costs: New Technologies and Practices, OTA-1M-
ISC-28 (Wasbillgton, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1988). 
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'A fi nd that many of the lower-tier firms Or. ou . . 
ssimistic about their chances .of survival. 
are pe believe that the government IS not com-!!:~ to the actual completion of new launch ve-
. 1 and that research and development money hie es, . 
·11 ot find its way past the pnme contractors. 
WI n ·d h h Congress may wish to consl er w at t e 
hances are that some of these lower-tier firms ~ght be forced out of business, and what effect 
that is likely to have on the United States' ability 
to compete in the international market. If all the 
companies that produce a particular component or 
material critical to the space transportation indus-
try go out of business because of lack of funds 
from the upper-tier firms, it could be very difficult 
and expensive to regain the capability to produce 
that component again. 
CRITICAL DECISION POINTS 
Each of the space transportation policy imple-
mentation plans was accompanied by an idealized 
timeline. While each department and agency was 
careful to say that the timelines were not set in 
stone, they do provide policymakers with some 
sense of the important decisions that await them 
and some of the hidden problems they may face in 
a few short years. Table S-2lists some of the more 
critical decision points and their potential im-
plications. Changes in political leadership, new 
space program goals, stretched out or terminated 
programs, unforeseen technical difficulties, and 
launch failures are just a few events that could dra-
matically alter the timing of these important deci-
sions. 
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TABLE S-2: Critical Decision Points and Their Possible Implications 
Date 
1995 
1996 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2000+ 
2001 
2001/2 
2005 
2005 
2005 
2012 
Decision or event 
Corporate investment strategies 
for X-33 and X-34 development 
programs must be formulated. 
Down-selection for Phase II of 
X-33 single-stage-to-orbit 
demonstration vehicle. 
Down-selection to one EELV 
producer. 
X-34 RLV demonstration vehicle 
flight tests are completed. 
Government decision required to 
pursue either a manned RLV vari-
ant or major block upgrades to 
the Space Shuttle. 
Corporate decision to build a 
commercial RLV. 
Medium EELV becomes 
operational. 
Trade agreements with Russia/ 
China expire. 
Heavy EELV becomes operational. 
Limited RLV flights commence. 
Last of the current generation of 
long-range ballistic missiles is 
produced. 
International Space Station is 
scheduled to cease operation just 
as a manned RLV replaces the 
Space Shuttle or block upgrades 
of the Shuttle commence. 
SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1995. 
Possible implications 
Corporate evaluation that government programs are unlikely to transpire as 
advertised could result in inadequate corporate investment, creating a self-
fulfilling prophesy. 
Industry participation in Phase II may require early government commitment 
to and legislative action on cost and risk sharing on the follow-on operational 
RLV. This is four years before NASA's specified 2000 decision on Space 
Shuttle upgrades (see below). Contract winner has an advantage for produc-
tion of follow-on RLV, unless other companies invest in their own competitive 
vehicles or the contract winner fails to meet program performance and cost 
objectives. 
Contract winner will develop family of medium-to-heavy vehicles for DOD, 
perhaps consolidating U.S. ELV business to one firm. Med-Lite winner, how-
ever, may compete at lower payload range. 
A successful X-34 producer could potentially dominate the SLV market if sig-
nificant per flight price reductions are achieved. U.S. government costs for 
SLVs drops. New markets may develop for LEO light satellites if X-34 produc-
er drastically lowers per flight prices. 
A premature decision to develop a manned RLV could result in a less-than-
revolutionary vehicle. Spending on major upgrades to the Shuttle could indefi-
nitely postpone RLV development to the detriment of government launch ex-
penditures and U.S. competitiveness in the commercial launch market. 
Size of government market and government commitment to RLV producer 
may lead producer to focus exclusively on government needs, at the expense 
of capturing and creating commercial markets. Alternatively, RLV producer 
may choose to construct two vehicles or a single vehicle with optional strap-
on boosters to accommodate heavy government payloads and medium com-
mercial payloads. 
A maximum 10-percent cost savings from new MLV improves U.S. position in 
the commercial market, but not enough to hold off Russian and Chinese com-
petition. To ensure success of its EELV program, DOD may avoid early partici-
pation on RLV flights, limiting the customer base for potential RLV investors. 
Unless new agreements are negotiated, U.S. launch providers find them-
selves at a severe priCing disadvantage. Without an RLV or greater than ex-
pected savings from a medium EELV, launch providers may find themselves 
unable to compete in the commercial market. 
A maximum 40-percent savings on new HLV results in substantial cost sav-
ings to the government. Potential for the development of a multipayload ver-
sion, like the Ariane 5, for limited, expensive commercial use. 
RLV begins direct competition for flights with the Space Shuttle, the EELV 
family, and other ELVs. 
Lack of development or production programs may result in loss of ability to 
make new ballistic missiles without significant startup costs and delays. Move 
of industry to all liquid-fueled boosters on the Space Shuttle, EELV, and future 
RLVs would all but eliminate domestic production of large solid rocket motors. 
One of the few planning goals identified for the RLV is its ability to deliver 
passengers and cargo to the space station orbit. Life extension of the Interna-
tional Space Station seems likely, especially if operations are passed to a 
commercial venture. 
The National 
Space Transportation 
Policy: Issues 
for Congress 
INTRODUCTION For nearly four decades, the United States has relied on its national space transportation technology and industrial base to support a multitude of defense, intelligence, civil, 1 
and commercial needs. This base has produced the rock-
ets to explore the planets and land the first man on the moon; 
assure the nation's strategic nuclear deterrent; and supply policy-
makers with intelligence, geodesy, weather, navigation, and other 
important information. It has generated new technologies, sup-
ported new space-based businesses, and helped the U.S. balance 
of trade. 
This vital industry, however, is currently being buffeted by 
events and trends that are forcing its major restructuring. The end 
of the Cold War has reduced the demand for defense and intelli-
gence space launches and halted new development oflong-range 
ballistic missiles. Federal budget deficit and debt concerns have 
put additional pressure on government departments and agencies 
to be more efficient and to reduce the number and cost of civil and 
national security space launches. And a debate has begun within 
the executive branch and Congress over the proper balance be-
tween public and private investment in space transportation. 
In the commercial market, the aging domestic fleet of expend-
able launch vehicles (ELVs) is facing stiff global competition 
from the commercially focused European Ariane rocket, as well 
as from Russian and Chinese ELVs, which benefit from hidden 
I Government other than national security. 
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The Delta MLV is marketed by McDonnell Douglas and serves 
the lower end of the medium-sized payload market. 
real costs and low-wage labor forces.2 Mean-
while, entrepreneurs in the telecommunication, 
navigation, and remote sensing satellite industries 
project a moderate increase in demand for small 
and medium launch vehicles (SLVs and MLVs) to 
support their business ventures. Other potential 
space markets remain dormant, in part because of 
the high cost of access to space. 
The Altas MLV is marketed by Lockheed Martin and serves 
the upper end of the medium-sized payload market. 
In response to these challenges, the Clinton Ad-
ministration released a new National Space Trans-
portation Policy (NSTP) on August 5, 1994.3 The 
NSTP established the President's strategic vision 
for space transportation and directed the Depart-
ment of Defense (DOD), the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration (NASA), and the De-
partments of Transportation (DOT) and Com-
merce (DOC) to prepare detailed implementation 
plans supporting the new policy within 90 days. 
2 The mostly reusable Space Shuttle carried some commercial payloads before the Challenger accident in 1986. All other currently opera-
tional space transportation systems are ELVs. This report does not address suborbital launch systems or transportation systems designed pri-
marily to move payload or passengers between or beyond Earth orbits. 
3 Presidential Decision Directive NSTC-4. Most, ifnot all, the text of this internal policy was released publicly in The White House, Office of 
Science and Technology Policy, "National Space Transportation Policy," Fact Sheet, Washington, DC, Aug. 5, 1994. See appendix for complete 
text of the fact sheet. 
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TABLE 1: MIssions and Activities Dependent on Launch Services 
Missions and activities 
Intelligence collection and arms 
control monitoring 
Human space flight and life sciences 
Telecommunications and entertainment 
Weather observation 
Navigation 
Environmental monitoring 
Geodesy 
Planetary exploration 
Photogrammetry 
Space sciences and astrophysics 
Space manufacturing and materials science 
Hazardous waste disposal 
SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1995. 
This report examines the policy and supporting 
implementation plans and raises issues that Con-
gress may wish to consider as it debates the future 
of U.S. space transportation. It is structured 
around the four fundamental objectives identified 
by the Administration when it announced its new 
policy. 4 
I The U.S. Space Transportation 
Technology and Industrial Base 
The u.s. space transportation technology and in-
dustrial base is the vast and complex collection of 
people, institutions, technological know-how, 
and facilities needed to conceptualize, design, de-
velop, test, produce, operate, and maintain space 
transportation systems and their supporting in-
National 
security Civil Commercial 
Current N/A Potential 
Potential Current Potential 
Current Current Current 
Current Current Current 
Current N/A Potential 
Potential Current Current 
Current Current Current 
N/A Current Potential 
Current Current Current 
Current Current Potential 
Potential Current Potential 
Potential Potential Potential 
frastructure.5 This base spans government, aca-
demia, and industry from the largest prime 
contractor to the smallest commodity supplier. 
This is not only a prestigious industry involv-
ing many high-skilled jobs, but also one entwined 
with other high-technology industries that depend 
on access to space or technologies developed for 
space.6 1t is vital to many intelligence and defense 
missions. (See table 1.) 
The U.S. space transportation technology and 
industrial base provides launch services to gov-
ernment and commercial customers, as well as 
long-range ballistic missiles to DOD. Historical-
ly, the U.S. government has been, and still is, the . 
largest customer for U.S. launch services, buying 
launches for defense, intelligence, and civil pur-
4 The White House, Office of Science and Technology Policy, "Statement on National Space Transportation Policy," Washington, DC, Aug. 
5, 1994. See appendix for complete text of the statement. 
5 As a part of its current assessment, OTA will publish a detailed report on the long-term prospects for the space transportation technology 
and industrial base in 1996. 
6 Space transportation services accounted for less than 10 percent of the $6.5 billion commercial space market in 1994. See U.S. Department 
of Transportation and U.S. Department of Commerce, "National Space Transportation Policy Implementation Plan," submitted to the White 
House Nov. 7, 1994, but not yet validated, p. 4. 
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poses. In 1994, it procured about 85 percent of all 
domestic space launches to meet national security 
or scientific objectives. About half of these 
launches involved the most expensive U.S. space 
transportation systems: the Titan IV and the Space 
Shuttle.7 
The large government role in the U.S. space 
transportation technology and industrial base has 
had a major effect on its character and culture. 
Like many defense-oriented industries, the space 
transportation industry has operated in a business 
environment significantly different from that of 
purely commercial businesses.8 The regulations 
and controls that have been a part of doing busi-
ness with the government have contributed to the 
slowness ofthe U.S. response to growing interna-
tional competition in the commercial market. 
Moreover, the relatively small number of 
launches worldwide open to international com-
mercial competition has been less attractive than 
the sizable U.S. government market. 
Some analysts predict the deployment of a new 
generation of smaller satellites, forming low-
Earth-orbit (LEO) constellations that will enable 
voice, video, data, and multimedia services 
around the globe. They believe these satellites 
will spark a telecommunications revolution and 
thus spur new SLV development to meet the grow-
ing demands of a competitive marketplace. More-
over, some analysts see a number of other new 
markets developing, particularly for remote sens-
ing and global positioning/navigation services. 
And a few analysts foresee even greater market 
opportunities in the more distant future (e.g., 
space manufacturing, tourism, nuclear waste dis-
posal, and life-science research), if space trans-
portation were made safer, more reliable, and 
much less costly.9 
TABLE 2: 1994 World Orbital Launch Vehicles 
Ibsto Ibsto 1994 
country Vehicle LEO GToa flights 
United 
States Scout 500 N/A 1 
Pegasus 620b N/A 3 
Taurus 2,100b N/A 
Titan II 4,200b N/A 1 
Atlas E 1,750b N/A 2 
Delta II 11,110 4,010 3 
Atlas I 13,000 5,240 2 
Atlas IIA 16,050 6,970 2 
Atlas liAS 19,050 8,450 
Titan IV 39,100 14,000 4 
Shuttle 53,500 13,000 7 
Russia Rokot 154c N/A 1 
Start-1 1,000 N/A 0 
Kosmos 3,000 N/A 5 
Tsyklon 8,800 N/A 8 
Molniya N/A N/A 3 
Soyuz 15,400 N/A 15 
Zenit 30,300 N/A 4 
Proton 44,100 12,100 13 
France Ariane 42P 13,200 5,730 2 
Ariane 42L 16,300 7,050 1 
Ariane 42LP 18,300 8,160 3 
Ariane 44L 21,100 9,260 2 
China Long March 20 N/A 2,750 
Long March 3A 15,800 5,500 3 
Long March 2E 19,400 7,430 1 
Japan H-II 22,040 8,816 2 
India AS LV 330b N/A 
PSLV 6,610 990 
a GTO = Geosynchronous transfer orbit, a temporary orbit used to re-
position spacecraft into geosynchronous Earth orbit (GEO). 
b Polar orbit. 
C Demonstrated. 
SOURCE: Bretton S. Alexander et aI., 1994 Space Launch Activities 
(Arlington, VA: ANSER, January 1995). Office of Technology Assess-
ment, 1995. 
7 Bretton S. Alexander et aI., 1994 Space Launch Activities (Arlington, VA: ANSER, January 1995). 
8 For a discussion of how defense and conunercial industries differ, see U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Assessing the 
Potential for Civil-Military Integration: Technologies, Processes, and Practices, OTA-ISS-61I (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, September 1994). 
9 See, e.g., T.P. Rogers, "Toward a New Public-Private Space Transportation Strategy," The Journal of Practical Applications in Space 
5(1):1-41,1993. 
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Today, six major centers offer space transporta-
tion services: Russia, 10 the United States, Western 
Europe, Japan, the People's Republic of China 
(hereafter China), and India. Table 2 lists the pri-
mary orbital launch systems in operation in 1994. 
The rise of a competitive, global market for 
commercial launch services in the past decade has 
cost U.S. launch service providers their previous 
monopoly on launching commercial satellites. I I 
In 1979, the European Space Agency (ESA) suc-
cessfully launched its fIrst Ariane 1 rocket and 
began to compete for commercial payloads. 
Meanwhile, the U.S. government began to pro-
mote the Space Shuttle for commercial and gov-
ernment payloads by charging below-market 
prices, and in the process weakened domestic ELV 
producers. 
The U.S. share of the world commercial space 
transportation market, however, plummeted in 
1986 after the explosion of the Space Shuttle 
Challenger and did not begin to recover until 
about 1990, when payloads designed to be carried 
aboard the Space Shuttle were reconfIgured for 
launch on domestic ELVs and DOD investments 
in the MLV I and MLV II lowered Delta and Atlas 
prices to rates competitive with Ariane. I2 
Still, current U.S. MLV launch vehicles are 
based on decades-old designs and are generally 
less competitive than foreign launchers in terms of 
price, launch schedule, launch operations, regula-
tory environment, and launch facilities. 
ESA developed the Ariane 4 MLV and the 
forthcoming Ariane 5 heavy launch vehicle 
(HLV) to serve not only the launch needs of ESA 
and its member countries, but also the commercial 
market at large. Commercial competitiveness 
Arianespace's Ariane 4 currently dominates the commercial 
market for launching medium-sized payloads. 
played an important part not only in the design and . 
sizing of the Ariane family of vehicles, but in 
launch infrastructure and operations that are opti-
mized to meet commercial payload needs and 
schedules. 
More recently, China and Russia have entered 
the commercial launch market, confronting U.S. 
launch providers with non-market economy com-
petitors who are able to undercut U.S. launch bids 
signifIcantly even under the terms of existing 
launch service trade agreements. 13 
10 Russia has launch sites in Russia and Kazakhstan. Ukraine is on the verge of entering the world space transportation services market. 
\I Some analysts argue that there is not a true global commercial market today, because of various government subsidies by the U.S. and 
foreign governments. 
12 All commercial payloads that had been booked for the Space Shuttle from 1987 to 1989 were flown on the Ariane, giving Ariane 100 
percent of the commercial market for that period. 
13 These trade agreements do, however, set quotas on the number of Russian and Chinese vehicles winning commercial competitions. These 
agreements are discussed in detail in the section covering fundamental objective #2. 
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The United States remains the world commer-
cial market leader in SLVs. These small rockets, 
however, account for relatively few of the total 
dollars spent on space transportation. 
At the same time, the end of the Cold War, the 
desperate state of the Russian economy, and the 
Russian interest in developing a market economy 
have opened numerous opportunities for coopera-
tion in space transportation technologies. Several 
American companies are negotiating with their 
Russian counterparts to secure Russian space 
launch technology, expertise, and hardware (e.g., 
engines). The recently merged Lockheed Martin 
Corp. now finds itself in the interesting position of 
being a partner in a U.S.-Russian joint venture 
(LKE International) to sell Russian launch ser-
vices that compete directly with its ·own U.S.-
made vehicles. 14 
The degree to which current commercial trends 
create problems for the United States space trans-
portation effort is a matter of dispute. Some ana-
lysts argue that U.S. government requirements are 
sufficient to maintain a viable space transporta-
tion technology and industrial base and suggest 
that the government should not be overly con-
cerned by the global competitive position of U.S. 
launch providers. IS 
Other analysts, however, believe that the devel-
opment of new, low-cost space transportation 
systems must be encouraged to enhance the com-
petitiveness of the U.S. space transportation in-
dustry and other domestic industries that require 
access to space. In their view, the government will 
also benefit from lower vehicle costs brought 
about by new technologies and larger sales vol-
umes. With sufficiently low prices, the space 
transportation industry will be able to capture 
greater commercial market share. And domestic 
satellite vendors will not fmd themselves depen-
dent on the possible vagaries of foreign launch 
providers. These analysts would like to see com-
mercial market interests actively considered when 
the government embarks on development of a 
next-generation space transportation system: 
The future space transportation system se-
lected must be responsive to commercial user 
requirements in addition to those of government 
users. While low operating cost is fundamental, 
other parameters, such as launch dependability, 
higher reliability, very short booking time, and 
user friendliness, are of equal importance. 
Another commercial requirement that will 
eventually emerge is the ability to accommodate 
the general public (in space flight) without rig-
orous astronaut-type training. These varied re-
quirements and systems capabilities must be 
introduced in the current technology develop-
ment plans. Unless the next space transportation 
system satisfies these needs, that system will not 
be widely used commercially. 16 
In general, however, industry officials are skep-
tical about the prospects for the development of 
new, low-cost space transportation systems. In the 
past decade, several new and often revolutionary 
proposals have been put forth, only to be dropped. 
These included the Advanced Launch System, 
National Launch System, the Air Force Space 
Lifter, the Space Shuttle C, the Space Shuttle II, 
and the National Aerospace Plane (NASP). This 
skepticism seems particularly profound within the 
lower tiers of the space transportation industry.I7 
14 LKE International President Charles Lloyd says that the Russian Proton and American Atlas rockets could serve as backups for each 
other. See Patrick Seitz, "Lockheed Martin Corp. Officials Ready Ax," Space News, Mar. 20, 1995, p. 6. 
15 See, e.g., U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, "Industrial Assessment for Space Launch 
Vehicles," Washington, DC, January 1995, p. ES-l. 
16 The Commercial Space Transportation Study Alliance, ''The Commercial Space Transportation Study: Executive Summary," April 
1994, p. 18. 
17 OTA conducted a workshop on the lower tiers of the space transportation technology and industrial base on March 2, 1995. Findings of 
this workshop will be presented in a short background paper to be released in June 1995. 
The National Space Transportation Policy: Issues for Congress I 25 
The multi-warhead Peacekeeper ICBM could be removed 
from the U.S. strategic arsenal under future arms control 
agreements and converted for space launch. 
Finally, long-range ballistic missiles constitute 
an important but often overlooked segment of the 
space transportation technology and industrial 
base. Originally, most space launch vehicles were 
derived from ballistic missiles or ballistic missile 
technology. Today, these two segments of the in-
dustrial base have diverged significantly, but im-
portant overlaps in both technology and business 
arrangements remain. Therefore, reductions in the 
numbers of long-range ballistic missiles under 
various arms control agreements and the planned 
cessation of production in 2005 may have an im-
portant impact on the space transportation indus-
trial base. Similarly, future choices in launch 
vehicle technologies may have important conse-
quences on future capabilities to reconstitute 
long-range ballistic missile design and produc-
tion. 
I The National Space Transportation 
Policy and Its Implementation Plans 
The origins of the new space transportation policy 
and its implementation plans can be traced to the 
congressional request in the FY 1993 VA-HUD-
Independent Agencies Appropriation Act for 
NASA to study govemment space launch needs 
and NASA plans for space transportation and the 
International Space Station. The "Access to Space 
Study," published by NASA in January 1994, re-
sponded to the congressional request as well as to 
NASA's own internal planning needs. I8 
Subsequently, Congress requested a similar as-
sessment by DOD in its 1994 Defense Authoriza-
tion Act (see appendix A). DOD's 1994 "Space 
Launch Modernization Study," more commonly 
known as the Moorman Report, responded to this 
congressional mandate. 19 This report built on 
previous studies, including the 1990 Augustine 
Report,20 the 1992 Aldridge Study,21 DOD's 
"Bottom-Up Review" in 1993, and NASA's "Ac-
cess to Space Study". 
The "Access to Space Study" and the Moorman 
Report provided the opening Department and 
Agency positions in interagency negotiations that 
led to the new Administration policy. 
The NSTP released by the White House on Au-
gust 5, 1994, was developed by the National Sci-
ence and Technology Council (NSTC) and 
approved by President Clinton after an extensive 
18 NASA, "Access to Space Study: Summary Report," Washington, DC, January 1994. 
19 U.S. Department of Defense, "Space Launch Modernization Study: Executive Summary," Washington, DC, 1994. 
20 "Report of the Advisory Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space Program," Independent Report for NASA, December 1990. 
21 Vice President's Space Policy Advisory Board, "The Future of U.S. Space Launch Capability," Washington, DC, November 1992. 
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interagency review of current and future space 
transportation plans and budgets. 
The policy provides overall guidance and 
direction for the executive branch. The specifics 
for implementing the policy were left to a second 
round of negotiations between the individual de-
partments and agencies and the Office of Science 
and Technology Policy (OSTP). The policy re-
quired that DOD, NASA, and DOT/DOC (in com-
bination) submit implementation plans within 90 
days.22 The DOD and NASA implementation 
plans were submitted to the White House in No-
vember 1994 and approved in November 1994 
and January 1995, respectively. The DOT/DOC 
implementation plan was also submitted in No-
vember 1994, but has not received final approval. 
MEETING THE FUNDAMENTAL 
OBJECTIVES OF THE POLICY 
The Clinton Administration's four fundamental 
objectives for the NSTP were to establish new na-
tional policy regarding: 
1. federal space transportation spending, consis-
tent with current budget constraints and the 
opportunities presented by emerging technolo-
gies; 
2. federal agencies' use of foreign launch systems 
and components; 
3. federal agencies' use of excess ballistic missile 
assets for space launch, to prevent adverse im-
pacts on the U.S. commercial space launch in-
dustry; and 
4. an expanded private sector role in the federal 
space transportation R&D decision making 
process.23 
In the following sections, the Office of 
Technology Assessment (OTA) examines each of 
these fundamental objectives and how the DOD, 
NASA, and combined DOT/DOC implementa-
tion plans propose to achieve them. The report 
then raises several issues of potential interest to 
Congress as it considers funding and oversight of 
the Administration's space policy, as well as 
changes in the laws governing space transporta-
tion. 
I Fundamental Objective #1: 
Space Transportation Funding 
and the Division of Responsibilities 
The first objective of the NSTP is to set govern-
ment spending priorities for current and future 
space transportation systems by assigning specif-
ic roles and functions to designated departments 
and agencies. The policy assigns to DOD the re-
sponsibility of overseeing improvements to the 
existing fleet ofELV systems and guiding devel-
opment of new ELVs. NASA will continue to sup-
port the Space Shuttle and undertake research and 
development (R&D) that could lead to a new, re-
usable launch vehicle (RL V), replacing the Space 
Shuttle. 
FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVE #1 
Establishes new national policy for federal space trans-
portation spending, consistent with current budget 
constraints and the opportunities presented by emerging 
technologies. Under the new policy, DOD will assume the 
lead responsibility for modernization of the current expend-
able launch vehicle fleet. NASA will assume lead responsi-
bility for research and development of next generation 
reusable systems. NASA will focus their investments on 
technologies to support a decision no later than December 
1996 on whether to proceed with a fl ight demonstration pro-
gram. This program would, in turn, provide the basis for de-
ciding by the end of the decade whether to proceed with a 
new launch system to replace the aging shuttle fleet. 
This section examines the proposed division of 
responsibility between DOD and NASA and the 
development of new launch vehicle systems pro-
posed in the DOD and NASA implementation 
plans. This examination suggests that, while the 
Clinton Administration's attempt to eliminate 
conflicts and redundancies may be a step in the 
22 The White House, Office of Science and Technology Policy, op. cit., footnote 3, sec. VIII(I). 
23 The White House. Office of Science and Technology Policy, op. cit., footnote 4. 
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1 . eral potential conflicts and re-~. ...:...-.Ion sev uu-- , . The examination further sug-
ii.ddCies remam. . h ~ . ber of additional concerns WIt ~.. that anum . ... .. D and NASA implementatIOn plans-es-• < ~ the proposed development programs-
" reroain. 
~ r:D, . plementation plan initiates an ELV de-iJ)O s 1m 
:wJoprnent program known as the Evolved Ex-
'peadabl Launch Vehicle (EEL V) program. The 
BELV ;ogram would dr~w on existing launch 
tecbnology to build a famIly of MLVs and HLVs 
tbat uses common components and subsystems. 
nble 3 shows the payload delivery capacities for 
both existing and proposed international space 
IIIDSportation systems. 
By developing the EELV family of launch ve-
bicles, OOD hopes to bring down the cost of put-
ting its payloads into space, especially in the 
beavy payload class. Compared with current ex-
penditures, DOD officials expect to achieve a 25-
to SO-percent reduction in overall life-cycle costs 
for launching DOD payloads.24 DOD anticipates 
that the EELV program will achieve these savings 
through the acquisition process, increased use of 
commercial products and practices, minimal use 
of unique government specifications, maximum 
use of common components and subsystems, and 
decrease in launch infrastructure costs. 
Specifically, DOD believes that using common 
components and subsystems will, for the most 
part, eliminate the need to maintain an indepen-
dent HLV production line and will also result in 
larger production volumes, possibly capturing 
economies of scale. The Department expects that 
the EELV program will benefit from current in-
dustry consolidation and reduce the need to main-
tain unique launch infrastructure and operations 
crews for multiple types of launch vehicles. 
Test flights of the DC-X RLV demonstrated the potential for 
rapid turnaround and simplified operations. 
Why EELV? 
DOD is-and projects that it will continue to be-
a primary user of ELVs in all payload classes.25 
DOD officials believes that space transportation is 
too costly and note that DOD currently spends 
roughly $1.9 billion per year for space launch ser-
vices. Of this money, $1.6 billion goes to support 
24 u.s. Department of Defense, personal communication, March 1995. 
2S U.S. Department of Defense, op. cit., footnote 15, p. II-II . 
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Kosmos 
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Russia 
3000 
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TABLE 3: Existing and Proposed International Space Transportation Systems 
!~~~ 
ASLV Scout Peoasus Peoasus XL X-34Ac Atlas E LLV1 e 
Small Small Small Small Small Small Small 
India U.S. . U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. 
330b 560b 731 b 1.021 b 1200d 1,750b 2,000 
_ -.llIA N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
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Smal Small Small Small Medium Medium Medium 
U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. India U.S. Russia 
3300 4000 4200 4790 6610 8000 8800 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 990 N/A _____ ~N/A 
!§ 
Taurus X-34Bc 
Small Small 
U.S. U.S. 
2,100b 2500d 
N/A N/A 
'\ 
H 
~ = ~ 
II!!IIi 
-
~~ iJII 
LM-2D Delta II 
Medium Medium 
China U.S. 
N/A 11 110 
2,750 4,010 
C Initially, either the X-34Aor X-34B will be developed, not both. The X-34 development team, led by Orbital Sciences and Rockwell International, will decide which version of the X-34 to build later in 
1995. 
d Orbit of 150 nautical miles (nmi) at an inclination of 28.5. 
e First flight scheduled for 1995. 
, Under development. 
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Vehicle 
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Country 
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Vehicle 
Class 
Country 
Ibs. to Leo 
Ibs. to GEO 
Atlas I LM-3A AR42P Molniva Sovuz 
Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium 
U.S. China France Russia Russia 
13000 15800 13200 N/A 15,400 
--
5,~4CL __ _ M~O __ ~,730 __ _ N/~ _ ___ N/~_ 
M-EELV' H-IJ AR44L 
Medium Medium Medium 
U.S. Japan France 
No Spec9 22,040 21,100 
No Spec9 8,816 9,260 
Zenit 
Medium 
Russia 
30,300 
N/A 
~ 
~ 
~ 
X-33h 
Medium 
U.S. 
40,0001 
N/A 
.... r-.:;~ 
Atlas IIA AR42L LM-?I= AR 44LP Atlas liAS 
Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium 
U.S. France China France France 
16,050 16300 19,400 18,300 19050 
6,970 7,050 7,430 8,160 8,450 
Proton Shuttle H-EELV' Titan IV Ariane 5e 
Heavv Heavv Heavv Heavv Heavy 
Russia U.S. U.S. U.S. France 
44,100 53,500 41,OOOb 39,100 44,000 
12,100 13,000 13,500 
-
14,000 _1~OQ9_ 
9 DOD has not specified payload delivery requirements for the medium EEL\/, The EELV manufacturer could potentially develop more than one medium-sized vehicle to handle the wide range of DOD 
payloads in the medium payload class. 
hThree development teams led by Lockheed Martin, McDonnell Douglas, and Rockwell International respectively, are conducting preliminary X-33 studies for NASA. At present, NASA plans to select 
one development team in December 1996 to build and test-fly its version of the X-33. 
iThis is equivalent to delivering 25,000 Ibs. to the International Space Station orbit. According to NASA, the 25,000 Ibs. to the International Space Station orbit is for planning purposes only and could be 
revised as development proceeds. 
SOURCES: Bretton S. Alexander et aI., 1994 Space Launch Activities (Arlington, VA: ANSER, Jan. 1995). Office of Technology Assessment, 1995. 
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TABLE 4: Summary of Options Presented in DOD's 1994 Space Launch Modernization Study 
Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 Option 4 
Develop new Develop new 
Sustain existing Evolve expendable expendable launch reusable launch 
launch systems launch vehicles system system 
Key features Maintain the current Fly current launch Correct deficiencies in Substantially reduce 
fleet of launch sys- vehicles already on current ELV fleet flight costs while improv-
tems for the foresee- contract Significantly improve ing operability and re-
able future Evolve a family of reliability, operability, sponsiveness 
Only upgrade to en- launch vehicles from and cost Tech. dev./demo. Costs: 
able missions, im- current systems by Develop a modular $0.6-0.98 
prove reliability and consolidating me- family comprised of a Engr./dev. costs: 
safety, or address ob- dium- and heavy-lift common core vehicle $6-20+8 
solescence booster families and/or common major Procure fleet of four 
Allow market-driven Lower operations subsystems vehicle between 
industry downsizing costs by increasing Option A: replace exist- 2004-2009: 
in order to reduce op- production rates ing ELVs $2.5-$10.58 
erations costs from Cost: $1-2.58 Option 8: replace exist- Future operations costs: 
current levels ing ELVs and Space $0.5-1.58 per year 
Shuttle 
Projected Medium: $50-125M Medium: $50-80M Medium: $40-75M None projected 
costs per Heavy: $250-320M Heavy: $100-150M Heavy: $80-140M 
flight Personnel: $90-190M 
Cargo: $130-230M 
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Defense, "Space Launch Modernization Study," 1994. 
DOD's HLV program, the Titan IV.26 The remain-
ing $300 million is spent primarily on MLVs, with 
some of this remaining money going to SLVs. 
DOD has focused on cost reduction as its primary 
objective, especially in the heavy payload class.27 
DOD's 1994 "Space Launch Modernization 
Study" offered a host of options for modernizing 
DOD's ELV fleet in a manner that would bring 
down the cost of access to space, especially for 
heavy payloads (see table 4). The EELV program 
is the implemented version of Option 2 presented 
in the study. 
EELV Schedule and Funding 
The EEL V program schedule, which spans the pe-
riod FY 1995-2005, is divided into three phases 
(see table 5). During Phase 3, DOD expects MLV 
development to precede HLV development. DOD 
projects that the MLV will become operational in 
2001, while the HLV will become operational in 
2005. DOD officials claim that this staggered 
introduction is likely to make the EELV procure-
ment more attractive to potential producers since a 
new MLV will probably improve industry's com-
26 The production cost of a Titan IV-although not firmly established-is on the order of $250 million per vehicle. Assuming an average 
launch rate of three Titan IV s per year, $750 million goes to the actual launch vehicles and the remaining $850 million goes to support payload 
integration, operational staff, and other supporting infrastructure. 
27 DOD is currently investigating ways to reduce its requirement for HLVs. 
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TABLE 5: Proposed EELV Schedule 
Phase Name 
Low-cost concept validationa 
Duration 
Expected 
number of 
contractors 
2 Preliminary engineering, management, and development 
Aug. 1995-Nov. 1996 
Dec. 1996-Apr. 1998 
May 1998-2005 3 Engineering, management, and development 
a DOD has scheduled this 15-month period to allow industry to demonstrate, with about 90-percent confidence, that it can achieve EELV cost reduc-
tions targets within the proposed $2.017 billion budget. U.S. Department of Defense, personal communication, March 1995. 
b DOD has allotted $120 million in contract money for this phase. DOD plans to award four contracts for this phase, with each team receiving $30 
million for 15 months of work. DOD is exploring, however, the idea of awarding only three contracts forth is phase, which would add $1 0 million to each 
contract. DOD will determine how many contracts to award for this phase based on whether the Department believes the $10 million add-on per 
contract will produce significant added value or not. U.S. Department of Defense, personal communication, March 1995. 
SOURCE: U.S. Air Force, "EELV Briefing," Space Day, Colorado Springs, CO, Dec. 15, 1994. 
TABLE 6: Proposed EELV Fundinga 
Fiscal year Funding ($M) 
1995b 40 
1996 111 
1997 72 
1998 104 
1999 173 
2000 107 
2001 110 
2002 250 
2003 460 
2004 330 
2005 260 
TOTAL 2,017 
a FY 1995 dollars. 
b Includes $30 million appropriation for FY 1995 and redesignation of 
$10 million from FY 1994. 
SOURCE: U.S. Air Force, "EELV Briefing," Space Day, Colorado 
Springs, CO, Dec. 15, 1994. 
petitiveness in the commercial space launch mar-
ketplace. Table 6 provides the proposed EEL V 
funding for FY 1995-2005. ~ 
Existing ELV Upgrades 
When DOD began to formulate its EELV develop-
ment program, it had several ELV upgrade pro-
grams underway. Since its decision to pursue the 
EELV, DOD has sought to limit redundancies by 
cutting back on ELV upgrade programs-retain-
ing those programs that it believes are necessary to 
keep the existing ELV fleet flying safely or have 
significant short-term payoff (see box 1). 
NASA 
In its implementation plan, NASA outlines an 
RLV development strategy consisting of two X-
vehicle programs-the X-33 Advanced Technol-
ogy Demonstrator and the X-34 Small Reusable 
Booster. The X-33 program is designed to prove 
the feasibility of a medium-size, reusable, single-
stage-to-orbit (SSTO) launch vehicle, while the 
X-34 program focuses on providing early test ex-
perience with a variety of technologies projected 
to go on commercial RLV s, as well as early expe-
rience with government-industry cooperative en-
deavors. The X-34 program is also expected to 
lead to a small, commercially operated, partially 
reusable launch vehicle. The impetus behind both 
X-vehicle programs is the belief that technology 
has advanced sufficiently to pursue development 
of reusable space transportation systems that 
could dramatically lower the cost of access to 
space. 
NASA plans to spend just under $1.2 billion 
between FY 1995 and FY 1999 on its two X-ve-
hicle programs. The X-33 program will receive 
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BOX 1: ELV-Related Upgrade Programs at DOD 
Although DOD has scaled back its long-term efforts to upgrade expendable launch systems, several 
ELV-related upgrade programs with short-term benefits are still underway. Ongoing DOD programs include 
the Range Standardization and Automation (RSA) program and vehicle and infrastructure upgrade pro-
grams for the Titan II, Delta II, Atlas II, and Titan IV. 
DOD views RSA as an essential upgrade to existing range operations infrastructure and expects the 
benefits to apply to all future launch systems-whether they be upgraded versions of existing ELVs or a 
family of EELVs. DOD's implementation plan notes that the RSA program-which includes significant com-
puter and electronics upgrades-will overhaul operations at both the Eastern and Western ranges, and that 
DOD expects the program to be completed by FY 2004 at a cost of more than $1 billion. 
Also, according to DOD's implementation plan, the Department will continue to operate several expend-
able launch systems and intends to complete ongoing development programs for these vehicles. The Delta 
launch vehicle flight safety and avionics upgrades are scheduled for completion in FY 1996. DOD expects 
that upgrades to the Atlas II propulsion system aimed at improving the launch vehicle's reliability will be 
completed in FY 1998.1 And near-term Titan IV initiatives to improve reliability, enhance schedule depend-
ability, and lower life-cycle costs are ongoing. 
With regard to infrastructure, DOD's implementation plan states that the Department will maintain its 
launch capabilities for the Delta, Atlas, and Titan IV at Cape Canaveral. At Vandenberg Air Force Base, 
Titan II and Titan IV launch capability will be sustained, the construction of a new Atlas II Space Launch 
Complex will continue, and the Delta launch complex will still be jOintly supported by DOD and NASA The 
new Atlas II launch facility at Vandenberg is projected to be ready for NASA and national security missions 
in FY 1998. 
1 This refers to continuing development efforts of an RL-1 OC upper-stage engine. DOD does not currently have plans to incorpo-
rate a newly developed RL-1 OC engine in the Atlas launch vehicle. 
SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1995. 
$662 million of this funding, with an additional 
$339 million going to fund "Supporting Tech-
nology Demonstration" and other RLV-related 
technology development programs.28 The X-34 
program-which will span a shorter period of 
time than the X-33-will receive a fixed NASA 
contribution of $70 million. Both the X-33 and 
X-34 programs will likely draw from the opera-
tional and technological experiences of NASA's 
ongoing DC-XA program (see box 2). 
Declining space transportation budgets have 
prompted NASA to pursue a strategy of close 
cooperation with industry in the development of 
reusable launch systems. NASA outlined this 
strategy in the cooperative agreement notices 
(CANs) it issued for each X-vehicle program. 
Each CAN delineates NASA's cooperative devel-
opment policies and guidelines and includes the 
proposed funding contribution from NASA. 
NASA expects industry to contribute funding to 
each program because it believes that the X-33 
and X-34 programs will help industry build RLVs 
capable of competing in the launch services mar-
28 "Supporting Technology Demonstration" and other RLV-related technology development programs are sometimes collectively referred 
to as the "core technology development programs" for the RLY. 
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BOX 2: The DC-X and DC-XA Programs 
In 1990, the Sallistic Missile Defense Organization (SMDO) was exploring concepts to launch hundreds 
of space-based interceptors designed to provide the nation with a shield against incoming ballistic mis-
siles. In the view of SMDO officials, a fully reusable single-stage-to-orbit (SSTO) vehicle was the most 
promising concept for reducing space transportation costs. 
SMDO initiated the Single Stage Rocket Technology program to design an SSTO vehicle, then fly a sub-
scale experimental vehicle as a proof-of-concept demonstrator. Four contractors were selected to develop 
SSTO designs between 1990 and 1991. Primarily because of funding limitations, McDonnell Douglas, 
which proposed a vertical-takeoff/vertical-Ianding configuration, was the only firm selected to build and fly 
the experimental DC-X vehicle. Using support from the U.S. Air Force's Phillips Laboratory, a streamlined 
management structure at SMDO, and a rapid prototyping team at McDonnell Douglas, the DC-X was built 
in 24 months and flown for the first time on August 18, 1993. 
The DC-X flew two more times in the summer of 1993 before flight testing was terminated for lack of 
funding. With funding support from NASA, SMDO was able to restart the DC-X test flight program in the 
summer of 1994. During the second flight of this series (flight number 5), a detonation in the ground sup-
port equipment ripped a large hole in the vehicle's composite skin. Despite the damage, the vehicle 
executed a successful emergency landing on the desert floor and was subsequently returned to the facto-
ry for repair. During the repair interval, the DC-X contract and all program management responsibility was 
transferred from SMDO to the Phillips Laboratory at Kirtland Air Force Sase, New Mexico. 
Several lessons have been learned from the DC-X program to date. Namely, streamlined government 
management of experimental programs is capable of reducing development costs while meeting schedule 
milestones; "aircraft-like" operations (including rapid turnaround between launches) and maintenance of 
space transportation systems are feasible; and the number of people required to operate a space trans-
portation sytem can be reduced through automated test and control. Furthermore, the DC-X successfully 
flight tested several critical-but not all encompassing-SSTO technologies such as navigation aided by 
the Global Positioning System and a gaseous oxygen/hydrogen reaction control system. 
The next flight series of the DC-X is scheduled for May 1995 through July 1995. This flight test phase is 
scheduled to culminate with the DC-X performing a "pitch maneuver" by which the vehicle transitions from 
the nose-down position required for atmospheriC reentry, to the tail-first position required for landing. Upon 
completion of the DC-X flight test program, Phillips Laboratory will transfer the vehicle and test equipment 
to NASA for the DC-XA program. The DC-XA program will incorporate numerous additional critical SSTO 
technologies into a highly modified DC-X and flight test them in mid-1996. NASA has designated Phillips 
Laboratory to manage the DC-XA flight test program. 
SOURCE: U.S. Air Force, 1995. 
keto Boxes 3 and 4 summarize the CANs for the 
X-33 and X-34, respectively. 
In ad'dition to its RLV efforts, NASA plans to 
continue its support of ELV development-al-
though in a more reserved manner. NASA's imple-
mentation plan states that "in coordination with 
DOD, NASA will continue to support [ELV] in-
dustry initiatives where the use of NASA facilities 
and resources can minimize the cost and enhance 
the value of the technology efforts."29 
Furthermore, NASA's implementation plan 
states that NASA retains the right to procure new 
ELV services "where mission-unique modifica-
29 NASA, "NASA Implementation Plan for the National Space Transportation Policy," Washington, DC, Nov. 7, 1994, p. 25. 
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BOX 3: The X-33 CAN 
NASA issued a cooperative agreement notice for the X-33 reusable launch vehicle on January 12, 1995. 
This CAN solicited proposals "that offer a new way of doing business, consistent with space policy."l The 
CAN divided the X-33 program into three phases: Phase I-Concept Definition/Design; Phase II-Design/ 
Demonstration; and Phase III-Commercial RLV DevelopmenVOperation. Phase I commenced in March 
1995 and is scheduled to run for 15 months. Phase II, which includes design, build, and flight demonstra-
tion, will begin by the end of FY 1996 and continue though the end of the decade. At the end of the dec-
ade, the government and private sector will jointly decide whether or not to proceed with Phase 111.2 
NASA requested detailed proposals from industry on Phase I and preliminary plans for Phases II and III. 
Four teams, lead by Lockheed Advanced Development, McDonnell Douglas Aerospace, Rockwellinterna-
tional, and Space Access, Inc., submitted proposals to NASA on February 24. NASA selected three 
(Lockheed Martin, McDonnell Douglas, and Rockwell) to proceed with Phase I. NASA and the selected 
companies will share expenses during Phase I, with a total NASA contribution of $24 million.3 
Selection of one or more X-33 concepts to proceed into Phase II will be based on specific criteria (which 
NASA reserves the right to change at any time up until Phase II proposals are requested) that reflect ma-
ture business and design plans.4 
The technical composition of the X-33 program is based on the goal of continually lowering the cost of 
access to space "to promote the creation and delivery of new space services and other activities that will 
improve economic competitiveness."5 In the technical description of the X-33, the CAN states that "the 
X-33 must adequately demonstrate the key design and operation aspects of [a single-stage-to-orbitl RLV 
rocket system .... "6 The CAN notes that an SSTO rocket system is the goal of Phases I and II "because 
past studies indicate it has the best potential for achieving the lowest cost access to space while acting as 
an RLV technology driver .... "7 Nevertheless, the CAN grants the private sector the option of proposing 
any RLV technology-not necessarily SSTO-in Phase III. 
The government contribution to the X-33 program for Phases I and II (Le., FY 1995-99) is projected to 
be roughly $662 million. During the same period, an additional $339 million has been allocated for core RLV 
technology development programs.8 NASA expects industry to fund final development (i.e., Phase III) of a 
commercial RLV, although the Agency realizes that a small government contribution may be necessary. 
1 NASA. "A Cooperative Agreement Notice: Reusable Launch Vehicle (RLV) Advance Technology Demonstrator-X-33." Jan. 12. 
1995, p. ii. 
2 Ibid., p. ii-iii. 
3 NASA, "X-33, X-34 Contractors Selected for Negotiations," NASANews Press Release, Mar. 8,1995. 
4 NASA, op. cit., footnote 1, p. iii. 
5 Ibid., p. A-2. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
8 "Supporting technology demonstration" and "RLV technology program (focused phase I and current NRA activities)" are often 
collectively referred to as the "core technology development programs." (See table 8.) 
SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1995. 
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BOX 4: The X-34 CAN 
NASA issued a cooperative agreement notice for the X-34 RLV on January 12, 1995. According to the 
CAN, "the intent of (the X-34) solicitation is to stimulate the jOint industry/government funded development 
of a small reusable, or partially reusable, booster that has potential application to commercial launch ve-
hicle capabilities, which will provide significantly reduced mission costs for placing small payloads in LEO. 
The booster must demonstrate technologies applicable to future reusable launch vehicles. "1 
The X-34 program is much shorter than the X-33 program and is not divided into major phases. Never-
theless, the CAN does set out three milestones for the X-34 program: test flights beginning in late 1997; 
orbital launch by mid-1998; and two test flights later in 1998 as a NASA research platform. 
After'reviewing CAN proposals from Space Access, Kelly Space and Technology, and a team led by 
Orbital Sciences, NASA selected the Orbital Sciences team (Orbital Sciences and Rockwell International) 
as the contractor for the X-34.2 The proposed government contribution to the X-34 program for FY 1995-99 
is $70 million. Orbital Sciences and Rockwell plan to invest $50 million each-for a total program cost of 
$170 million.3 
Despite losing the X-34 competition, both Space Access and Kelly Space and Technology are reported-
ly looking for private backing for their concepts. Each company plans to continue its development effort 
without government support4 
1 NASA, "A Cooperative Agreement Notice: Reusable Launch Vehicle (RLV) Small Reusable Booster-X-34, "Jan. 12, 1995, p. ii. 
2 NASA, "X-33, X-34 Contractors Selected for Negotiations," NASANews Press Release, Mar. 8, 1995. 
3 Any cost overruns on the X-34 program will fall upon the Orbital Sciences/Rockwell team. See Ben lannotta, "OSC, Rockwell 
Selected To Run X-34 Project," Space News, Mar. 13, 1995, pp. 4, 37. 
4 Ibid. 
SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1995. 
tions are required of the existing medium/heavy-
lift vehicles.,,30 This statement signals NASA's 
intent to proceed with a special procurement of a 
new, low-end medium or "Med-Lite" launch ve-
hicle, and according to the implementation plan, 
"NASA's budget contains funding to continue to 
acquire launch services from the U.S. commercial 
ELV industry to support civil government launch 
service requirements. "31 
springboard to a commercial RLV in the medium-
to-heavy payload class that radically reduces the 
cost of access to space while improving both reli-
ability and operability. 
The CAN does not restrict the X-33 's commer-
cial follow-on to anyone particular RLV concept, 
and NASA officials insist industry will decide for 
itself what kind of commercial RLV to build. Nev-
ertheless, NASA believes that an SSTO space 
transportation system-if it proves technological-
ly feasible-will be the lowest cost solution (see 
box 5). Therefore, NASA has limited X-33 devel-
opment to the SSTO concept. 
X-33 
The X-33 Advanced Technology Demonstrator is 
the flagship of NASA's RLV Technology Pro-
gram. NASA hopes that the X-33 will provide the 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
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BOX 5: Single Stage To Orbit 
Since at least the early 1960s, launch vehicle engineers have dreamed of building reusable launchers 
because they offer the potential of relative operational simplicity and reduced costs compared with ex-
pendable vehicles.1 Until recently, the necessary technologies were not available. Now, thanks to recent 
technology improvements,2 many engineers believe that the United States is technically able to design and 
produce an SSTO vehicle with sufficient payload capacity to meet most government and commercial space 
transportation requirements. 
Notwithstanding these recent technological advances, the development of an SSTO space transporta-
tion system involves significant risk. For example, because an SSTO launch vehicle will have no expend-
able components, it will need to carry more fuel than would otherwise be necessary if it were shedding 
weight by dropping stages during ascent. Achieving the fuel mass fraction3 necessary to reach orbit with a 
useful payload will require a host of technological advances that improve fuel efficiency and lower structur-
al weight without compromising structural integrity. Additionally, completely reusable launch vehicles are 
technologically much more difficult to achieve because components must be capable of resisting deterio-
ration and surviving multiple launches and reentries. 
The best configuration-if there is one-for an SSTO vehicle is yet undetermined. The difficulties of a hori-
zontal takeoff-horizontal landing vehicle are known from the National Aerospace Plane Program, and it is likely 
that this configuration will not receive much consideration. Three other potential configurations pose unique 
technical obstacles, but are likely to receive more serious consideration: vertical-takeoff/vertical-Ianding, ver-
tical-takeoff/horizontal-Ianding (winged body), and vertical-takeoff/horizontal-Ianding (lifting body). 
Vertical-takeoff! 
vertical-landing 
Vertical-takeoff! 
horizontal-landing (winged body) 
Vertical-takeoff! 
horizontal-landing (lifting body) 
The decision to focus on SSTO development in the X-33 program was based on NASA's 1994 "Access 
to Space Study." This study investigated three options for reducing the cost of access to space. The first 
option called for an overhaul of several Space Shuttle subsystems and continued operation of an upgraded 
Space Shuttle. NASA estimated that such an operation would fail to reduce sufficiently the cost of access 
to space. The second option proposed the development of new multistage ELV technologies that would 
deploy either a cargo pod or manned vehicle. While NASA viewed this option as more appealing than the 
first, it was less attractive to NASA than the third option-development of an SSTO. 
1 For the early history of attempts to build reusable launch vehicles, see Richard P. Hallion (ed.), The Hypersonic Revolution: Eight 
Case Studies in the History of Hypersonic Technology, Volume II (Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio: Special Staff Office, Aeronau-
tical Systems Division, 1987), p. 948. 
2 Some of these improvements were funded through the National Aerospace Plane Program (1986-94). The goal of NASP was to 
design and build a horizontal takeoff-horizontal landing, air-breathing SSTO. 
3 The term fuel mass fraction refers to the ratio of the weight of fuel required to accomplish the mission to the total initial vehicle 
weight (excluding payload). An SSTO launch vehicle will require a higher fuel mass fraction (i.e., lower structural weight fraction) than 
existing multiple-stage vehicles in order to reach orbit. 
SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1995. 
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Pending the successful completion of the X-33 
program, NASA sees the RLV as a potential re-
placement vehicle for the Space Shuttle.32 For this 
reason, the X-33 CAN requires that the commer-
cial follow-on RLV support the International 
Space Station. TheX-33 CAN sets the required di-
mensions of the follow-on RLV's payload bay to a 
15 ft diameter and a 30 ft length, with a required 
mass payload deployment capability of 20,000 to 
25,000 lbs to a 220 nrni (maximum 244 nrni) alti-
tude inclined at 51.6°.33 
Although the CAN requires a commercial fol-
low-on to the X-33 to service the International 
Space Station, it requires only suborbital flight of 
the X-33 during Phase II test flights. Table 7 sum-
marizes the technical requirements for the X-33 
program. 
The CAN outlines the cost-sharing arrange-
ment between government and industry for the de-
velopment and operation of the X-33. Table 8 
shows NASA's projected funding contribution for 
Phases I and II. NASA expects that industry will 
roughly match the government's overall Phase IIII 
contribution. A number of core technology devel-
opment programs were started in FY 1994,34 and 
Phase I award winners have already been selected. 
Table 9 summarizes the Phase I award winners, 
their major team members, and their respective 
vehicle concepts. 
Although NASA has the lead role in RLV de-
velopment, DOD maintains a supporting role.35 
Within DOD there are both skeptics and optimists 
about whether RLV technology will mature to a 
point where it will be useful to the Department. 
Nevertheless, DOD engineers and managers hope 
to retain some influence over the direction ofRLV 
development so that DOD will be in a position to 
benefit from future RLVs. 
Already DOD has budgeted $20 to $30 million 
per year for RLV-related technology projects over 
the projected life of NASA's program.36 Addi-
tionally, DOD has accelerated some of its propul-
sion technology programs to provide data to 
NASA to support its December 1996 decision on 
the X-33. DOD is also involved in materials re-
search that could be useful to RLV development, 
and it will playa key role in helping NASA design 
and execute a launch operations concept for both 
the X-33 and X-34 programs.37 
X-34 
NASA views the X-34 program as a means of 
gaining early experience with government-indus-
32 Industry may choose to develop one RLV to capture NASA flights and another to serve the commercial space transportation market. 
33 Text in the CAN states that this requirement "is a preliminary assessment of minimum single payload element weights that are required to 
support the Space Station [and that this] estimate is for planning purposes only and [does] not represent a commitment by the Space Station 
Program." See NASA, "A Cooperative Agreement Notice: Reusable Launch Vehicle (RLV) Advance Technology Demonstrator-X-33," 
Washington, DC, Jan. 12, 1995, p. vi. NASA officials contend that this language allows for the possibility of satisfying the 20,000- to 25,000-1b 
payload delivery requirement with multiple flights and that the ultimate decision on RLV payload capacity will be made by industry. Industry 
officials and other analysts note, however, that NASA is not precluded by this text from setting a final requirement that dictates a payload deliv-
ery capability of 20,000 to 25,000 lbs to International Space Station orbit in a single flight. 
34 The $20 million budgeted in FY 1995 for these core technology development programs is controlled by DOD. The DOD Comptrollers 
Office has held up distribution of this money to Phillips Laboratory. Phillips Laboratory, once it receives the money, is expected to use it to 
support the ongoing core technology development programs. The delay in transferring this money could potentially jeopardize successful 
completion of Phase I by each of the remaining contractors. 
35 The White House Office, Office of Science and Technology Policy, op. cit., footnote 3, sec. III(2)(c). 
36 U.S. Department of Defense, personal communication, February 1995. 
37 NASA and the U.S. Air Force's Phillips Laboratory are taking steps to ensure technical coordination between DOD and NASA on RL v-
related technology development. 
38 I Office of Technology Assessment 
TABLE 7: Minimum X-33 and Corresponding RLV Requirements 
CAPABLE 
Performance 
Sub-orbital, reusable rocket-based flight system 
Mission applications: 
Payload delivery: government (civil/military) and commercial missions. 
Capable of delivering/returning cargo and crew complement to/from the Interna-
tional Space Station (ISS) in accordance with ISS requirements (e.g., minimum 
sizes, loads, schedule). 
• ISS located at 220 nmi (244 nmi max.) altitude and 51.6 inclination. 
• Current estimated payload delivery requirement: 20,000-25,000 Ibs. 
Launch and Flight Operations 
Automated pre-flight and flight operations (launch, ascent, on-orbit, reentry, landing). 
The flight vehicle shall be capable of safely aborting to the launch site during the 
ascent phase if required. 
7-day maximum mission duration. 
7-day ground processing time from landing to launch. 
3.5-day ground processing time from landing to launch for reflight under emergency 
conditions. 
On-Orbit Operations 
The system shall be able to autonomOUSly rendezvous and station keep with the ISS 
and other orbital spacecraft. 
The system shall be able to autonomously dock payloads with the ISS. 
Accommodate Payloads 
The flight vehicle shall provide standardized structural, mechanical, electrical, commu-
nications, and other interfaces to payload. 
15-ft-diameter x 30-ft-long cargo bay. 
OPERABLE 
Schedule Dependability 
The probability of launching within TBD days of scheduled is 0.95. 
Responsive 
Maximize robustness to adverse weather conditions. 
Supportable 
Launch and landing at same location (nominal condition). 
The flight vehicle shall be capable of unplanned landing at alternate landing sites 
with minimal support equipment/facilities, e.g.: 
No existing cryogenic facilities, launch stands/equipment, etc. 
Self-ferry of flight vehicle between landing and launch sites (add-on engines, 
landing/nav. lights, etc., equipment allowed). 
Maintainable 
Corresponding 
X·33 RLV 
REO 
N/A 
REO 
GOAL 
N/A 
GOAL 
GOAL 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
GOAL 
REO 
REO 
GOAL 
N/A 
REO 
REO 
REO 
REO 
GOAL 
GOAL 
AS REO 
REO 
REO 
REO 
REO 
REO 
REO 
REO 
To the extent practical, on-board subsystems required for the flight vehicle shall be field GOAL REO 
repairable/replaceable. 
'Equipment required to repair, process, and return vehicle to launch site shall be GOAL REO 
transportable. 
RELIABLE 
0.995 probability of safe recovery of the flight vehicle per mission. N/A REO 
0.999 probability of safe recovery of the human passengers per mission. N/A REO 
NOTE: GOAL=Desirable Attribute; N/A=Not Applicable; REQ=Required; AS REQ=As Required 
SOURCE: NASA, "A Cooperative Agreement Notice: Reusable Launch Vehicle (RLV) Advance Technology Demonstrator-X-33," Jan. 12. 1995. p. 
A-4. 
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TABLE 8: Proposed NASA X-33 Fundinga 
Phase 1&11 II 
FY 95b ($M) FY 96 ($M) FY97 ($M) FY 98 ($M) FY 99 ($M) 
Concept definition/design 18.0 6.0 
(phase I) 
Design/demonstration 43.0 147.0 270.0 178.0 
(phase II) 
Supporting technology 20.0 40.0 147.0 
demonstration 
RLV technology program 51.2 50.7 30.6 
(focused phase I & 
current NRA activity) 
System engineering and 4.6 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7 
analysis 
Long-term, high-payoff 8.7 8.6 15.6 25.7 30.1 
technology investment 
Total 102.5 113.0 197.9 34Q.4 359.8 
a FY 1995 dollars. 
b Includes DOD funding. 
SOURCE: NASA. "A Cooperative Agreement Notice: Reusable Launch Vehicle (RLV) Advance Technology Demonstrator-X-33." Jan. 12. 1995. p. 
A-9. 
Prime Contractor 
Lockheed Martin 
(Advanced Development. 
a.k.a. Skunk Works) 
McDonnell Douglas 
Aerospace 
Rockwell (Space 
Systems Division) 
TABLE 9: X-33 CAN Phase I Award Winners 
Major team members 
Lockheed Martin (5 divi-
sions plus Rocketdyne), 
Rohr, Allied Signal, Bankers 
Trust, and Space Express 
Boeing, Douglas Aircraft, 
Rocketdyne, Aerojet, Pratt 
and Whitney, and Honeywell 
Rockwell (North American 
Aircraft, Rocketdyne), 
Northrop Grumman, Federal 
Express, and Orbital 
Sciences 
Vehicle concept 
Vertical-takeoff/ 
horizontal-landing 
(lifting body) 
Vertical-takeoff/ 
vertical-landing or 
vertical-takeoff/ 
horizontal-landing 
Vertical-takeoff/ 
horizontal-landing 
(delta wing with twin 
tails) 
Concept details 
126-ft-long, 1.6 million Ibs at 
liftoff (87.5 % fuel) 
To be announced in June 1995 
X-33: 52 % scale of RLV, 100-ft-
long, 55-ft wingspan, 350,000 
Ibs at liftoff, 3 engines 
RLV: 187-ft-long, 1.9 million Ibs 
at liftoff, 15,000-40,000 Ibs 
payload 
SOURCES: Bruce A. Smith. "NASA Speeds Selection of X-33. X-34 Plans." Aviation Week and Space Technology. vol. 142. No. 11. Mar. 13. 1995. 
pp. 107. 109. Office of Technology Assessment. 1995. 
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The partially reusable X-34 hopes to achieve threefold cost reductions for launching small payloads. 
TABLE 10: Proposed NASA X-34 Fundinga 
Fiscal year Funding ($M) 
1995 10 
1996 30 
1997 15 
1998 10 
1999 5 
TOTAL 70 
a FY 1995 dollars. 
SOURCE: NASA, "A Cooperative Agreement Notice: Reusable Launch 
Vehicle (RLV) Small Reusable Booster-X-34," Jan. 12, 1995, p. A-5. 
try cooperation and hopes that the program will 
provide opportunities to develop and demonstrate 
technologies applicable to future development of 
a commercial follow-on to the X-33.38 A low-cost 
commercial version of the X -34 could significant-
1y reduce NASA's cost for launching small pay-
loads (about 10 to 12 per year) as well as further 
expand the commercial LEO market for small 
payloads. 
The X -34 CAN sets out three milestones for the 
program: 1) test flights beginning in late 1997,2) 
orbital launch by mid-1998, and 3) use as a NASA 
test bed later in 1998. The X-34 planned by the 
team of Orbital Sciences and Rockwell is a partial-
ly reusable, two-stages-to-orbit (TSTO) ve-
hicle.39 NASA's portion of the budget for the X -34 
program is provided in table 10. Orbital Sciences 
and Rockwell will each contribute an additional 
$50 million and cover any cost overruns experi-
enced by the program. 
Space Shuttle 
The NSTP also directs NASA to "continue to 
maintain the capability to operate the Space 
38 In particular, NASA hopes to advance the use of graphite composites in the primary vehicle structure, gain experience with autonomous 
vehicle health management and monitoring, improve reusable cryogenic tank systems and thermal protection systems, and learn more about 
RLVoperations. 
39 The proposed X-34 will be carried on a large jet aircraft-much like Orbital Sciences' Pegasus SLV-to a specific altitude and distance 
from the landing field. The aerodynamic, fully reusable booster vehicle of the X-34 will then be launched from the jet, climb out of the Earth's 
atmosphere, release a non-aerodynamic, expendable orbiting vehicle that is attached to the payload, and then return to its landing field. The 
orbiting vehicle, after separation from the reusable booster, will continue on and deliver the payload to its intended orbit. 
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FIGURE 1: Shuttle Phasing Strategy Timeline 
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SOURCE: NASA, "NASA Implementation Plan for the National Space Transportation Policy," Washington, DC, Nov. 7, 
1994, p. 19. 
Shuttle fleet and associated facilities."40 In doing 
so, the NSTP notes that NASA should focus on 
improving "reliability, safety, and cost-effective-
ness."41 
In response to this directive, NASA proposes a 
phased approach for the Space Shuttle program 
(see figure 1). Until 2000, the RLV technology de-
velopment program will proceed on a path to re-
place the Space Shuttle in 2012. Simultaneously, 
NASA will continue to upgrade Space Shuttle 
components and subsystems in an effort to reduce 
costs and improve safety, performance, and reli-
ability. 
NASA contends that in 2000 the government 
and industry must decide on whether ornot to pur-
sue commercial development of a follow-on RL V. 
If either the government or industry decides to for-
go commercial development of an RLV, NASA 
states that it "may need to embark on a substantial 
[Space Shuttle] upgrade program" that would in-
40 The White House Office, Office of Science and Technology Policy, op. cit., footnote 3, sec. III( 1). 
41 Ibid., sec. 1(2). 
42 I Office of Technology Assessment 
clude ground facility modernization, Liquid Fly 
Back Booster (LFBB) development, and likely 
additional Shuttles.42 All improvements will be 
aimed at reducing cost without comprising 
Shuttle safety and reliability. 
If, on the other hand, the government and in-
dustry decide to develop a commercial follow-on 
RLV between 2000 and 2012, NASA will main-
tain those activities needed to "ensure that the 
Shuttle system flies safely, reliably, and at a lower 
cost until a replacement vehicle is operational. "43 
Furthermore, NASA states that many of the 
technologies developed during the X -3 3 and X -34 
programs could potentially be implemented in the 
Shuttle system to achieve safety, reliability, and 
cost objectives.44 
Med-Lite 
NASA issued a request for proposal (RFP) for a 
new ELV called Med-Lite on December 5, 1994. 
NASA designed its Med-Lite procurement to 
meet its planetary mission requirements for the 
next 10 years. NASA believes the Med-Lite ve-
hicle will fill a launch capacity gap between cur-
rent small and medium launchers. NASA also 
believes that procurement of the Med-Lite vehicle 
will cost less than purchasing existing ELV s for its 
future planetary missions. NASA's projects a cost 
of $25 million to $30 million per launch for the 
Med-Lite.45 
NASA received two proposals for the Med-Lite 
procurement on February 28,1995. One proposal 
was made by McDonnell Douglas with Orbital 
Science as a primary partner. The other proposal 
42 NASA, op. cit., footnote 29, pp. 18,21-22. 
43 Ibid., p. 20. 
44 Ibid., pp. 17-18. 
was made by Russian-owned Polyot, which pro-
posed using the Kosmos launch vehicle for 
NASA's planetary missions.46 NASA has official-
ly selected the McDonnell Douglas/Orbital 
Sciences team for negotiations leading to eventual 
award of the Med-Lite contract.47 According to 
NASA officials, final selection of a Med-Lite con-
tractor will be made by August 1995.48 
ELV Technology Programs 
NASA has a rich history of ELV technology de-
velopment. In response to the NSTP, however, 
NASA is reducing its allocations for continued in-
vestment in ELV technologies. NASA expects to 
complete its Cooperative ELV Tasks in 1996 at a 
cost of $34 million in FY 1996.49 Nevertheless, 
NASA will continue to make its facilities and ex-
pertise available to DOD to support ongoing ef-
forts to improve existing ELV technology. 
Issues for Congress 
The NSTP and the DOD and NASA implementa-
tion plans raise several issues for Congress 
relating to the development of new space trans-
portation systems. In particular, this section dis-
cusses: 
• questions raised by divided development re-
sponsibility between DOD and NASA; 
• existing impediments to improved interagenc) 
coordination; 
• the potential for conflicts and redundancies 
among the development programs; 
• the effect of DOD's emphasis on HLVs in the 
EEL V program; 
45 This does not include extra costs that might be incurred due to launch delays. NASA, personal communication, February 1995. 
46 The Med-Lite RFP contained two qualification criteria. First, the prime contractor must be a U.S.-owned company. Second, more than 50 
percent of the Med-Lite vehicle must be produced in the United States. The Polyot proposal does not meet either of these qualification criteria. 
47 Warren Ferster, "NASA Makes Med-Lite Award," Space News, Mar. 27, 1995, pp. 1,20. 
48 NASA, personal communication, March 1995. 
49 NASA, Office of Space Access and Technology, "Science, Aeronautics and Technology Fiscal Year 1996 Estimates," Washington, DC, 
p. SAT 5-5. 
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• issues surrounding RLV development; 
• questions about NASA's current focus on 
SSTO and what might happen if commercial-
ization of an SSTO is forgone in 2000; and fi-
nally, 
• NASA's plans and contingencies for the Space 
Shuttle beyond 2000. 
II-$ifl"" Divided responsibility and 
inter-agency coordination 
The NSTP divides the government's primary 
responsibilities for space transportation between 
DOD and NASA, but it does not discuss how con-
flicts in space transportation policy will be re-
solved between the two organizations. The lack of 
any such discussion in the policy and OTA's inter-
views with Administration officials suggest that 
conflicts in space transportation policy will be re-
solved on a case-by-case basis via negotiations be-
tween DOD and NASA, possibly with some 
mediation by a third party within the executive 
branch. 50 
At a minimum, divided responsibility will in-
crease the need for DOD and NASA to coordinate 
with one another as well as with the private sector, 
especially if national space policy objectives are 
to be achieved within tight budget constraints. 
DOD will have to consult with each party that uses 
ELV assets in order to manage those assets in a 
manner conducive to all interests, and the same 
applies to NASA for RLVs. 
That DOD and NASA will adequately account 
for the interests of all parties is not a certainty, 
especially as funds available for space transporta-
tion diminish. When conflicts arise over how to 
approach development of new space transporta-
tion systems, negotiations may succeed in keep-
ing both DOD and NASA satisfied, but could fail 
to account for the interests of all relevant parties, 
especially those in the private sector. 
Such negotiations could also lead to program-
matic redundancies.51 The absence of central au-
thority or leadership may allow DOD and NASA 
to discount potential redundancies and promote 
those projects that best address their own orga-
nizational requirements. As a result, hard space 
transportation decisions may go unmade. 
The imposition of a central authority has been 
proposed by many analysts and policy makers as a 
way to better account for all interests and avoid 
programmatic redundancies. 52 It is not clear, how-
ever, that a central authority would necessarily 
remedy these problems. Both DOD and NASA 
possess a considerable amount of bureaucratic an~d 
political weight. Therefore, competing organiza-
tional interests could potentially override the 
wishes of a central authority. 
Existing legal and organizational obstacles 
may also stand in the way of achieving the level of 
interagency and private sector coordination 
sought by a central authority. The recent contro-
versy over NASA's Med-Lite procurement may be 
emblematic of this problem (see box 6). Med-Lite 
has engendered a great amount of debate between 
DOD and NASA, and illustrates how interagency 
coordination can be precluded by current law, di-
vergent interpretations of that law, and competing 
organizational interests. 
Therefore, although the Administration's 
policy calls on DOD and NASA to "combine their 
[ELV] requirements into single procurements 
when such procurements would result in cost sav-
ings or are otherwise advantageous to the gov-
ernment," achieving this level of interagency 
coordination may prove extremely difficult. Con-
gress may wish to consider legislative action that 
would facilitate improved interagency coordina-
tion on all space transportation policy matters. If 
Congress decides to take up this issue, a compre-
hensive review of existing laws affecting such in-
50 Potential third parties within the executive branch include OSTP, NSTC, or either the President or Vice President. 
5l See the discussion below about potential conflicts and redundancies within the proposed development programs. 
52 For example, in the Bush Administration Vice President Quayle was given considerable authority over space transportation policy. 
44 I Office of Technology Assessment 
BOX 6: The Med-Lite Controversy 
In NASA's view, the Med-Lite procurement will fill a gap in ELV launch capacity that lies between small-
and medium-size launch vehicles. NASA officials see the Med-Lite program as a procurement of launch 
services for planetary exploration that complies with the Launch Services Purchase Act of 1990. 
DOD, on the other hand, has several concerns about the Med-Lite program. 1 In particular, DOD officials 
view Med-Lite as a launch vehicle development program-not a procurement of launch services. In their 
eyes, the Med-Lite vehicle may threaten the ability of the EEL V program to achieve maximum launch cost 
reductions for 000.2 NASA officials reject the claim that Med-Lite is a development program. They contend 
that DOD's position on the matter is heavily influenced by a traditional DOD philosophy of procuring launch 
vehicles. NASA contends that it procures launch seNices-not launch vehicles-and that NASA gets its 
money back if a launch is canceled.3 
In response, DOD officials accuse NASA of using this argument to divert attention away from the devel-
opment nature of the Med-Lite program. DOD pOints to the unusually long procurement period of four 
years4 for the Med-Lite as an indication that, indeed, the procurement is a development program. Further-
more, DOD officials claim that the Med-Lite request for proposal clearly lays out a development program.5 
This dispute over procurement philosophy shows just how difficult it is to reconcile conflicting interests. 
This difficulty becomes even more apparent when one reviews the divergent interpretations regarding the 
legality of the Med-Lite procurement. DOD has suggested that the Med-Lite procurement may be in viola-
tion of Public Law 102-139, Title III, October 28, 1991, section 2459d entitled "Prohibition of grant or con-
tract providing guaranteed customer base for new commercial space hardware or services." This statute 
1 DOD. "Med-Lite: A DOD White Paper," Washington, DC, December 1994. 
2 This point is discussed in further detail later in this report. 
3 DOD officials take issue with this characterization of DOD launch procurement by NASA. In their view, the Department procures 
launch seNices aswell, but writes in reflight provisions in its contracts in the event that a launch is canceled. 
4 DOD notes that "typical lead times for procurements conducted by commercial satellite builders are about two years [and that] 
NASA typically orders expendable launch vehicles 24-30 months ahead of launch." See DOD, op. cit., footnote 1, p. 3. 
5 DOD originally made this observation based on a draft Med-Lite request for proposal dated September 27, 1994, and noted that 
this draft RFP provided for "extensive NASA oversight through design review, technical interchange meetings, hardware acceptance 
reviews, quarterly program reviews, daily engineering interface, independent flight assurance reviews, hardware and software pedi-
gree reviews, full approval of designs and modifications, and a series of mission and launch readiness reviews." See DOD, op. cit., 
footnote 1, p. 3. 
teragency coordination may be a prudent first 
step, as there will likely be much disagreement on 
how the necessary reforms should be formulated. 
G.i-iUJdl Potential conflicts and redundancies 
NASA has a number of space transportation 
programs underway. Work has already begun on 
both the X-33 and X-34 programs; test flights of 
the DC-XA resumed in May 1995; upgrades to the 
Shuttle continue; and the Med-Lite procurement 
is moving forward. DOD, for its part, is pressing 
ahead with the EELV program and at the same 
time continuing some upgrades to the existing 
ELV fleet. All of this amounts to a sizable portfo-
lio of new space transportation technology devel-
opment and procurement. While this multitrack 
approach may reduce the overall risk of pursuing 
new space transportation systems, it may also lead 
to potential conflicts and redundancies. 
EELV and RLV 
NASA officials hope the proposed X-33 develop-
ment program will lead to a commercial RLV that 
will provide dramatically lower launch costs than 
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BOX 6 (cont'd.): The Med-Lite Controversy 
states that "no amount appropriated to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration in this or any 
other Act with respect to any fiscal year may be used to fund grants, contracts or other agreements with an 
expected duration of more than one year, when a primary effect of the grant, contract, or agreement is to 
provide a guaranteed customer base for or establish an anchor tenancy in new commercial space hard-
ware or services ... "6 DOD officials think that NASA has designated its planetary missions as an anchor 
tenant for Med-Lite and notes that it is unusual for any government entity to purchase launch services for 
yet unspecified payloads.7 
NASA officials counter this contention and argue that, in fact, the Med-Lite procurement is required by 
the law. POinting to the Launch Services Procurement Act of 1990, NASA officials believe that-with minor 
exception-it must purchase launch services in a competitive manner from commercial providers for its 
primary payloads.8 NASA officials do not believe that any of the exceptions provided for in the law apply. 
Therefore, in their view, NASA must go forward with the Med-Lite procurement. 
While divergent legal interpretations have proven problematic, other legal intricacies not under dispute 
have also influenced the Med-Lite debate. DOD offered to launch three NASA planetary exploration mis-
sions on three Titan II launch vehicles. In return, DOD asked only that NASA pay for refurbishment and 
launch operations at an approximate cost of $18 million per vehicle. This option, however, was legally pre-
cluded by the Economy Act, which requires that DOD sell its launch vehicles to NASA at full price-
approximately $54 million per vehicle. This difference in cost effectively precluded NASA from considering 
this option because the Med-Lite cost target is $25 million to $30 million per launch. 
6 DOD, op. cit., footnote 1, p. 3-4. 
7 NASA projects five "firm" launches between now and 1999. Only three, however, have been named: Mars Orbiter-2, Mars 
Lander-1, and the Far Ultraviolet Spectroscopic Explorer (FUSE). See Warren Ferster, "NASA Makes Med-Lite Award," Space News, 
Mar. 27,1995, pp. 1,20. 
B Exceptions include instances in which "(1) the payload requires the unique capabilities of the space shuttle; (2) cost effective 
commercial launch services to meet specific mission requirements are not reasonably available and would not be available when 
required; (3) the use of commercial launch services poses an unacceptable risk of loss of a unique scientific opportunity; or (4) the 
payload serves national security or foreign policy purposes." See Title II, Section 204b of the National Aeronautics and Space Admin-
istration Authorization Act, FY 1991. 
SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1995. 
existing launch systems. DOD's investment in 
EELV could potentially preclude or hinder 
achievement of this objective. If the EEL V pro-
gram succeeds in making the U.S. space trans-
portation industry more competitive in the global 
marketplace for launch services, the incentive to 
sustain a continuous stream of private investment 
into the commercial development of an RLV over 
several years may well diminish. 
Nonetheless if commercial development of an 
extremely low-cost RLV proceeds, then, at a mini-
mum, the RLV will compete with the EELV for 
payloads. This competition could prevent the 
EELV program from achieving long-term cost re-
duction targets set by DOD. For example, if ex-
tremely low launch prices were charged during the 
pioneering flight stage of the RLV, the RLV would 
probably attract payloads away from the EELV. 
This would reduce EEL V production volumes-
offsetting or potentially outweighing any gains in 
production volume created by commonality with-
in the EEL V family. 
This conflict between the EEL V and RLV pro-
grams has prompted some analysts to question the 
prudence of pursuing both programs simulta-
neously. Some have suggested forgoing the EELV 
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Artist's conception of Rockwell's proposed commercial 
follow-on RLV to the X-33. 
program and investing the $2 billion in RLV de-
velopment instead. They argue that the existing 
ELV fleet can adequately support DOD's manifest 
of payloads indefinitely or until a low-cost RLV is 
developed. 
In response to this proposal, DOD officials note 
that, in an environment of declining space budg-
ets, the Department must act now to lower its 
launch costs. They further note that there is sub-
stantial uncertainty surrounding the RLV devel-
opment program and its ability to achieve radical 
launch cost reductions. Therefore, DOD offi-
cials-who are fairly confident that the EELV 
program can reduce overall launch costs for the 
Department-believe they have chosen a prudent 
course of action. 
NASA officials offer a similar line of reasoning 
for the RLV development program to those that 
suggest it be eliminated in favor of a scaled-up 
EELV program. Current operating costs for the 
Space Shuttle and growing budget constraints 
have put NASA in the position of pursuing SSTO 
as a potentially low-cost Shuttle alternative, and 
NASA officials argue that any delay in pursuing 
SSTO would require a major investment in the ag-
ing Shuttle fleet to keep it in .operation beyond 
2012. 
X-33 and X-34 
NASA officials issued CANs for both the X-33 
and X-34 because they believe that a successful 
technology development and demonstration ef-
fort must fund a diverse number of projects. While 
conceding that some projects will be successful in 
maturing the technology and others will not, they 
argue that a premature cessation of any given proj-
ect would leave the overall program vulnerable to 
reliance on a potentially "wrong" technology. 
A dual-track strategy, however, is most effec-
tive when both tracks are on course to solve the 
same problem. The X-33 and X-34 programs do 
not address the same problem. The X-33 program 
is focused on developing a fully reusable SSTO to 
replace the Space Shuttle (Le., for use as a me-
dium-to-heavy-lift booster). The X-34, on the oth-
er hand, addresses the problem of developing a 
partially reusable launch system for delivering 
small payloads to orbit (i.e., a small-sized boost-
er). Therefore, critics of NASA's dual-track strate-
gy contend that the absence of one or the other 
X -vehicle would not increase the likelihood of ar-
riving at the "wrong" technological answer, be-
cause each program-from the start-has been 
designed to pursue a different technological an-
swer. 
Some analysts and policymakers have sug-
gested canceling the X-34 program based on this 
argument. Others have suggested terminating the 
X-34 program because they believe it is more of 
an operational vehicle development program than 
a true experimental vehicle program. Those mak-
ing this latter argument note that the X-34 pro-
gram is scheduled to conduct only a small number 
of test flights (which critics do not believe will be 
conducted in time to inform X-33 development), 
with only two technology demonstration flights 
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before becoming a commercially operated vehicle 
sometime in 1999.53 
Despite the criticisms leveled against the X-34 
program, there are several reasons for proceeding 
with X-34 development. First, the X-34 could po-
tentially provide an early in-flight test bed for 
RLV-related technologies.54 This experience 
could positively affect the design of the X-33 by 
steering it toward or away from certain technolo-
gies. Second, one of the objectives of the X-34 
program is to achieve a threefold reduction in the 
cost of access to space for small payloads. 
NASA and other government payloads consti-
tute a major portion of the small payload mar-
ket.55 Therefore, ifthe X-34 program succeeds in 
achieving targeted cost reductions, NASA-for a 
relatively small investment in the X-34 pro-
gram-will have achieved significant long-term 
savings for the government and will quickly re-
coup its $70 million investment. 56 Additionally, if 
the X-34 dramatically reduces the price charged 
for launching small payloads, the commercial 
benefit to the United States could show up in a 
larger market share of the global launch services 
industry, expanded space-based business opportu-
nities, and lower prices for consumers for both ex-
isting and new space-based services (e.g., 
telecommunications ). 
Med-Lite and EELV 
As noted in box 6, NASA is committed to the 
Med-Lite procurement while DOD officials are 
concerned that the Med-Lite vehicle may threaten 
the ability of the EELV program to achieve maxi-
mum launch cost reductions for DOD. DOD offi-
cials would be less concerned if they felt that the 
manufacturer of the Med-Lite could successfully 
scale up its vehicle design to meet DOD heavy-lift 
requirements. If this were possible, then the Med-
Lite would be a potential EELV candidate. But be-
cause DOD officials have little confidence that the 
Med-Lite can be successfully scaled up, they are 
concerned that the Med-Lite might eventually 
compete with the EELV for medium payloads-
thereby reducing EELV production volumes and 
possibly dampening overall EELV cost savings.57 
Additionally, the Med-Lite vehicle may slow, if 
not undermine, the industry consolidation cur-
rently underway in space launch services that 
some DOD officials believe is necessary. 
Space Shuttle and RLV 
NASA has proposed to phase in any newly devel-
oped RLV between 2005 and 2012. During this 
period, the Space Shuttle would continue flying, 
while the RLV would fly only a few times a year. 
The yet unproved reliability of the RLV combined 
53 At present, NASA has yet to decide what technologies it wishes to test on these flights. NASA officials are contemplating using the flights 
to conduct high-speed aerodynamic, aeropropulsion, or structural tests. Although such tests would be conducted on the reusable suborbital 
rocket booster, they would not necessarily be geared toward testing reusable launch technologies. Because the small reusable rocket booster 
resembles an aircraft in many respects, the tests could potentially be geared to test aircraft-related technologies instead. 
54 Many RL V-related technologies have undergone extensive ground testing. This testing seldom mimics what might occur in flight. There-
fore, first-time flight testing of these technologies on a relatively inexpensive X-34 may be more prudent than trying them out for the first time 
on either the Space Shuttle or the X-33. 
55 Recall that NASA plans to launch 10 to 12 small payloads per year over the next 10 years. DOD will probably contribute another I to 4 
small payloads per year over the same period of time. 
56 If the X-34 achieves a threefold reduction in the cost of access to space for small payloads, NASA would recoup its investment after 
launching approximately seven payloads of an average weight of 1,500 Ibs. This estimate would vary depending on the actual cost reductions 
achieved as well as the actual weights of the payloads launched. 
57 Recent comments by industry officials regarding Med-Lite indicate that the threat perceived by DOD may not be very real. Industry 
seems to be skeptical of the long-term viability of a Med-Lite vehicle-instead viewing the EELV as the vehicle of the future. See Warren Fer-
ster, op. cit., footnote 47. 
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with the need to fly missions to the International 
Space Station would probably preclude the option 
of grounding the Space Shuttle during this period. 
Therefore, NASA might require substantial fund-
ing during these years in order to support the si-
multaneous operation of the Space Shuttle and 
flight testing of the RLV. 
ItiiYiM HLVs drive the EEL V program 
Historically, cost has taken a back seat to mis-
sion in defense-related space activities. Budget re-
ductions, however, have prompted DOD to reduce 
how much it spends on space transportation. The 
V.S. Air Force plans to reduce its out-year space 
transportation budgets by downsizing its pay-
loads and phasing out its heavy-lift require-
ments.58 The intelligence community, however 
has a continued need for HLV s. 59 Therefore, be 
cause DOD believes larger cost savings are pos 
sible in the HLV class than in the MLV class, it ha 
geared the EEL V program toward achieving sig 
nificant HLV cost reductions.60 
Some industry officials have expressed cor 
cern that DOD's focus on HLV cost reductions i! -
nores private sector concerns.61 In their view, thi::-
market for medium payloads is the biggest portion 
of the satellite market. Therefore, V .S.launch pro-
viders, satellite owners, and ultimately the con-
sumers of space-based services would much 
prefer cheaper, more reliable MLV s over cheaper, 
more reliable HLV s. Others note that commercial 
geosynchronous-Earth-orbit (GEO) payloads are 
getting heavier and contend that significant HLV 
cost reductions would be commercially attractive, 
DOD has a continuing need for HLVs, such as this Titan IV. A 
heavy-lift EELV is scheduled to be operational in 2005. 
as evidenced by ESA's development of the heavy-
lift Ariane 5. It is unlikely, however, that the 
heavy-lift EELV will be able to compete success-
fully in the commercial market for launch ser-
vices--even if it achieves a 40-percent cost 
reduction over the Titan IV.62 
58 Currently, the U.S. Air Force is purchasing enough Titan IVs to launch its remaining heavy payload manifest. 
59 U.S. Department of Defense, personal communication, January 1995. See also U.S. Department of Defense, op. cit., footnote 15, p. II-II. 
60 DOD officials expect that the EELV program will achieve a maximum cost savings of 40 percent for HLVs, while only achieving a maxi-
mum of 10 percent cost savings for MLVs. U.S. Department of Defense, personal communication, January 1995. 
61 See the section covering fundamental objective #4 for a more developed discussion of the private sector role in space transportation 
policy decisionmaking. 
62 ESA developed the heavy-lift Ariane 5 so that Arianespace will be able to continue its practice oflaunching multiple payloads per launch 
when such a practice is feasible. 
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liifliliJl RLV development 
NASA has pointed to its RLV development 
strategy as one example of its "new way of doing 
business." This section examines some of the con-
cerns that have emerged outside of NASA as the 
result of its proposed RLV development strategy. 
Property and Data Rights and 
Core Technologies 
Both NASA and its X-34 industry partners have 
argued that technical data acquired on the X-34 
program could be of potential use to the X-33 pro-
gram. Even if the technical data gathered on the 
X -34 program were useful, however, any effort to 
transfer that data to the X-33 program may face 
notable difficulties. 
The CANs for both the X-33 and X-34 grant 
specific property and data rights to both prime and 
lower-tier contractors. For example, the CANs 
state that NASA-in the event of a joint invention 
with an industrial partner-will attempt to "re-
frain from exercising rights which would adverse-
ly affect commercialization" by that industrial 
partner.63 
NASA's desire to transfer technology from the 
X-34 to the X-33 may put a strain on its ability to 
adhere to the spirit of this language. This may be 
especially true if a contractor or subcontractor that 
has developed technology for the X-34 is not part 
of the X-33 development team. It would be less 
problematic if firms developing technology for 
the X-34 were also on the X-33 team.64 
Concerns about property and data rights are not 
limited to technology transfer from the X-34 to the 
X-33. In conversations with industry, OTA has 
learned that property and data rights issues SUf-
63 NASA, op. cit., footnote 33, p. ii. 
rounding the proposed RLV core technology de-
velopment programs are a point of major concern, 
particularly those core technology development 
programs planned for Phase II of the X-33 pro-
gram.65 At present, NASA has not told industry 
whether these core technology development pro-
grams will be controlled by NASA, awarded com-
petitively, or granted to the X-33 contracting 
team.66 
Industry officials contend that if NASA retains 
control or decides to offer these core technology 
development programs to all of industry, property 
and data rights issues could-in one way or anoth-
er-potentially hamper technology transfer or 
commercialization. 
For example, if NASA decided to honor the 
X -33 CAN language concerning property and data 
rights and allow firms to retain title to property 
and data rights,67 technology transfer would de-
pend on industry negotiations. These negotiations 
could potentially slow or thwart the commercial-
ization of a follow-on RLV if compensation paid 
to firms developing core technologies significant-
ly reduced the return on investment for developers 
of the RLV. Also, industry negotiations could re-
sult in a waste of government investment if devel-
opers of the RLV dismiss technologies developed 
by other firms. 
If NASA decides to take the opposite approach 
and exercise its title rights, it could transfer a 
technology out of the core technology develop-
ment programs and into the commercial develop-
ment of the follow-on RLV without compensating 
the firm that developed the technology. Any firm 
losing its title rights might reasonably complain 
that NASA had violated the spirit of the CAN by 
64 Rockwell International is the only finn competing as a major team member on both X -vehicles. Orbital Sciences, for its part, has told OTA 
of its willingness to share new X-34 technology with NASA and X-33 contractors. 
65 NASA projects that it will contribute roughly $187 million toward core technology development during Phase II. 
66 NASA's current position appears to be that it will control core technology development program decisions and obtain input pertinent to 
making those decisions from the X-33 contracting team. 
67 In the case of inventions developed by small or disadvantaged businesses or nonprofit organizations, NASA must, by law, allow such 
firms to keep their property and data rights if they elect to retain them. See NASA, op. cit., footnote 33, p. iii. 
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The YF-22 (top) beat the YF-23 (bottom) in a head-to-head 
fly-off competition for the U.S. Air Force's advanced tactical 
fighter procurement. 
undercutting the firm's ability to commercialize 
technologies in which it invested. 
And finally, if NASA chooses to compete the 
core technology development programs on the 
open market, NASA would effectively be the enti-
ty to decide what core technologies should or 
should not be developed, rather than developers of 
the RLV. While this may not be an unusual role for 
government, it may not be the most cost-effective 
path to a commercial RLV, especially if develop-
ers of the RLV decide to fund additional core 
technology programs of their own. 
In any case, industry teams preparing business 
plans for Phase II proposals of the X-33 program 
will want to have a clearer understanding of how 
funds for the core technology development pro-
grams will be distributed before they settle on 
their final Phase II proposals. 
X-33: Alternative Programmatic Approaches 
Some critics of the proposed X-33 program argue 
that NASA should look back to the early days of 
jet aircraft for a development model. They argue 
that the X-33 should not be designed in the shad-
ow cast by future requirements for the Internation-
al Space Station. Instead, NASA should fully fund 
an X-33 program that focuses solely on demon-
strating SSTO technology. 68 
NASA contends that, although the X-33 pro-
gram is not fully funded, it is, indeed, an X-pro-
gram that focuses solely on demonstrating SSTO 
technology. NASA justifies its approach because 
of declining space budgets and because the 
eventual intent of the program is to commercialize 
a follow-on RLV. Therefore, NASA believes that 
industry should be expected to contribute to X-33 
development. 
Others have suggested a competitive fly-off be-
tween or among competing X-33 concepts.69 
NASA has expressed an interest in conducting 
such a fly-off. Proponents of a fly-off strategy be-
lieve that it would decrease the possibility of 
choosing the "wrong" technology and increase the 
likelihood of retaining competition in the domes-
tic launch vehicle industry. 
To conduct a fly-off that would be technologi-
cally meaningful, the government would need to 
budget more money in the near term than currently 
planned. This increased government investment 
68 Some proponents of this view are suggesting a figure of approximately $2 billion for the period spanning FY 1996-2000, an amount 
comparable to DOD EELV funding. 
69 A fly-off would entail development of multiple versions of the X-33 by competing teams. Each version of the X-33 would undergo a 
similar regime of flight tests. At the end of flight testing, each team could move forward with commercialization of its concept if it chose to. A 
fly-off competition need not be limited to SSTO concepts. Such a fly-off could be open to other RLV concepts such as TSTO. 
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runs counter to the trend toward smaller govern-
ment space budgets. Moreover, a fly-off strategy 
would entail significant financial risk for industry 
participants. This financial risk might be lowered 
by a winner-take-all fly-off strategy, with the loser 
being reimbursed for its efforts. This option, how-
ever, would further increase the cost to govern-
ment for pursuing such a strategy. 
The Role of DOD Payloads in 
RLV Development 
Many of the industry-government partnership 
schemes for RLV funding under debate within the 
executive branch contain an implicit requirement 
that some DOD payloads be committed to early 
RLV launches. DOD officials cite the Space 
Shuttle experience as their reason for being hesi-
tant to make any such commitment. DOD officials 
also note that the proposed RLV will initially only 
place payloads in LEO at altitudes comparable to 
that of the International Space Station. Therefore, 
because most DOD payloads are placed in higher 
orbits, an upper stage would be required for DOD 
payloads to reach their mission orbit. The addition 
of an upper stage would add technical complexity 
and increase the cost for such missions.7° 
Excluding DOD payloads during the pioneer-
ing flight phase of the commercial follow-on RLV 
would drive the price oflaunching the RLV higher 
if other payloads cannot be attracted to fly aboard 
the new system.71 The commercial RLV develop-
er could attract other payloads by offering to 
deploy them at little to no cost during RLV test 
flights. Critics of this proposal note, however, that 
it would undercut other U.S. commercial launch 
vehicles and limit their ability to become more 
competitive by taking away a piece of their mar-
ket, thereby reducing their volume of production. 
At this time it is unclear how this issu~\I'ill be 
resolved. NASA and its commerCial partndS need 
a sufficient number of payloads to both atllact po-
tential investors and prove the reliability of RL V 
technology during its pioneering flig~1 stage. 
DOD wishes to safeguard its miSSions cJis not 
willing to contribute payloads in the pioneering 
stage ofRLV flight. And attempts to attra(tother 
payloads to the pioneering flight stage ooe RL V 
may undercut the commercial POsition of we rest 
of the U.S. space transportation industry. 
$1-iU'" SSTO? 
The prudence of focusing the RLV develop-
ment program on the SSTO concept is a 1J1Itter of 
some debate. Some industry analysts claiJll tlrat 
NASA has prematurely committed to S~fO by 
unnecessarily ruling out other RLV optionS, par-
ticularly a fully reusable TSTO. In their view, the 
RLV development program may end up being less 
revolutionary than it otherwise might be if the 
TSTO option were retained in the short terrJI' Om-
er analysts believe that SSTO is the only ~terna­
tive that will sufficiently reduce the cost of9ccess 
to space and claim that NASA is proceediJlg toO 
cautiously. Table 11 summarizes the adv~tages 
and disadvantages of both the SSTO and TSfO re-
usable concepts. 
SSTO or RLV? 
The NSTP assigns NASA the responsibility o:f 
leading the effort to develop and demonstrate 
"next generation reusable space transportation 
systems" and offers SSTO as only one possible 
technological option.72 Yet, the policy also 
instructs NASA to focus research "on tec/IUolo-
gies to support a decision no later than Deccmbe:r 
1996 to proceed with a sub-scale flight dcmon-
70 Similarly, most medium· sized commercial satellites are stationed in orbits higher than that of the International Space Station, Therefore: • 
they too would require an upper stage-at added expense-in order to reach their desired orbit, 
71 The non-recurring development costs for a commercial RLV system would have to be amortized over a smaller number of l,tJ!IcheS. • 
thereby raising the cost per launch, 
72 The White House Office, Office of Science and Technology Policy, op. cit., footnote 3, sec. 1(3). 
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TABLE 11: Pros and Cons of the SSTO and TSTO Reusable Concepts 
Pros 
Cons 
SSTO 
Uses one vehicle instead of two 
Avoids cost and complexity of staging 
Requires less complex aerodynamic analysis 
and design than TSTO 
Simplifies ground and flight operations com-
pared to TSTO 
Requires high fuel mass fraction (i.e., low struc-
tural weight fraction) not achievable with existing 
technology 
Requires performance maximization (i.e., small 
performance margins)a 
Uses engines at all altitudes, although engines 
are optimized for one altitudeb 
TSTO 
Reduces technological difficulty of reaching orbit 
compared to SSTO 
Allows for use of expendable thrust augmentation 
(i.e., strap on boosters) 
Allows designers to build in larger performance 
marginsa than SSTO 
Adds cost and complexity of staging 
Makes ground and flight operations more costly and 
complicated than SSTO 
Requires more complex aerodynamic analysis and 
design than SSTO 
Requires reintegration of stages before reflight 
a The term "performance margin" refers to the difference between the designed and required performance of any given component or subsystem. A 
space transportation system with small performance margins must operate close to its design limit. A space transportation system with large perfor-
mance margins does not have to, but can, operate close to its design limit. 
b Engines could be optimized for multiple altitudes. This, however, would require complex and expensive variable geometry engines. 
SOURCES: Lt. Col. John London, U.S. Air Force, "Affordable Space Access: Issues, Choices, and Methods," Space Workshop '95: Reducing Space 
Mission Costs, Denver, CO, Mar. 8-10, 1995. Office of Technology Assessment, 1995. 
stration which would prove the concept of single-
stage-to-orbit.'>73 
NASA has responded to this pair of directives 
by proposing what it believes to be a phased 
technology maturation program for the SSTO 
concept that periodically pauses along the way to 
evaluate its progress. If at any of the designated 
evaluation points the Administration decides that 
insufficient progress is being made, the pursuit of 
SSTO can be called off. NASA could then consid-
er other RLV concepts and possibly draw from 
past SSTO technology development where appli-
cable. 
Some space policy analysts have taken issue 
with this approach. They argue that it grants-to 
the detriment of other RLV concepts-too much 
attention to the SSTO concept. They note that, be-
cause SSTO truly is a revolutionary goal, pursu-
ing it with such vigor and then having to break off 
73 Ibid., sec. III(2)(b). 
that pursuit in favor of upgrading the Space 
Shuttle or perhaps pursuing another RLV concept 
may lead to an inefficient and suboptimal result. 
For example, the addition of any type of first stage 
to a vehicle originally designed as an SSTO-
whether it be a reusable booster, a set of strap-on 
solid rocket motors, or an expendable, liquid-
fueled engine-would probably require a costly 
and time-consuming structural redesign in order 
to accommodate the additional thrust at takeoff. 
One alternative to NASA's current RLV devel-
opment strategy would be a more evolutionary ap-
proach-whereby "reusable building block" 
technologies would be gradually developed and 
tested in existing launch systems in the hope that 
they could eventually be expanded upon and used 
in an operational RLV (either SSTO or TSTO).74 
Another alternative would be to design, from the 
74 Buzz Aldrin with John Kross, "Reusable Launch Vehicles: A Perspective," Ad Astra, March! April 1995, p. 31. 
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beginning, an SSTO capable of accommodating 
strap-on solid rocket motors to augment thrust. 
This has the advantage of avoiding the structural 
redesign noted above, and it would also provide a 
contingency for ensuring the nation's continued 
ability to design and produce long-range ballistic 
missiles. 
Despite the criticisms, NASA believes that its 
current approach is prudent. It believes that SSTO 
is the RLV option that will reduce launch costs the 
most. Therefore, SSTO is deserving of a vigorous, 
yet carefully measured, technology development 
program-something NASA believes it has 
achieved with the X-33 program. _--------..J 
Criteria for Judging X-33 Program Success 
Although the X-33 CAN sets out broad criteria for 
selecting a contractor for the fabrication and test 
flight phase (Le., Phase II) of the program,75 these 
criteria address the conditions for initiating Phase 
II and awarding a Phase II contract, but not for 
judging the success of Phase II. 
The absence of specifically delineated criteria 
for evaluating the success of Phase II is troubling 
for two reasons. First, it may make it difficult for 
industry to predict how NASA will reach future 
X-33 program decisions. This uncertainty will af-
fect the amount of money firms will be willing to 
invest in the X-33, if they choose to participate at 
all. Second, it will make it more difficult for 
NASA to explain to Congress and others why cer-
tain X-33 program decisions were made. 
NASA, in conjunction with OSTP and the Of-
fice of Management and Budget (OMB), has es-
tablished criteria to support both the 1996 and 
2000 decisions.76 They note that these criteria ad-
dress cost, operations, and design and develop-
ment factors and that all of the criteria (for both the 
1996 and 2000 decisions) include a link to any fol-
low-on commercial RLV development activities 
that might be proposed by prospective contrac-
tors,?7 
Some have suggested that because, in the fu-
ture, Congress will be asked to provide continued 
annual support for the X-33 program, Congress 
may wish to ask that NASA provide a set of spe-
cific intermediate criteria for evaluating X -33 pro-
gram success on an annual basis. Some analysts 
have noted, however, that annual evaluation of the 
X-33 program may slow the development process 
as a result of increased industry reporting require-
ments and the added dimension of program uncer-
tainty that such evaluations would introduce. 
If SSTO Commercialization Does Not 
Begin in 2000: What Next? 
There is a distinct chance that industry will forgo 
commercial development of an RLV in 2000, ei-
ther because the technical risks associated with the 
SSTO concept were not sufficiently resolved by 
the X-33 program or because market conditions 
do not justify the investment. If industry decides 
not to proceed with commercialization of an 
SSTO vehicle in 2000, one of five scenarios could 
unfold. 
Scenario 1: NASA decides to extend the 
SSTO development program beyond 2000 and 
upgrade the Space Shuttle to extend its opera-
tion until the newly projected date (sometime 
beyond 2012) for RLV replacement. NASA 
might choose this course of action if it believes 
that the technical risks associated with SSTO are 
75 These criteria address cost, operations, and design and development factors, and all of the criteria include a link to any follow-on commer-
cial RLV development activities that might be proposed by a prospective contractor. 
76 NASA, The White House, Office of Science and Technology Policy, and U.S. Office of Management and Budget, "Decision Criteria for 
the Reusable Launch Vehicle Technology Program Phases II and III," May I, 1995. 
77 These criteria link the decision to proceed with Phase III of the X -33 program (i.e., development of a commercial follow-on RLV) to the 
ability of the X-33 and X-34 programs to meet "their respective program goals within a fixed Government budget [and demonstrate) that the 
industry-led, co-funded development of advanced space technology is an efficient, cost-saving program approach." Ibid., p. 12. Industry offi-
cials involved in the X-33 program are troubled by this link because they do not believe that X-34 program success is necessary to justify pro-
ceeding with Phase III of the X -33. 
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on the verge of being resolved. NASA's ability to 
choose this option would be constrained in two 
ways. First, NASA would have to convince Con-
gress to fund both a continued SSTO development 
program and a Shuttle upgrade program that will 
probably cost more than current upgrade plans. 
Second, industry may decide that it is not in its 
long-term interest to pursue continued develop-
ment of SST0.78 
Scenario 2: NASA decides to initiate a par-
tially or fully reusable TSTO development pro-
gram starting in 2000 and upgrade to the Space 
Shuttle to extend its operation until the newly 
projected date (sometime beyond 2012) for 
RLV replacement. NASA might pursue this op-
tion if it believes that the X-33 program achieved 
significant advances in RLV-related technologies, 
but decides that an SSTO vehicle remains beyond 
reach. NASA would probably request a more sig-
nificant budget increase than that required for the 
previous scenario because NASA is skeptical that 
a TSTO designed to replace the Space Shuttle 
would be commercially viable and believes TSTO 
development would have to be fully funded by 
NASA. Without a significant budget increase, 
fully funding TSTO development might hamper 
NASA's ability to pursue the requisite Shuttle up-
grades necessary to keep it flying safely until the 
TSTO comes on line. 
The X-33 contractor would likely have an ad-
vantage over its competition in a TSTO competi-
tion if NASA could obtain from Congress the 
budget needed to fund the entire development of 
the vehicle. This advantage might be lessened if 
NASA, for whatever reason, turned to industry to 
partially or fully fund TSTO development.79 
Were NASA to decide to select another con-
tractor for the TSTO, it could resurrect NASA's di-
lemma over property and data rights for 
technologies developed during the X-33 program. 
NASA could exercise its title rights to inventions 
(and any associated data) developed in the X-33 
program and transfer this knowledge to the new 
TSTO contractor. Alternatively, NASA could al-
low property and data rights issues to be worked 
out within industry. This, however, would raise 
costs and possibly slow down the development of 
the TSTO. 
Regardless of the route that NASA takes to de-
velop a TSTO under this scenario, some analysts 
believe that the resultant TSTO would be subopti-
mal because all prior development work will have 
focused on SSTO. Furthermore, they believe that 
the resultant TSTO would probably fall short of 
achieving the level of launch cost reductions that 
might otherwise have been achieved with a par-
tially or fully reusable TSTO had the TSTO con-
cept not been discounted by NASA earlier in the 
development process. 
Scenario 3: Industry decides to commercial-
ize a partially or fully reusable TSTO that 
would allow NASA to retain its current plans 
for replacing the Space Shuttle in 2012 with the 
new RLV. Industry might pursue this option if it 
thought that RLV-related technology advances 
achieved in the X-33 program were not enough to 
justify SSTO development, but did make TSTO a 
viable technology option. As noted in the discus-
sion of the previous scenario, NASA officials 
question the commercial viability of TSTO. 
Therefore, industry would likely require a pack-
age of financial incentives-similar to, if not 
78 The X -33 contractor may decide that any continued investment in SSTO will not reap sufficient fmancial returns. Other potential contrac-
tors may conclude that the level of investment required for it to spool up an SSTO program and bring it to fruition by commercializing an SSTO 
vehicle would outweigh any potential financial reward from doing so. 
79 Any technical advantage gained by the X-33 contractor during development may be partially counterbalanced by the fact that the con-
tractor invested substantial resources in a technology development program that did not result in an operational vehicle. 
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greater than, those it is currently demanding for 
SSTO development-before proceeding with 
commercialization of a TSTO vehicle.80 Any 
TSTO developed under this scenario might be 
suboptimal for the same reasons articulated in the 
previous scenario. 
Scenario 4: NASA decides that it wants to 
initiate a program of block upgrades to the 
Space Shuttle that would extend its operations 
until 2020. NASA would likely pursue this option 
if its current RLV technology development effort 
failed to reduce the technical risk associated with 
RLV launch systems sufficiently. NASA contends 
that wholesale block upgrades to the Space 
Shuttle would cost roughly $5 billion to $10 bil-
lion8! on top of the current expenditures of about 
$4 billion per year for Space Shuttle operations. 
Improvements would likely include a handful of 
options listed in NASA's implementation plan as 
well as the incorporation of certain technologies 
successfully proven during the X-33 program (see 
section below on the Space Shuttle beyond 2000). 
Scenario 5: NASA decides to reevaluate its 
plans for the future, possibly commissioning a 
new space transportation study or perhaps 
considering alternative options already ex-
amined in past studies (e.g., development of a 
new, low-cost ELV that is capable of deploying 
either a cargo canister or a small, manned 
space vehicle). NASA might pursue this option if 
it believes all other options are not viable. Contin-
ued Space Shuttle operation would depend on the 
operational status of the International Space Sta-
tion. If operation of the International Space Sta-
tion ceases, for any reason, Shuttle flights could 
potentially be suspended-which would enable 
NASA to direct more funds toward the develop-
ment of alternative space transportation options. 
Block upgrades initiated in 2000 could keep the Space 
Shuttle in operation until 2020. 
If Shuttle flights to the International Space Station 
are still necessary, the range of alternative space 
transportation options that NASA would be capa-
ble of pursuing may well be limited. 
It"$·i'illl Space Shuttle-beyond 2000 
If the government and industry decide in 2000 
to forgo continued RLV development, NASA 
plans block upgrades to the Space Shuttle. These 
improvements are needed to ensure safe opera-
tions until 2020. At some point, however, the 
introduction of new technologies results in a sub-
stantially new vehicle with many of the same test-
ing and safety concerns of a new vehicle. 
Furthermore, if reconstitution of old Space 
Shuttle production capabilities becomes neces-
sary, it will require both time and money. 
80 Possible financial incentives include some type of guarantee from the government to launch its payloads exclusively on the newly devel-
oped TSTO. Another option would be to simply contribute government funds to the development of the vehicle. 
8l Daniel S. Goldin, NASA Administrator, testimony at a hearing before the Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Sci-
ence, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC, Feb. 13, 1995. Some industry officials believe that this projection is an overestimate. 
One official suggests that Shuttle operations costs could be reduced by a $1 billion per year by privatizing the Shuttle and initiating a targeted 
upgrade program costing only $200 million per year. 
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NASA's implementation plan lists several po-
tential upgrades that might be pursued. One of the 
main improvements proposed by NASA is the 
substitution ofLFBBs for the existing solid rocket 
boosters (SRBs) between 2007 and 2010.82 
NASA touts the benefits of LFBBs in its imple-
mentation plan-namely increased safety, pay-
load performance, and launch probability as well 
as reduced annual operating costs compared with 
SRBs. The implementation plan does not, how-
ever, outline any contingencies to address poten-
tial negative consequences associated with the 
switch over to LFBBs.83 
Those concerned with maintaining a continued 
capability to produce ballistic missiles might have 
reason to be troubled by this omission. Replacing 
SRBs with LFBBs may have a significant impact 
on the solid rocket motor industry. NASA's imple-
mentation plan, however, does not address the 
national security implications of its SRB phase-
out.84 
In fact, NASA's implementation plan pays little 
direct attention to the Space Shuttle industrial 
base.85 NASA's implementation plan seems to as-
sume that the industrial base will possess the vital-
ity to perform the block upgrade efforts cited by 
NASA as necessary to keep the Space Shuttle fly-
ing until 2020. OTA has spoken with a number of 
82 NASA, op. cit., footnote 29, p. 21. 
industrialists, however, particularly in the lower 
tiers, who are concerned with the present health of 
the industrial base and warn that reconstituting the 
Space Shuttle industrial base for the block up-
grades requires more planning than NASA is cur-
rently doing.86 The lack of planning suggests to 
some industrialists that NASA is not serious about 
upgrading the Space Shuttle beginning in 2000. 
Finally, there remains the prospect of another 
Space Shuttle accident that results in the loss of an 
Orbiter. Past OTA analysis has shown that if 
Shuttle reliability is 98 percent there is a 50-50 
chance of an Orbiter loss in the next 34 
launches.87 Such a loss would have major reper-
cussions for both the Space Shuttle and X-33 pro-
grams. 
I Fundamental Objective #2: 
U.S. Use of Foreign Launch 
Systems and Components 
The NSTP expressly encourages federal depart-
ments and agencies "to take advantage of foreign 
components or technologies in upgrading U.S. 
space transportation systems or developing next 
generation space transportation systems."88 The 
Administration's new policy also limits the flight 
of U.S. government payloads to U.S. space trans-
83 NASA officials maintain that the decision to use LFBBs or make any other upgrade will not be made until the year 2000. They contend 
that at that time, as part of the decision process, a thorough analysis will be completed to assess the efficacy of changeover to LFBB or any other 
technology. 
84 See the discussion later in this report on preservation of long-range missile capabilities. 
85 NASA was unable to provide OTA with any studies by NASA of the Space Shuttle technology and industrial base. NASA, personal com-
munication, March 1995. 
86 Recent discussion in the press may lend support to this concern. It seems that NASA might be considering consolidating Space Shuttle 
efforts by closing down Rockwell operations in both Downey and Palmdale, California and shifting all Shuttle related work to Kennedy Space 
Center in Florida. Although this is only one of several proposals currently under consideration by NASA, it suggests that major changes in the 
industrial base are inevitable. How these changes will affect NASA's ability to carry out block upgrades to the Space Shuttle appears to remain 
an open question. See United Press International, "NASA document targets Rockwell plants," Mar. 2, 1994 
87 At the time ofOTA's analysis, experts considered Space Shuttle reliability to fall between 97 and 99 percent. See U.S. Congress, Office of 
Technology Assessment, Access to Space: The Future o/U.S. Space Transportation Systems, OTA-ISC-415 (Washington, DC: U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, April, 1990). NASA has made a variety of improvements to the Space Shuttle, some of which may improve its reliability 
and reduce the chance of losing an orbiter. 
88 The White House, Office of Science and Technology Policy, op. cit., footnote 3, sec. VI(2). 
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portation systems, in effect removing U.S. gov-
ernment payloads from the available international 
marketplace for launch services. In this, it follows 
past policy. 
NSTP Fundamental Objective #2 
Establishes policy on federal agencies' use of foreign 
launch systems and components. With the end of the Cold 
War, it is important for the U.S. to be in a position to capital-
ize on foreign technologies-including Russian technolo-
gies-without, at the same time, becoming dependent on 
them. The policy allows the use of foreign components, 
technologies and (under certain conditions) foreign launch 
seNices, consistent with U.S. national security, foreign 
policy and commercial space guidelines in the policy. 
The NSTP recognizes the growing internation-
al interdependence of space activities by allowing 
launch of government payloads on foreign launch 
vehicles that are made available on "a no-ex-
change-of-funds basis to support the following: 
flight of scientific instruments on foreign space-
craft, international scientific programs, or other 
cooperative government-to-government pro-
grams."89 This provision would cover, for exam-
ple, such undertakings as the 1992 launch of the 
U.S.-French TOPEX-Poseidon spacecraft on an 
Ariane 4 launcher, and the use of non-U.S. launch 
vehicles during construction and operation of the 
International Space Station.90 
The NSTP supports the negotiation of "interna-
tional space launch trade agreements with other 
nations that define principles of free and fair trade 
for commercial space launch services.,,91 It also 
notes that such agreements must conform with re-
lated U.S. obligations and treaties, such as 
Ariane 4 in flight. The Ariane family of vehicles was primarily 
designed to serve the international commercial market. 
technology transfer policies and the Missile 
Technology Control Regime (MTCR).92 
The past two decades have brought striking 
changes in the character of space transportation 
services on the world market. The international 
marketplace for space transportation services has 
become far more complex and interdependent 
than it was just a few years ago. Before 1979, 
when the ESA successfully launched its first pay-
89 The White House, Office of Science and Technology Policy, op. cit., footnote 3, sec. VI( I )(a). 
90 It also covers the planned launch of the Stratospheric Aeorsol and Gas Experiment (SAGE) and Total Ozone Mapping Spectrometer 
(TOMS) instruments on Russian Meteor 3 spacecraft, on Russian boosters. 
91 The White House, Office of Science and Technology Policy, op. cit., footnote 3, sec. V(l). 
92 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) does not affect the international trade of launch services. Subsidy language in the 
Uruguay round of GATT pertains only to goods traded across borders-not services. Therefore, at present, the launch services market falls 
outside of the domain of GATT. Indeed, the unique nature of the launch service industry was a key factor behind the United States' pursuit and 
acquisition of launch service trade agreements outside of the GATT framework with both China and Russia. 
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load aboard the Ariane 1 ELV, the U.S. govern-
ment was the only supplier of launch services for 
commercial satellites.93 In the mid-1980s, the 
United States made the fIrst moves toward com-
mercializing its ELV fleet. In the late 1980s, fIrst 
China, then the Soviet Union began to offer 
launch services aboard indigenous launchers. 
Most recently, as a direct result of the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, Russian and Ukrainian launch 
services and Russian subsystem technology have 
become available on the international market-
place. 
These circumstances have forced policymakers 
to account not only for U.S. space transportation 
development needs, but also for the effects of the 
use offoreign technology in U.S. launch systems 
and competitive foreign launch services on the 
U.S. space transportation industry. 
In particular, the high performance and low 
costs of Russian liquid-fueled engines and other 
launch technologies has led U.S. fIrms to consider 
incorporating Russian technology into current 
and future U.S. space transportation systems. 
Such uses of Russian technologies may reduce the 
costs and increase the performance of U.S. launch 
systems, making them more attractive to purchas-
ers of U.S.-built satellites. Some policymakers 
and industry leaders, however, are concerned that 
incorporating Russian technology into U.S. 
launch systems might also lead to the loss of U.S. 
jobs in the space transportation industry. In addi-
tion, dependence on Russian technology raises 
concerns about the maintenance of the U.S. space 
transportation technology and industrial base, and 
U.S. readiness to meet national security chal-
lenges. 
This section explores the effects that the poli-
cies toward introducing non-U.S. launch compo-
nents into U.S. launch systems, contained in the 
NSTP and its supporting implementing plans, 
might have on the competitive position of the U.S. 
space transportation and satellite industries,94 It 
also examines the use of non-U.S. launch services 
for U.S. commercial and foreign payloads and in-
ternational trade in launch services. 
Incorporating Foreign Technology 
into U.S. Launch Systems 
Since the United States began work on the partial-
ly reusable Space Shuttle in the early 1970s, it has 
spent relatively little on the development of new 
technology for ELVs. Until the loss of Challenger 
in January 1986, the United States had followed a 
policy that focused on the Space Shuttle as the 
sole provider oflaunch services for all payloads.95 
The only new U.S. launch vehicle was the Titan 
IV, developed to provide an alternative means of 
placing large DOD payloads into orbit. 
Although the manufacturers of ELVs have in-
creased the payload capacity of U.S. systems and 
reduced operational costs, they have not kept pace 
with developments in foreign launch systems. 
U.S. launchers still take longer to process and to 
integrate with payloads than competing launch 
systems. The United States might be able to im-
prove its fleet of ELV s and reduce launch services 
costs by adopting new technology and some of the 
automated launch operations practices of its com-
petitors.96 
The end of the Cold War has greatly broadened 
the available range of technology available to U.S. 
93 Both the United States and the Soviet Union also launched payloads for other governments, but arrangements were always made on a 
governmental level. 
94 See the section covering fundamental objective #4 for a discussion of the private sector role in space transportation decisionmaking and 
the status of the international market for launch services. 
95 This policy was first stated publicly in President Reagan's space policy of 1982. The White House, "National Space Policy Fact Sheet," 
Washington, DC, July 4, 1982. 
96 See, e.g., U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Reducing Launch Operations Costs: New Technologies and Practices, OTA-
TM-ISC-28 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1988). 
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launch system manufacturers. During the Cold 
War, because of the close connection between 
launch vehicle technologies and ballistic missile 
technologies, the United States and other space-
faring nations kept close control over the flow of 
launch technologies to other countries. As a result, 
U.S. insight into the details of the capabilities of 
the Soviet Union was quite limited.97 U.S. and 
Soviet officials closely scrutinized even high-pro-
file cooperative programs such as the Apollo-So-
yuz linkup in 1975 to prevent unwanted technology 
transfers. 
Beginning with the political reforms instituted 
during the Gorbachev regime, the United States 
began to gain direct access to Soviet technology, 
including launch technology. This process accel-
erated dramatically after the dissolution of the So-
viet Union in December 1991. In the past few 
years, the United States has instituted closer rela-
tionships in space with the former Soviet Union 
(FSU), especially with Russia. These new coop-
erative relationships extend from large, complex 
partnerships like the International Space Station, 
to smaller, simpler cooperative agreements on 
space and earth science. Emblematic of the new 
relationships are the cooperative commercial 
agreements between U.S. and FSU firms, most of 
which involve launch technology, a field in which 
the Russians excel. U.S. firms have proposed em-
ploying Russian technology in U.S. boosters and 
have entered into agreements to market Russian 
boosters internationally.98 
Incorporation of foreign technology might in-
crease launch vehicle performance and reduc~ 
costs. The use of Russian technology promises to 
be particularly beneficial. The greatest strength of 
the Russian space program, and the principal 
strength of the Ukrainian program, lies in launch 
vehicles and associated technologies, particularly 
propulsion and rapid payload processing and in-
tegration. As noted above, several U.S. firms are 
exploring the use of Russian expertise and 
technology to enhance U.S. launch capabilities. 
Box 7 examines Russian launch technologies and 
outlines some U.S. efforts to incorporate them 
into U.S. space transportation systems. 
U.S. Government Use of Foreign 
Launch Systems 
As noted above, the NSTP explicitly allows the 
use of foreign launch systems on a no-exchange-
of-funds basis to support cooperative programs. 
Such use can sharply reduce U.S. costs for scien-
tific programs of interest to the United States.~ 
The availability, robustness, and established 
reliability of Russian ELVs-built on large-vol-
ume, series production over many years-are also 
major assets for cooperative civil space activities. 
Their use on a no-exchange-of-funds basis could 
enable some projects that would not be undertak-
en otherwise.99 The United States and Russia are 
pursuing this potential: 
• Russian launch vehicles are being extensively 
scheduled to provide critical transportation for 
the assembly and operation of the International 
Space Station. 
• The two governments are discussing the use of 
Russian launch vehicles in cooperative projects 
such as planned missions to Mars and Pluto. 
• In 1991, a Russian Tsyklon booster (SL-14) 
and a Meteor-3 satellite carried a U.S. Total 
Ozone Mapping Spectrometer into orbit. By 
the end of the century, Russia will boost two 
additional Meteor-3 spacecraft carrying U.S. 
Earth observations instruments into space. 
Such arrangements represent a way for Russia 
to make use of their substantial space capabilities 
97 Yet the relative openness of U.s. society always made U.S. technology developments more accessible to Soviet inquiry than the reverse. 
98 For a detailed discussion of these new cooperative relationships, see U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, U.S.-Russian 
Cooperation in Space, OTA-ISS-6l8 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 1995), chs. 3 and 6. 
99 This section does not address the potential risks of working with the Russians, especially economic and political instabilities, and the 
changing structure of Russian companies. See U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, op. cit., footnote 98, for such a discussion. 
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BOX 7: Russian Launch Technologies and U.S.-Russian Joint Ventures 
Liquid-Fueled Engines 
With the exception of the Space Shuttle Main Engine, the United States has developed no new liquid-
fueled rocket engines since the 1960s.1 Aerojet, a U.S. aerospace firm specializing in the design, testing, 
and manufacture of rocket engines, has proposed to buy a number of Russian NK-33 engines from the 
Samara Scientific and Technical Complex. These engines, which burn liquid oxygen and kerosene, were 
manufactured in the 1970s, but have features such as high chamber pressures that allow them to perform 
better than comparable U.S. engines. Aerojet believes that it can adapt the engines to make the U.S.-built 
Delta or Atlas boosters less costly and more powerful.2 Similarly, Pratt and Whitney has proposed to 
modify the Russian RD-180 for use on the Atlas.3 In each case the company involved expects that the 
cooperative venture will result in reducing the price of launch services. 
U.S. industry and government officials have also explored the potential for incorporating modified Rus-
sian propulsion systems in U.S. X-vehicles. For example, Pratt and Whitney and NASA have announced 
plans to explore the application of tri-propellant rocket engine technology developed by NPO Energomash, 
to new RLVs4 Tri-propellant engines are capable of using both kerosene and liquid hydrogen oxidized by 
liquid oxygen. Such engines may offer the benefit of improving engine performance and reducing the size 
of propellant tanks, but also require greater logistics and operations complexity and additional propellant 
tanks. 
Automated Launch Capabilities 
The Russians perform their payload processing and integration and launch operations more efficiently 
and faster than U.S. launch providers. By doing much of their launch vehicle and payload integration off 
the launch pad, they are able to launch quickly and with less manpower than the United States, with no 
discernible loss of reliability (see table 12). Incorporating Russian operations methods and technology into 
U.S. launch operations could increase U.S. operability. Yet payload launch preparation and integration con-
sume a large part of the time U.S. launch vehicles spend on the launch pad. To reduce pad time, U.S. 
operators would have to change the design of satellites and the methods used to prepare them for launch. 
U.S. firms would also have to redesign the launch vehicles themselves. 
Advanced Materials 
Russia also has extensive experience in the use of aluminum-lithium and other materials for space 
transportation applications, which are lighter in weight and more ductile than the conventional aluminum 
alloys used in the United States. This expertise allows manufacturers to use more cost-effective manufac-
turing processes, and to produce more durable engines.5 Russian technicians have developed special 
1 The United States has, however, developed large solid rocket motors for the Space Shuttle, the Titan IV launch systems, and a 
variety of long-range ballistic missiles. 
2 Michael A. Oornheim, "Aerojet Imports Trud NK-33 Rocket Engine," Aviation Week and Space Technology, Oct. 25, 1993, p. 29. 
3 The RO-180 is derived from the larger, more powerful RO-170 that powers the first stage of the Russian-Ukraine Zen it booster. In 
November 1992, Pratt and Whitney signed an agreement with NPO Energomash to bring the latter's propulsion technology to the 
United States. See Jeffrey M. Lenorovitz, "Pratt Signs Accord with NPO Energomash," Aviation Week and Space Technology, Nov. 2, 
1992, p. 25-26. 
4 Jeffrey M. Lenorovitz, "Tripropellent Engine Tested for SSTO Role," Aviation Week and Space Technology, July 11, 1994, p. 54. 
5 U.S. aircraft manufacturers have considered employing aluminum-lithium alloys in aircraft and NASA has funded a program to 
incorporate U.S. aluminum-lithium alloys in the Space Shuttle's external tank, in order to reduce the mass of the external tank. The 
lighter tank will allow NASA to place some 8,000 additional pounds of payload in the Space Shuttle when launched to the planned 
International Space Station. 
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BOX 7 (cont'd.): Russian Launch Technologies and U.S.-Russian Joint Ventures 
coatings that permit engine turbine drive systems to run with a high proportion of oxidizer to fuel and in-
crease engine thrust chamber durability. To date, the United States has not adopted the use of these mate-
rials because of the high cost of changing production lines. However, aluminum-lithium and other materials 
developed by Russian materials scientists might find future application in U.S. space transportation sys-
tems if they prove less costly than comparable U.S. materials. 
Launch Technology Expertise 
The Russian aerospace industry has many engineers and technicians with years of experience in areas 
such as rocket engine design, systems integration, and computer programming. The declining budgets for 
the aerospace enterprises mean fewer job opportunities and lower salaries for Russian aerospace engi-
neers. Cooperative U.S.-Russia ventures could give the United States access to some of Russia's underuti-
lized aerospace workforce, albeit at the expense of some American workers. 
U.S.-Russian Joint Ventures 
Rather than using Russian technologies in U.S. launch systems, some U.S. companies have sought to 
establish partnerships with Russian launch firms. Lockheed Corporation, for example, in January 1993 
teamed with the Russian firms Khrunichev and RSC Energia in a joint venture (LKE International) to market 
launch services on the Proton launcher.6 
In a similar arrangement, Boeing Commercial Space Development Company is seeking U.S. govern-
ment approval for a joint venture with Ukraine's NPO Yuzhnoye,7 RSC Energia, and Kvaerner NS of Oslo, a 
Norwegian builder of offshore oil platforms, to market launch services using the Zenit vehicle, which is 
capable of placing 30,300 Ibs of payload into LEOB 
6 Jeffrey M. Lenorovitz, "Lockheed, Khrunichev To Market Proton Launcher," Aviation Week and Space Technology, Jan. 4, 1993. 
7 This proposal awaits licensing by the Department of State. See "U.S. Eyes Zenit Warily," Space News, Dec. 12, 1994, pp. 1,28. 
8 The Zen it uses a highly automated launch processing system, which could give it a competitive advantage. This Russian innova-
tion COUld, in principle, be applied to evolving U.S. systems as well. 
SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1995. 
and participate in cooperative space activities. In 
return Russian scientists would receive access to 
data that could enhance their capabilities in space 
science and applications. Potentially, the Ukraini-
an Zenit and Tsyklon boosters could be used for 
similar purposes, should Ukraine wish to partici-
pate in cooperative scientific activities. 
Several U.S. instruments have already flown 
on European spacecraft, which were launched by 
Ariane launchers. In 1992, the U.S.-French TO-
PEx/Poseidon ocean topography spacecraft was 
launched into orbit aboard an Ariane 4 launcher. 
Europe has also sought to reduce its cash contribu-
tions to the International Space Station by offering 
TABLE 12: Russian and U.S. Launch 
Processing Times Compared 
Average total Average time 
processing on launch 
Launch vehicle time (days) pad (days) 
U.S. Delta 70 40 
U.S. Atlas 62 59 
U.S. Titan IV 198 100 
Russian Tsyklon 3 2 hrs 
Russian Soyuz 18 2 
Russian Proton 21 6 
Russian-Ukraine Zenit 17 
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Defense, 1994. 
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Russia's Proton MLV is being marketed by LKE International, 
a U.S.-Russian joint venture. 
the recently developed Ariane 5 launcher for car-
rying payloads to the space station. 
Japan would like to employ its new H-U 
launcher to carry payloads to the space station. In 
early 1996, Japan plans to use its H-U to boost the 
Japanese Earth observation ADEOS spacecraft 
[nto orbit. ADEOS will carry two U.S. instru-
-ments. 
International Trade in Launch Services 
Beginning in the 1970s with the development of 
the Ariane launch system by ESA, the United 
States faced foreign competition in providing 
commercial launch services. Arianespace, S.A., 
the launch operations company incorporated in 
Europe, offers flights on the Ariane 4 series of 
MLV s and now commands about 60 percent of the 
world's available market for launch services. 100 In 
the late 1980s, Russia (then the Soviet Union) be-
gan to market the Proton, and China offered 
launch services on its Long March 2 and Long 
March 3. In 1992, LKE International began to 
market launch services on the Proton. In early 
1995, Khrunichev and Daimler-Benz Aerospace 
formed Eurorokot, a consortium to market the Ro-
kot SLY, developed from the SS-19 ballistic mis-
sile. 
In the near future, firms in India, Israel, and Ja-
pan might begin offering launch services on the 
commercial market. The overall available market 
for launch services is currently small compared 
with the supply of launch vehicles (see table 
13).101 In the absence of new markets, the average 
available number of GEO launches in the early 
part of the next century will probably number 
about 15. The market is also highly cyclical in na-
ture. 
Each launch company competes for payloads 
from a different economic and political basis. Al-
though the combined Russian and Chinese share 
of the world's market in launch services is current-
1y quite small, 102 some U.S. launch providers fear 
100 The "available market" for launch services is composed of the entire market for which all U.S. and foreign commercial launch compa-
nies can compete. It includes U.S. and foreign commercial payloads and some non-U.S. government payloads, but excludes most government 
payloads of the launching entities. 
101 The market for payloads is currently a "buyer's market," in which the availability of launch systems exceeds the number of available 
payloads. 
102 Between January 1990 and September 1995, China captured about 10 percent of the commercial market for launch services. See U.S. 
Department of Transportation, Office of Space Transportation, "Quarterly Launch Report: April 1995," Washington, DC, April 1995. In the 
future, if existing launch agreements hold, China is likely to garner an estimated 15 percent of the commercial launch services market and Rus-
sia an estimated 10 percent. 
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TABLE 13: International Launch Firms Offering 
Commercial Launch Services 
Country Firm Launch vehicle 
China China Great Wall Long March 2 
Industry Long March 3 
Europe Arianespace Ariane 4 
Ariane 5 
Russia LKEa Proton 
Eurorokotb Rokot 
STC Start-1 
United McDonnell Douglas Delta 
States 
Lockheed Martin Atlas 
LLV 
Orbital Sciences Pegasus 
Taurus 
EER Systems Conestoga 
a U.S.-Russian joint venture offering Russian vehicle. 
b Russian-German jOint venture offering Russian vehicle. 
SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1995. 
that low prices made possible by a combination of 
extremely low wages and a non-market economy 
will undercut U.S. opportunities to sell launch ser-
vices to the available market. U.S. satellite 
manufacturers, however, generally support the 
entry of Chinese and Russian launchers into the 
world market because these launch systems pro-
vide a wider choice oflaunch schedule and perfor-
mance, reduced launch prices, and incentive for 
U.S. launch providers to lower their prices. 103 
Although all launch providers receive some 
government support, the arrangements differ 
among countries. These differences, and disagree-
ments over what effects such differences make in 
an international competition for launch services, 
make it extremely difficult to achieve genuinely 
free and fair trade in the commercial launch ser-
vices market (see box 8). 
The perceived degree of European subsidy for 
Ariane and the effects of non-market competition 
from China and Russia have led to claims of unfair 
competition by U.S. launch service firms. Other 
countries respond that not only has the United 
States subsidized its launch vehicle development, 
it also maintains a relatively large, protected mar-
ket of government launches for DOD and other 
government departments and agencies. However, 
other governments protect part or all of their 
launch services market as well. ESA satellites 
generally fly only on the Ariane launcher, and 
Chinese and Russian government payloads fly 
only on indigenous launchers. All these concerns 
remain points of contention as China, EuroQe, 
Russia, and the United States attempt to reach 
agreement over appropriate mechanisms to man-
age international trade in launch services. 
The Missile Technology Control Regime 
Managing trade in launch services is complicated 
even further by the added dimensions of arms con-
trol, nonproliferation, and the control oftechnolo-
gy transfer. The NSTP acknowledges this added 
dimension by requiring that: 
International space launch agreements in 
which the U.S. is a party must be in conformity 
with U.S. obligations under arms control agree-
ments, U.S. nonproliferation policies, U.S. 
technology transfer policies, and U.S. policies 
regarding observance of the Guidelines and An-
nex of the Missile Technology Control Regime 
(MTCR).104 
Although missile systems and space-launch 
systems serve quite different purposes, they have 
much in common. Hence, the United States has a 
strong interest in limiting the ability of countries 
that currently do not possess missile capabilities 
from acquiring space launch technology. U.S. of-
ficials worry, in particular, that the testing and de-
velopment of weapon delivery systems can be 
103 Warren Ferster, "China Wins Big in Launch Deal," Space News, Feb. 6, 1995, p. 1,20. 
104 The White House, Office of Science and Technology Policy, op. cit., footnote 3, sec. V (I) (b). 
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BOX 8: Government Involvement in Space Transportation Development 
Europe 
The European Space Agency paid for the full development costs of the Ariane family of launch vehicles 
and the associated infrastructure. From the beginning, ESA planned to operate the Ariane system as a 
commerciallauncher,1 and set up Arianespace, SA, a European firm incorporated in France, to market 
and operate launch services.2 Through thoughtful, cost-effective design and aggressive marketing, Ariane-
space is now the industry leader in providing commercial MLV services.3 ESA continues to fund improve-
ments to the Ariane system; most recently it has paid for the development of the Ariane 5 launch vehicle, 
launch pad, and infrastructure in Kourou, French Guyana. 
United States 
The federal government developed the Atlas, Delta, and Titan launch systems in the 1960s and contin-
ued to improve them through the 1970s.4 The United States also began to develop the Titan IV HLV in the 
mid-1980s. In 1983, the Reagan Administration made the Atlas, Delta, and Titan III launch systems avail-
able for private ownership and operation,5 but the development of private launch services was inhibited by 
competition with the government-operated Space Shuttle. 
Private sector entry into the commercial market for launch services became economically feasible only 
after the Reagan Administration limited use of the Space Shuttle to payloads that require the unique fea-
tures of the Shuttle.6 Several U.S. firms now offer commercial launch services (see table 13). 
Both NASA and DOD continue to fund limited launch system improvements that will benefit the U.S. 
government by improving performance or reducing costs. NASA contributed approximately $54.9 million to 
such development work in FY 1994 and plans to spend $33.6 million in FY 1995. The Air Force spent about 
$191.5 on ELV technology development in FY 1994 and will spend about $149.2 in FY 1995.7 
1 ESA followed this route in order to 1) establish Europe as a supplier of commercial space services, and 2) help keep launch costs 
down. 
2 Arianespace's principal investors are 35 European companies, 13 European banks, and CNES, the French Space Agency. 
3 Arianespace received a boost in sales following the loss of Challenger when the United States decided not to offer commercial 
launch services on the Space Shuttle. Before then, the U.S. government had been competing with both the European Ariane and U.S. 
commercial launch service providers. 
4 Each of these launch vehicles derives from ballistic missiles. 
5 On May 16, 1983, the Reagan Administration announced that "the U.S. Government fully endorses and will facilitate commercial 
operations of [ELVsl by the U.S. private sector." 
6 Ronald Reagan, Presidential Decision, Aug. 15, 1986. 
7 These budgetfigures include $50. 7 million in FY 1994 and $67.0 million in FY 1995 forthe Range Standardization and Automation 
program. Personal communication, U.S. Department of Defense, May 1995. 
achieved under the guise of developing a space 
launch program. Any country that can design and 
build space launch vehicles should be considered 
capable of developing ballistic missiles. 
In 1987, in order to limit proliferation oflong-
range delivery systems capable of delivering 
weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical, 
and biological weapons), the United States and 
other Western industrialized nations developed 
the MTCR. Admittance to the U.S. satellite mar-
ket has become a tool in encouraging adherence 
by China and Russia to the MTCR. Recently, the 
members of the MTCR have encouraged Russia 
and Ukraine to join the MTCR. Russia, for exam-
ple, has agreed to abide by MTCR rules until it be-
comes a full-fledged member. Participation in the 
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BOX 8 (cont'd.): Government Involvement in Space Transportation Development 
Russia 
The Soviet Union developed the world's first space launch system in the late 1950s, derived from its 
ballistic missile systems. Since then, the Soviet Union, and now Russia, has led the world in the number of 
launches per year. Until very recently, the Soviet (now Russian) government funded all launch system de-
velopment, manufacturing, and operations. Now, as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
moves by Russia to develop a market economy, Russia has privatized much of its space industry, and 
markets a variety of launch services to the international community.8 
On the international market, Russian firms benefit from low labor costs and large-scale, assembly-line 
production. Although major elements of Russia's command economy still exist, the new space enterprises 
have begun to assume the costs of manufacturing. Whether the firms or the Russian government will shoul-
der the burden of new developments required to meet market needs for launch services is not yet clear. 
Nevertheless, financial analysts experience great difficulties gaining insight into development and produc-
tion costs, in part because Russian officials themselves often do not know how much goods and services 
cost. Hence, it is extremely difficult to know how Russian pricing practices relate to the cost of providing 
services. 
China 
The Chinese introduced their Long March series of launchers to the world market in 1985.9 Like the 
ELVs of other countries, China's launchers were developed from ballistic missiles.1o Marketed through the 
government company, China Great Wall Industry Corporation, the Long March 2 and Long March 3 have 
been used primarily to place communication satellites into GEO. Since China began to offer services to the 
international community, it has successfully launched five satellites into space.11 Although China Great 
Wall Industry operates much like a private corporation, the costs of launcher development and manufactur-
ing are borne by the Chinese government. China has the competitive cost advantage of very low wages 
and non-market accounting practices. 
8 Russia launched its first U.S. satellite on January 23, 1995 aboard a Kosmos launcher. See James R. Asker, "Russia Launches Its 
First U.S. Satellite," Aviation Week and Space Technology, Jan. 30, 1995, pp. 68-69. 
9 "China Offering Space Launch SeNices to International Users," Aviation Week and Space Technology, Apr. 8, 1985, p. 25. 
10 China received the basic ballistic missile technology from the Soviet Union in the 1960s. 
11 Long March vehicles have also sustained several failures; the most recent was a failure of a Long March 2E on Jan. 26, 1995, 
which was carrying an American Hughes satellite, Apstar 2. 
SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1995. 
MTCR requires that Russia prohibit the transfer of 
complete missile systems, components that could 
be used to make complete systems, and technolo-
gy involved in the production of components or of 
complete systems. Ukraine has agreed to abide by 
the terms of the MTCR to demonstrate that it 
would follow the MTCR upon admittance to the 
regime. 
China has refused to join the MTCR, although 
it too has agreed to abide by its terms. The United 
States monitors China's compliance to the MTCR 
and has raised issues of noncompliance. On Octo-
ber 4, 1994, the United States and China agreed to 
"work together to promote missile nonprolifera-
tion through a step-by-step approach to resolve 
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differences over missile exports."!05 The United 
States and China agreed to "hold in-depth discus-
sions on the MTCR. .. [and] to promote eventual 
Chinese membership in the MTCR."!06 Under the 
terms of the MTCR and U.S. law governing sanc-
tions against foreign entities, the United States 
could levy sanctions against a Chinese launch 
company, including prohibition of satellite 
launches, if the United States found that the entity 
was selling missile-related technology to a coun-
try that did not previously possess such tech-
nology. 
Although the MTCR has had some measure of 
success in limiting the flow of missile-related 
technology, it also inhibits the flow of technology 
that could be used to develop new launch vehicles. 
Officials in India and Brazil, for example, have 
complained that their efforts to develop indige-
nous launch vehicles have been inhibited by the 
MTCR. Recently, the Brazilian government has 
agreed to join the MTCR, in part because member 
countries had limited technology transfer to Bra-
zil. This move may help Brazil obtain crucial 
guidance technology for development of its indig-
enous launch vehicle. 107 
Space Launch Trade Agreements 
The United States has considerable influence over 
trade in launch services because it continues to sell 
more satellites on the international market than 
any other country, even as its share of the launch 
services market has declined. When a U.S. satel-
lite firm offers to sell a payload to a foreign com-
pany or government entity, it specifies launch 
services as part of the package. These services are 
selected in the international marketplace based on 
several factors, including estimated reliability, 
success in meeting schedules, and price. Typical-
ly, U.S. satellite firms may sell a satellite to a for-
eign firm or government and launch it on a 
third-party launch vehicle. 108 
Because the United States could otherwise se-
verely restrict the international sale ofU .S.-manu-
factured satellites launched on other countries' 
vehicles, the United States has been able to negoti-
ate space launch trade agreements with both Rus-
sia and China. The fundamental premise of these 
trade agreements is "to establish criteria regarding 
participation by space launch industries in coun-
tries in transition from a non-market to a market 
economy."!09 The office of the U.S. Trade Repre-
sentative (USTR)110 is the U.S. agent in these ne-
gotiations. 
The United States has depended on quantity re-
strictions and pricing guidelines to manage the 
impact of Chinese and Russian launch services on 
U.S. space transportation services providers. The 
following paragraphs summarize the contents of 
the existing and past trade agreements. 
The 1989 U.S.-China Launch Agreement: The 
United States reached its first launch services. 
agreement With China in January 1989. It re-
mained in force until December 31, 1994, and es-
tablished the fundamental structure for later 
agreements with both China and Russia. The 
agreement allowed only nine Chinese launches of 
international payloads to GEO over the period of 
105 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, Fact Sheet, "Joint United States-People's Republic of China Statement on Miss ile 
Proliferation," Washington, DC, Oct. 4, 1994. 
106 Ibid. 
107 Philip Finnegan, "Brazil Prepares to Sign MTCR," Space News, Apr. 24, 1995, p. 3, 29. 
108 For example, the Chinese have scheduled AsiaSat 2, a satellite built by Martin M<Ilietta (now Lockheed Martin) for launch later this ye ar 
on a Long March 2E launcher. If successfully launched, AsiaSat 2 will be owned by Asia Satellite Telecommunications Co. of Hong KOIllg. 
109 The White House, Office of Science and Technology Policy, op. cit., footnote 3, sec. V(l). 
110 The various implementation plans submitted by DOD, NASA, and DOT/DOC do not speak to the issues of free and fair trade, since !bose 
negotiations are the domain of the USTR. The DOT/DOC implementation plan does cite, however, the importance of trade agreements to 1i:mit 
market perturbations. 
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the agreement. 111 Additionally, the agreement es-
sentially precluded Chinese launch service pro-
viders from collectively launching more than 
three international payloads in anyone calendar 
year. 
According to the agreement, both the United 
States and China support "the application of mar-
ket principles to international competition among 
providers of comrnerciallaunch services, includ-
ing the avoidance of below-cost pricing, govern-
ment inducements, and unfair trade practices." 112 
These premises were the basis for a pricing guide-
line known as pricing "on a par." In effect, the 
guideline required that Chinese launch service 
providers establish prices, terms, and conditions 
in a manner comparable to the prevailing norms of 
the international launch services market. 1 13 Fail-
ure to price on a par, according to the agreement, 
would be grounds for punitive actions by the 
United States as permitted by U.S. laws and regu-
lations. The agreement did provide for the less 
stringent option of consultation on demand by ei-
ther party. However, it failed to establish criteria 
by which China could be judged to be in or out of 
compliance with the provision of pricing on a par. 
Therefore, the provision had little effect on Chi-
nese behavior in the market, although the overall 
agreement may have limited the number of com-
mercial satelfites launched by the Chinese. 
The 1993 U.S.-Russia Launch Agreement: In Sep-
tember 1993, the United States and Russia signed 
a launch agreement that is similar to the U.S. -Chi-
na agreement, but which adds an additional mea-
sure of control. The agreement, which lasts until 
December 31,2000, establishes pricing criteria on 
which the actions of Russian launch service pro-
.~~ 2£. c:ooa began ~it1g iil$ iL4Jng Matdv 
ffilmriilly~/iaJJJmttIfI~ in the late 1~. 
viders can be judged on a bid-by-bid basis. Any 
Russian bid more than 7.5 percent below the low-
est Western bid for a comparable launch service 
triggers automatic consultations between the two 
parties. 1l4 When such a consultation is called, 
Russia is given the opportunity to provide valid 
III The agreement provided for annual consultations at which the quantity restriction could, at the request of China, be adjusted because of 
changed conditions in the market for launch services. 
112 "Memorandum of Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People's Republic of 
China Regarding International Trade in Commercial Launch Services," Washington, DC, Jan. 26, 1989, pp. 1-2. 
113 Ibid., p. 2. 
114 "Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation Regarding In-
ternational Trade in Commercial Space Launch Services," Washington, DC, September 1993, art. V(2). 
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reasons (e.g., different insurance conditions or 
additional integration costs) for pricing below the 
7.5 percent differential. 
The Russian agreement allows for the launch of 
eight principal payloads to GEO or geosynchro-
nous transfer orbit (GTO) over seven years 115 and 
limits Russian launch service providers, as a 
group, to two launches within any 12-month peri-
od. This provision is notably more restrictive than 
the equivalent one in the 1989 U.S.-China agree-
ment, which limited China to no more than three 
launches in anyone calendar year. 
U.S. and Russian officials disagree over which 
launches count against the agreement's quota-a 
disagreement that stems from a practice known as 
"leasing on orbit," whereby a satellite owned by a 
firm from one country and launched by that coun-
try is leased to a foreign entity after the satellite 
reaches orbit. Russian officials contend that leas-
ing Russian satellites launched by Russian 
launchers does not count as the launch of an in-
ternational payload and thus should not be 
counted against the quota. U.S. trade officials 
strongly disagree, insisting that such launch op-
portunities should count against the quota on 
grounds that they should be open to international 
competition. 116 Trade officials have also not 
reached agreement on how to count the launch of 
multiple satellites on a single launcher. 
Unlike the 1989 U.S.-China agreement, the 
agreement between the United States and Russia 
requires the two countries to consult about com-
mercial launches to orbits other than GEO and 
GTO, and suborbital launches on a case-by-case 
basis, including the emerging market of launches 
to LEO.!17 However, the agreement establishes 
no specific quantity restrictions or pricing guide-
lines for LEO launch services. 
The 1995 U.S.-China Launch Agreement: In March 
1995, the United States and China entered into a 
new launch agreement that will last until Decem-
ber 31,2001. In developing this agreement, U.S. 
officials benefited from experience with the earli-
er launch agreements and addressed three U.S. 
concerns: the appropriate level of quantity restric-
tions and pricing guidelines, leasing on orbit, and 
the emerging LEO market. U.S. satellite firms and 
U.S. partners of Russian launch services firms had 
criticized the U.S.-Russia agreement for its quan-
tity restrictions and pricing guidelines, 118 arguing 
that the quantity restrictions deny U.S. satellite 
manufacturers adequate access to highly reliable 
Russian launch services and that the 7.5 percent 
consultation trigger increases Russian launch ser-
vice prices. 
In response to these criticisms, and recognizing 
that the new Chinese agreement would probably 
set precedents for revising the U .S.-Russia agree-
ment, the USTR added to the new agreement a 
built-in adjustment to the quota in the event that 
the GEO payload market improves. This provi-
sion allows China a total of two additional GEO 
launches if, over the first three years of the agree-
ment, an average of20 or more GEO payloads per 
year are launched in the available world market. It 
allows for an additional three launches (for a total 
offive extra launches), if this trend continues for a 
fourth year. 
The USTR relaxed the previous 7.5 percent 
level for consultation to 15 percent. It was able to 
do this because the new Chinese agreement also 
delineates a set of quantified "comparability fac-
tors" to which both the United States and China 
can refer in order to determine whether a Chinese 
bid below the 15 percent level is justified. This 
115 Excluding the INMARSAT 3 and three Iridium LEO satellite launches that Russia had contracted with consultations before signing the 
agreement, four of the eight GEO/GTO launches may consist of two principal payloads on a single launch vehicle. 
116 The United States did not count, however, the first such launch. 
117 The agreement specifically mentions the Iridium communications constellation currently under development by Motorola and its part-
ners. 
118 Brian D. Dailey, "U.S. Trade Policy's Future Role," Space News, Oct. 17, 1994, p. 15. 
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method is intended to account for differences in 
business practices and market environments (e.g., 
payment terms and conditions, insurance costs, 
intended orbit, or major differences in launch pro-
cedures) that would change the effective price to 
the customer. 
The new Chinese agreement clearly spells out 
that a satellite leased on orbit counts against the 
quota. Although the USTR believes that China is 
unlikely to lease communication satellites on or-
bit because the country currently lacks adequate 
communications satellite capacity, it sought this 
clarification in order to provide leverage in later 
negotiations with either Russia or China. 
Finally, the latest U.S. agreement with China 
states that China's participation in the LEO mar-
ket should be proportionate, nondisruptive, and 
not interfere with U.S. participation in the LEO 
market. The agreement requires consultations if 
China contracts to launch over 50 percent of any 
given LEO communications constellation. 
Future Possible Agreements: U.S. officials expect 
Russian trade officials to request changes in the 
present launch agreement with the United States. 
In particular, Russia is likely to push to have the 
LEO provisions of the agreement brought into line 
with those delineated in the latest U.S.-China 
agreement. Russia, with the strong support ofU .S. 
satellite manufacturers and U.S.-Russian launch 
company partners, 119 may also seek an increase in 
its quotal20 and a relaxation of the 7.5 percent 
consultation level. 
Recently, the United States invited Ukrainian 
officials to begin exploratory negotiations toward 
establishing a bilateral launch services agreement 
similar to those negotiated with China and Rus-
sia. 121 Such an agreement could allow U.S. satel-
lite manufacturers the choice of the Ukrainian 
Zenit and Tsyklon vehicles for placing payloads 
into orbit. Reaching agreement with Ukraine 
would place even more pressure on the United 
States to modify its agreement with Russia. 
Issues for Congress 
The use offoreign launch technology and foreign 
launch services and cooperation between the 
United States and other countries raise several is-
sues of interest to Congress. These include the ef-
fects on U.S. industry, the U.S. technology base, 
technology transfer, and possible rules for interna-
tional trade in launch services. 
&iiO#4 Effects of the use of foreign launch 
technologies on the U.S. aerospace industrial 
base 
Provisions of the NSTP regarding U.S. use of 
foreign technologies in U.S. space transportation 
systems are designed to improve the efficiencies 
of U.S. launch systems, in order to meet the do-
mestic need for access to space and compete more 
effectively in the international space transporta-
tion market. As noted earlier, Russian propulsion 
technologies are of greatest interest to U.S. firms. 
Because the requirements of the Soviet/Russian 
space program have differed from those of the 
U.S. program, Russia has developed systems with 
different operational and design characteristics. 
Access to Russian technological innovations 
could offer U.S. manufacturers a wider range of 
design possibilities from which to choose, many 
of which have already been tested and implement-
ed by the Russians. U.S. officials have also ex-
pressed interest in adopting some of the 
technologies and techniques used by Arianespace, 
Russia, and Ukraine for launch operations. Re-
cently, an Arianespace official offered the Ariane 
5 heavy-lift launcher as a candidate for the DOD 
119 "We still believe the best outcome [in launch services agreements] is the removal of quotas in such agreements to best serve the [U.S.] 
satellite community since they constitute 90 percent of the space market," Brian Dailey, Lockheed vice president for Washington operations, 
quoted in Warren Ferster, "China Wms Big in Launch Deal," Space News, Feb. 6, 1995, pp. 1,20. 
120 Peter B. de Selding, "Russian Quota Questioned," Space News, Apr. 3, pp. 4, 45. 
121 Warren Ferster and Peter B. de Selding, "Zenit, Cyclone Parley To Start," Space News, Apr. 10, 1995, pp. 1,20. 
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The Russian NK-33 engine is one candidate tor mCOffJU(ation 
into U.S. space transporation systems. 
EELV program, arguing that the United States 
could thereby avoid a costly development pro-
gram. 122 
The effect on the U.S. aerospace industry of us-
ing Russian technology in U.S. launch vehicle 
systems will depend on how U.S. firms structure 
commercial cooperation with the Russians and on 
which part of the industry attention is focused. On 
the one hand, access to different and up-to-date 
technologies, production and processing meth-
ods, and cheaper hardware could make the U.S. 
aerospace industry stronger in an increasingly 
competitive world market for space-related ser-
vices. On the other hand, cooperative arrange-
ments could also lead to unwanted technology 
transfer, strengthening of a competitor, loss of do-
mestic production jobs, and a weakening of U.S. 
capabilities because of dependence on a foreign 
source. 
Representatives of some lower-tier firms in the 
U.S. launch industry expressed another viewpoint 
at a recent OTA workshop. They believe that the 
domestic launch industry is struggling and does 
not need another competitor in the medium-to-
heavy launch service market, irrespective of any 
possible enhancement of U.S. capabilities 
through cooperation with the Russians. 123 
U.S. firms could adopt several approaches to 
using foreign technology. One approach is to buy 
components directly from foreign suppliers. In the 
case of Russian propulsion systems, for example, 
such a buy would probably result in job losses for 
the engine-manufacturing segment of the domes-
tic industry. Yet, in most cases, testing and sys-
tems engineering will still be required. Also, 
cheaper engines might make U.S. launch services 
more competitive, potentially increasing business 
and creating jobs in that sector of the industry, as 
well as in others stimulated by low-cost launch 
services. 
Alternatively, a U.S. firm could buy a license 
for a given engine technology and set up its own 
production line. Licensing of technology would 
result in increased employment for U.S. workers 
if the licensing firm is successful in producing a 
product. It could also make those parts of the in-
dustry that depend on the licensed technology 
more competitive in the world market. 
Ultimately, as the worldwide launch industry 
becomes more like other commercial industries, 
the use of foreign components and systems will 
become more widespread, although the terms of 
the MTCR will limit technology transfer. If the 
U.S. launch industry is to become competitive on 
the world market, it may have to become more 
flexible and make effective use of non-U.S. 
technologies. Currently, the United States leads in 
the development of avionics, computers, electro-
mechanical actuators, and other technologies that 
support the launch industry. U.S. industry could 
also improve its competitive stance by developing 
launch technologies for non-U.S. launch systems. 
Exporting many of these technologies will require 
the relaxation of U.S. export controls. 
122 Ben Ionatta and Cheri Privor, "Arianespace's EELV Proposal Finds Little Favor," Space News, Apr. 10, 1995, p. 3. The official listed 
several options, among which is the potential for licensing Ariane 5 technology to U.S. firms for construction in the United States. 
123 A background paper on this workshop is forthcoming, June 1995. 
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The United States must also decide how much 
of its industrial base should be maintained to en-
sure access to space and to meet national security 
needs. Use of foreign technologies could reduce 
the amount of R&D required of U.S. firms,124 re-
sulting in reduced costs, but it could also undercut 
the development of U.S. capabilities in certain 
areas. Because the space industry is considered to 
be indispensable to the security of the United 
States, many argue that the United States should 
develop and maintain its capabilities in certain 
critical areas to prevent any weakening in its tech-
nological base. 
DOD is willing to use launch systems that have 
foreign components and technology, but only in 
such a way that foreign suppliers cannot deny 
DOD access to space: 
This can be accomplished by such measures 
as stockpiling critical foreign components and 
assuring that alternative sources of critical com-
ponents could be developed in a timely fashion 
should foreign sources cease to be available. 125 
Although this approach might result in higher 
costs to the government, it ensures that the United 
States will be able to fulfill its space-related na-
tional security needs without depending on for-
eign suppliers oflaunch services. Arianespace has 
suggested that if the United States wished to pur-
sue the use of Ariane 5 (developed by U.S. allies) 
for the EELV program, it could license the entire 
launcher for construction in the United States, 
modifying it as needed and buying some parts in 
Europe. Such an arrangement could substantially 
reduce the costs of building and operating a U.S. 
heavy-lift launch vehicle. 126 However, building a 
vehicle under license might inhibit the develop-
ment of new U.S. technology that could be used to 
improve the U.S. MLV fleet. 
lfi#Y#.<l1 The ground rules for international 
trade in launch services 
The United States' response to the competitive 
challenge posed by the market entry of Chinese 
and Russian launch systems has been to work with 
trade representatives of other countries to achieve 
a common understanding of what constitutes fair 
trade practices in selling launch services: 
The U.S. and the PRC [China] support the ap-
plication of market principles to international 
competition among providers of commercial 
launch services, including the avoidance of be;-
low-cost pricing, government inducements, and 
unfair business practices. 127 
The resulting launch service agreements limit 
the total number of commercial launches China 
and Russia can sell on the world market. In allow-
ing each country to sell launches to U.S. satellite 
firms, but limiting them to a fixed total of the 
world's available launch services market over a 
defined period, the USTR has steered a middle 
course between a "hands-off' approach and allow-
ing no foreign launches of U.S.-built satellites. In 
other words, the USTR has attempted to manage 
the commercial market in launch services. 
Critics of this policy, who include U.S. satellite 
manufacturers and satellite customers as well as 
U.S. partners of Russian launch firms, complain 
that such market management effectively raises 
the overall price of launch services. They argue 
that because the agreements limit the total number 
of Chinese and Russian launches between now 
and 2001,128 U.S. launch providers have little in-
124 u.s. industry could use the technologies to develop the base for the next generation of R&D. However, it might have less incentive to 
invest in R&D if it were able to earn sufficient profit with foreign technology. 
125 U.S. Department of Defense, "DOD Implementation Plan for National Space Transportation Policy," PDD/NSTC-4, Washington, DC, 
Nov. 4, 1994, p. 9. 
126 Ben Ionatta and Cheri Privor, op. cit., footnote 122. 
127 Op. cit., footnote 112, art. II(A). 
128 The U.S.-Russia agreement concludes on December 31, 2000; the U.S.-China agreement concludes on December 31, 2001. 
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centive to reduce their prices. On the other hand, 
U.S. launch services companies worry that with-
out some limits on China's and Russia's ability to 
sell launches below cost, U.S. market share will 
slip even further than it has. 
The USTR has attempted to structure the 
launch service agreements to encourage China's 
and Russia's moves away from their bureaucratic 
command systems toward adopting the financial 
practices of market economies, in which prices are 
based primarily on actual costs oflabor, manufac-
turing, and operations, while encouraging a viable 
U.S. space transportation industry, as called for in 
the NSTP.129 
Some observers worry that the present launch 
agreements with Russia and China do little to pro-
mote a change from centrally managed econo-
mies. They argue that the existing framework, 
based on quantity restrictions combined with bid-
by-bid pricing guidelines, lacks the ability to fos-
ter market-oriented behavior. These skeptics 
contend that the existing agreements simply hand 
a portion of the launch services market to the Rus-
sians and Chinese in exchange for their agreement 
not to undercut U .S.launch service providers with 
very low launch prices, subsidized by other parts 
of their economies.130 As they see it, the best 
long-term protection available to U.S. launch ser-
vice providers would be a marketplace where all 
players engage in fair competition based on mar-
ket principles-something they do not believe the 
present agreements are designed to achieve. Com-
peting on the basis of market mechanisms has the 
benefit that a firm cannot long continue to offer 
services substantially below cost and survive. 
One of the major obstacles in policing the 
launch services agreements is the difficulty of de-
termining the actual price of a launch. Potential 
customers must take many factors into account, 
including demonstrated launch success rate, the 
condition of payload integration facilities, geo-
graphical location of the launch pa~, and cost of 
insurance. For example, a $50-million Atlas 
launch may provide more or less value than a 
$50-million Ariane launch, and price alone will 
not determine the winning bid. 
Despite these criticisms, some argue that the 
current launch agreements with Russia and China 
are the best that can be expected under the circum-
stances. According to this view, trade agreements 
of this sort are often cumbersome and disagree-
ments over details are inevitable. Moreover, they 
often include foreign policy considerations be-
yond the narrow scope of the agreements. 
Competition between Arianespace and U.S. 
launch firms presents the USTR and U.S. launch 
firms with a set of issues different from those 
raised in agreements with China and Russia. Al-
though European govemments generally main-
tain much closer relationships with their major 
industrial firms than does the U.S. government, 
European market norms and practices are much 
closer to the U.S. example than are those of China 
and Russia. 
Nevertheless, U.S. launch companies com-
plain that the European governments unfairly sub-
sidize Arianespace's operation. 131 Attempts to 
determine the amount and nature of these subsi-
dies have generally concluded that, although such 
subsidies may be greater than U.S. subsidies, de-
termining the exact amount and how they may af-
fect the pricing of launch services is extremely 
difficult. The structural differences between U.S. 
and European institutions, coupled with the finan-
cial complexities of a launch services agreement, 
cloud the comparison of subsidies. Hence, 
suggestions to impose sanctions on European 
launch services have been short lived. In 1984, for 
example, Transpace Carriers, Inc., filed a com-
129 The White House, Office of Science and Technology Policy, op. cit., footnote 3, sec. IV(I). 
130 Andrew Lawler, "Industry Criticizes U.S. Launch Agreements," Space News, Oct. 3, 1994, p. 3. 
131 See "U.S. Space Launch Services Company Brings Unprecedented Complaint Against Europeans," U.S. Import Weekly 9: 1088, 1984. 
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plaint under section 301 of the U.S. Trade Act of 
1974, stating, among other things, that Ariane-
space was unfairly subsidized compared with U.S. 
carriers. 132 Investigation following the complaint 
found that European subsidies and pricing prac-
tices were not out of line in comparison to U.S. 
practices. 
In addition, U.S. satellite manufacturers tend to 
oppose any type of pricing agreement with Eu-
rope, seeing such an agreement as a barrier to 
globally provided launch services, and an oppor-
tunity for both Europe and the United States to 
raise prices artificially. Ultimately, the United 
States may find it more effective to concentrate on 
ways of reducing the costs of U.S. space trans-
portation systems, rather than attempt to manage 
the international market in launch services. 
61-10#41 Controlling technology transfer and 
other foreign policy objectives 
Cooperative ventures entail the risk of transfer 
of domestic technologies that could be used to 
strengthen a competitor's position in the interna-
tional aerospace market and could enable the de-
velopment of ballistic missiles. Experts disagree 
over how effective means to prevent such transfer 
can really be, but present policy clearly moves to-
ward loosening trade restrictions. Specifically, 
many components having to do with satellites and 
satellite technology have been moved from the 
U.S. Munitions List133 onto the Commerce Con-
trol List, effectively making it easier to trade in 
those items. 
Recent reports suggest that the State and Com-
merce Departments are working on loosening re-
strictions further. 134 As noted above, the greater 
relaxation of these restrictions could result in im-
132 Ibid. 
proved U.S. trade in launch technologies. On the 
other hand, the United States must remain sensi-
tive to the potential proliferation of technologies 
that would assist belligerent countries in develop-
ing the means of delivering weapons of mass de-
struction.135 
The desperate economic state of Russia and 
Ukraine makes the sale of expensive, high-
technology missile components and systems to 
other countries extremely attractive. For example, 
in 1992, India contracted with Russia to buy a liq-
uid-oxygenlliquid-hydrogen-fueled engine to be 
used as the upper stage for its Geosynchronous 
Satellite Launch Vehicle. The United States op-
posed the sale on grounds that it violated the 
MTCR, a move that both India and Russia re-
sisted. U.S. officials were concerned that the 
technology associated with the engines would as-
sist India in building ballistic missiles. Fearing 
that the United States would institute sanctions al-
lowed by the terms of the MTCR, in 1993 Russia 
agreed to break its contract with India and with-
hold the engine technology.136 
Even if Russia abides by the MTCR and pro-
hibits the export of hardware useful in ballistic 
missiles, it might not be able to prevent the 
emigration of rocket scientists to countries seek-
ing to use their expertise. Despite Russia's appar-
ent concern over the loss of its aerospace 
engineers, it might not be able to prevent the de-
parture of many to countries that might be hostile 
to U.S. interests. People with expertise can freely 
emigrate from Russia to the neighboring Newly 
Independent States, and keeping track of where 
they go from there might not be possible. 
The Clinton Administration considers that as-
sisting the Russian civilian space program to stay 
133 22 CFR Ch. I. SUbchapter M-Intemational Traffic in Arms Regulations, Part 121-The United States Munitions List 
134 "Satellite Export Controls to Ease," Space News. Feb. 20, 1995, p.1 
135 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Export Controls and Nonproliferation Policy, OTA-ISS-596 (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, May 1994). 
136 Experts differ in their opinions about the usefulness of cryogenic engines for weapon systems. Weapon systems benefit from constant 
readiness, and cryogenic engines take a long time to prepare for launch. Still, all early U.S. ballistic missiles were liquid-fueled. 
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as healthy as possible and capable of retaining its 
experts will be in the interest of global nonprolif-
eration. Similarly, the United States provides 
some direct funding to scientific researchers re-
sponsible for the development and engineering of 
nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons in an 
effort to keep them employed in areas other than 
the development of those weapons. 137 
Many of the scientists and engineers in the Rus-
sian civil and military space programs have exper-
tise that could be usefully applied to space science 
missions. The incorporation of Russia in the In-
ternational Space Station has been undertaken in 
part to support Russia's attempts to maintain its 
civilian space efforts. 138 Even during Cold War 
periods when the political atmosphere made larg-
er, high-profile cooperative science efforts unac-
ceptable, small, low-profile science projects 
involving Russian and U.S. scientists continued. 
That ongoing cooperation kept the lines of com-
munication between the two countries open and 
fostered commonality of interest. With the lessen-
ing of tensions after the end of the Cold War, op-
portunities for including Russia in international 
science projects and for joint U.S.-Russian space 
missions have increased. Supporting Russian ef-
forts to maintain Russia's civilian space program 
could, however, help Russia become a stronger 
competitor to the United States. 
Increased commercial ties between Russian 
and Western aerospace companies could also pro-
vide added incentive for Russia to abide by the 
MTCR. Russia has privatized several of its largest 
aerospace enterprises, which are now seeking cus-
tomers for their products. 
I Fundamental Objective #3: 
The Use of Excess Ballistic Missiles 
The third fundamental objective of the Clinton 
Administration's new space transportation policy 
addresses the use of long-range ballistic missiles 
that have been either superseded by more modern 
weapons or eliminated under the provisions of the 
Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START) 
Treaty. 
NSTP Fundamental Objective #3 
Establishes policy on federal agencies' use of excess 
ballistic missile assets for space launch, to preventadverse 
impacts on the U. S. commercial space launch industry. Un-
der START, these assets may be used in certain circum-
stances for civilian space launch. A serious concern in 
developing the policy was the possible impact that wide-
spread use of these assets could have on U.S. commercial 
launch companies. The policy obliges the government to 
fully consider commercial services as part of the decision 
making process and imposes specific criteria on the use of 
excess assets to avoid "flooding" the commercial market. 
The policy language regarding excess missile 
assets reflects the consensus of an Interagency 
Working Group with representatives from DOD, 
NASA, DOT, DOC, the Department of State, the 
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and 
the USTR. The policy reflects the results of a sub-
group jointly chaired by the National Security 
Council and OSTP. 
The policy states that U.S. excess ballistic mis-
siles shall either be retained for government use or 
be destroyed. DOD will consider whether to use 
excess ballistic missiles on a case-by-case basis, 
137 Since FY 1992, the Nunn-Lugar amendment to Public Law 102-228 and subsequent legislation have authorized the transfer of $1.6 
billion of DOD funds to help destroy and secure weapons of mass destruction. Of that money, $25 million was to be the 1994 U.S. contribution to 
the International Science and Technology Center, which would provide research opportunities for FSU scientists in collaborative efforts with 
Western scientists. See U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Proliferation and the Former Soviet Union, OTA-ISS-605 (Washing-
ton, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1994), pp. 23-28. Some U.S. private foundations have also made money available to 
Russian research institutions to try to curtail the proliferation of nUclear-weapons expertise. 
138 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, op. cit., footnote 98. 
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and will require approval from the Secretary of 
Defense. 139 
The policy directs government departments 
and agencies requiring access to space to purchase 
commercially available U.S. space transportation 
products and services to the fullest extent feasible, 
and stipulates conditions on the use of excess bal-
listic missiles. Such use must support the sponsor-
ing organization's mission; be consistent with 
international obligations, including the Missile 
Technology Control Regime (MTCR) guidelines 
and the START agreements; and result "in a cost 
savings to the U.S. Government relative to the use 
of available commercial launch services that 
would also meet mission requirements, including 
performance, schedule, and risk."I40 
In testimony before the Subcommittee on 
Space of the House Committee on Science, Space 
and Technology,141 John Gibbons, Assistant to 
the President for Science and Technology, further 
clarified U.S. policy on use of missile assets, stat-
ing that "engineering tests and suborbital flight 
experiments are allowed, but orbital flights which 
may compete with private sector providers would 
have to satisfy some tough criteria."142 
Gibbons argued that "these criteria are clear 
and reasonable and . . . they provide sufficient 
flexibility to protect government interests while 
continuing to encourage private sector investment 
in new space transportation systems. If converting 
ballistic missiles to space launch vehicles can be 
done in a manner that saves money for the govern-
ment, this policy will still allow us to take advan-
tage of those savings."143 
DOD does not currently plan to use interconti-
nental ballistic missile (ICBM) assets made ex-
Static firing destroys a Pershing /I engine under provisions of 
the Intermediate·Range Nuclear Forces treaty. 
cess by START agreements for launching 
payloads into orbit, but its implementation plan 
notes that: 
... several contractors use ICBM heritage 
designs and tooling to produce new hardware 
similar or identical in design. New production of 
launch vehicle systems using ICBM technology 
and design will be allowed for either EELV 
competition or commercial application, but new 
productions must comply with existing policies 
of proliferation control of missile technology, as 
well as START provisions. 144 
Background 
DOD currently has four U.S. strategic ballistic 
missiles in stock that are either retired or being re-
tired. They are the Minuteman II and Titan II 
ICBMs, and the Trident I C4 and Poseidon C3 
submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). 
139 The White House, Office of Science and Technology Policy, op. cit., footnote 3, sec. VII(l). 
140 Ibid., sec. VII(l)(c). 
141 Now the House Science Committee's Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics. 
142 John H. Gibbons, Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy, "Statement on National Space Transportation Policy," testimony at 
hearings before the Subcommittee on Space, Committee on Science, Space and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC, 
Sept. 20, 1994. 
143 Ibid. 
144 U.S. Department of Defense, op. cit., footnote 125. 
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BOX 9: Treaty-Driven Force Reductions 
The first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), signed by President Bush and Soviet President 
Gorbachev on July 31, 1991, called for limiting each nation to 6,000 accountable warheads on 1,600 strate-
gic offensive delivery vehicles. 
As a result of START I, the United States has removed warheads from all 450 single-warhead Minuteman 
II ICBMs. In addition, the United States has removed the missiles from all its Poseidon ballistic missile 
submarines. Nearly half of the missiles from 31 Poseidon submarines that were in the U.S. fleet have been 
eliminated. 
Protocols to the START I treaty now in force call for the elimination of most surplus ballistic missiles. The 
Nineteenth Agreed Statement annexed to the START I agreement requires that a party to the treaty wishing 
to use surplus missiles to develop space launch boosters must get the consent of the Joint Compliance 
and Inspection Commission. Converted space transportation systems would be allowed provided the re-
sulting boosters differ verifiably from ICBMs and SLBMs, and provided the number of boosters produced 
and stored do not exceed space launch requirements. START I might result in a surplus of as many as 450 
ICBMs and 192 SLBMs. 
START II was signed on January 3, 1992, but has not been approved by either the United States or 
Russia. This treaty would further reduce warheads on strategic offensive delivery vehicles to 3,500 or fewer 
and would ban multiple warhead ICBMs. Russian ratification appears uncertain.1 One U.S. deployment 
option under START II could add 50 Peacekeeper ICBMs to the surplus created by START I. START II also 
calls for reducing the number of warheads on SLBMs from eight to four, but without reducing the number of 
missiles themselves. 
1 "Russian Parliament Approval of START II 'Uncertain at Best': CIA Aide," Aerospace Daily 173(40):311. 1995. 
SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1995. 
Some of the retirements are a result of various 
arms control agreements (see box 9). 
Minuteman 
All of the 450 single-warhead Minuteman IIs were 
taken off alert in September 1991 and will be re-
tired under START. 145 By the end of 1994, the Air 
Force had removed 384 Minuteman II ICBMs 
from their silos and had transported them to stor-
age or to processing facilities. The United States 
plans to deactivate the remaining 66 Minuteman 
IIs by the end of 1995. Martin Marietta has advo-
cated refurbishing the Minuteman II for use as a 
small launcher capable of supporting suborbital 
experiments and carrying 1,200-lb satellites to 
LEO. Minuteman IIs have been used for several 
Strategic Defense Initiative tests and were once 
considered for use in evaluating National Aero-
space Plane (NASP) technologies. l46 Further-
more, a Minuteman II was an early booster choice 
of the Universities Space Research Association 
(USRA) to launch scientific payloads in its Stu-
dent Explorer Demonstration Initiative. 
145 The Anns Control Association, "U.S. and Commonwealth MIRVed Strategic Ballistic Missiles: Fact Sheet," Washington, DC, Jan. 10, 
1991. 
146 Leonard David, "NASP Backers Seek Scramjet Tests on Surplus Missiles," Space News, Mar. 22, 1993. 
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Titan II 
The Air Force has retired some 53 Titan II boost-
ers from silos in Nebraska, Kansas, and Wyo-
ming. 147 The Air Force is currently evaluating 
how many of these missiles to retain for other uses 
and how many to destroy. Engines from the Titans 
are likely to be returned to Martin Marietta Denver 
for retrofitting into current Titan lIG SLVs. At 
least two firms are believed to have contacted the 
Air Force stating their intentions to bid on the 
Med-Lite competition using Titan lIs, but the bids 
never materialized. 
Martin Marietta has an Air Force Space Com-
mand contract to refurbish retired Titan lIs for use 
as SLVs. The contract calls for the conversion of 
14 Titan II missiles into Titan IIG SLVs, to be 
completed by September 1995. As a result of that 
contract, the Ballistic Missile Defense Organiza-
tion was able to boost its Clementine lunar space-
craft into orbit on a refurbished Titan IIG in 
January 1994. 
Trident/Poseidon 
The United States plans to retire 92 Trident I C4 
missiles when their submarine carriers are retired. 
The current schedule calls for the destruction of 
these SLBMs after Lockheed Missiles and Space 
Co. evaluates whether they might have commer-
cial use. Lockheed has expressed an interest in us-
ing the C4s for sounding rockets or small satellite 
boosters. Navy officials, however, claim that the 
C4s will ultimately be destroyed. The Navy also 
plans to destroy the 160 Poseidon C3 missiles that 
were retired as of the end of 1991. 
Issues for Congress 
Arms control agreements and military downsiz-
ing have left both the United States and Russia 
with a significant surplus of long-range ballistic 
missiles. Both countries have the option to con-
A Titan /I missile silo in Arizona is destroyed under terms of . 
the Strategic Arms Umitation Treaty /I. 
vert them to space launch vehicles, but, to date, the 
United States has generally decided to forgo this 
option. The Russians, on the other hand, are pur-
suing several conversion projects. Both of these 
choices raise issues for Congress. 
It-iilJ#tj Unfair competition or market cre-
ation? 
Before the Clinton Administration's policy on 
use of missile assets, former Vice President 
Quayle, while head of the National Space Coun-
cil, sponsored a set of studies on the future of 
America's space capabilities. The Vice Presi-
dent's Space Policy Advisory Board issued a re-
port on U.S. space launch capability that called 
attention to the promise of using excess ballistic 
missiles.148 At the time, the Bush Administration 
had not taken a formal position on the use of ex-
cess ballistic missiles for commercial space 
launch, but in the interim had denied the use of 
147 David Mosher, Congressional Budget Office, private communications, Mar. 22, 1995. 
148 Vice President's Space Policy Advisory Board, "The Future of the U.S. Space Launch Capability: A Task Group Report," November 
1992, pp. 7-8, 26, 35-36. 
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I 
TABLE 14: Use of Excess Ballistic Missiles 
Benefits 
Lowers cost of access to space. 
Increases space-related R&D in both the commercial and 
academic sectors. 
Creates business opportunities to convert surplus mis-
siles and to provide associated launch services. 
Tests the market for SLVs, which will allow entrepreneur-
ial firms to raise investment capital for the creation of 
new, more competitive launch vehicles and services. 
Costs 
Undermines the commercial production of space 
launch vehicles by reducing their volume, thereby 
raising their cost. 
Stalls the development of new, more efficient SLVs. 
SOURCE: Vice President's Space Policy Advisory Board, "The Future of the U.S. Space Launch Capability: A Task Group Report," November 1992. 
these assets pending completion of a review. 149 
The report's review of potential benefits and costs 
of converting Titan II, Poseidon, and Minuteman 
assets is summarized in table 14. 
The task group suggested that a balance be-
tween the two points of view must be found, and 
recommended the establishment of a government-
supported, small payload launch program. This 
program would use low-cost launch vehicles to 
promote and encourage space research and exper-
imentation and permit the use of excess ballistic 
missiles as space launch vehicles for government-
sponsored research or commercial applications 
under specifically controlled conditions. 
Most of the points raised by former Vice Presi-
dent Quayle's task force continue to be valid. At a 
time when the United States is trying to reduces its 
budget, however, the requirement for less-expen-
sive launch vehicles is paramount, not only for 
military and scientific purposes, but for commer-
cial needs as well. 
Recycling missile assets has been viewed by 
some as a means of reestablishing U.S. leadership 
in commercial space transportation. Surplus mis-
siles could be retrofitted to accommodate the 
growing requirement for low-cost launch ve-
hicles. In the process, the government would be 
149 Ibid., p. 26. 
saved the expense of both scrapping the missiles 
and buying new SLVs. Over 600 ballistic missiles 
are slated for retirement by the end of the decade in 
the United States alone. 150 
A lucrative market is now evolving to provide a 
new generation of global satellite telecommunica-
tions. 151 Private firms are developing constella-
tions of small satellites that are scheduled to be 
placed in LEO in the near future. The number of 
spacecraft required for each constellation, and the 
need to replenish individual satellites as they dete-
riorate, is adding to an appetite for low-cost 
launch vehicles. Moreover, the compact nature of 
these spacecraft permits the use of smaller launch 
vehicles. 
Still, many U.S. commercial launch providers 
view the release of retired missile assets as a threat 
to their industry. They believe these assets will not 
be priced according to their true costs. Moreover, 
they point out that the United States is already the 
dominant provider of commercial SLY s. Convert-
ing excess ballistic missiles might lower govern-
ment costs and expand the U.S. share of the world 
market in the near term, but could inhibit long-
term investment in SLY development. 
ISO David Mosher, Congressional Budget Office, private communications, Mar. 22, 1995. 
lSI See the section covering fundamental objective #4. 
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Converted excess ballistic missile assets would compete with existing U.S. SLVs, such as this Pegasus. 
The availability and possible use of retired mis-
sile assets in the United States has been hotly de-
bated, most ardently between the Orbital Sciences 
Corp. (OSC) of Dulles, Virginia, and officials at 
USRA. OSC opposes use of missile assets for or-
bital insertion of payloads while USRA favors us-
ing the less-expensive assets, in particular the 
Minuteman II, to launch small scientific pay-
loads. 152 
As a practical matter, DOD and NASA have 
generally discouraged the conversion of ballistic 
missiles. DOD did offer NASA use of its Titan II 
for NASA's Med-Lite missions, but NASA de-
cided instead to purchase the services commer-
cially.153 
Some companies have opted to avoid the issue 
of excess ballistic missiles, focusing instead on 
adapting ballistic missile production technology 
and designs to new commercial vehicles. For ex-
ample, on January 23, 1995, E'Prime Aerospace 
Corp. of Titusville, Florida announced that it had 
received DOD approval to market a space launch 
vehicle based on Peacekeeper ICBM technology. 
E'Prime claims that, under an amendment to its 
Commercialization Agreement with the U.S. Air 
Force, it has the rights to use Peacekeeper technol-
ogy to develop a commercial launch vehicle-the 
Eagle S Series. No existing Peacekeepers them-
selves will be used, but Peacekeeper tooling and 
ground support equipment has been purchased 
from the government. 154 
Lockheed Missiles and Space Co. offered to 
use a modified Poseidon C3 to launch small satel-
lites for the military several years ago, but "vague 
and uncertain DOD policies" did not warrant de-
152 osc supports the conversion of ballistic missiles for suborbital launches. Such a policy poses no threat to OSC's standing in the SLV 
market. 
153 For a detailed discussion of this decision, see box 6. 
154 Bob Davies, President, E'Prime Aerospace Corp., private communications, April 1995. 
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Lockheed privately financed development of the LLV. 
velopmentofthe concept, according to Lockheed 
officials. 155However, the effort led to the compa-
ny's development of a family of Lockheed Launch 
Vehicles (UV). LLV development has drawn on 
tested and ttied motors, as well as other off-the-
shelf components. The maiden flight of an LLV-I 
is slated forllight from the Vandenberg Air Force 
Base in California sometime in 1995. 
Given the restricted budgets available within 
the government to pursue new types of launch ve-
hicles, the prospect of falling back on surplus mis-
siles for certain smaller classes of payloads might 
be attractive, particularly if these missiles could 
be used to create a market for future SLVs. The 
cost of using these missiles, however, might be 
too high if it undermines the ability of commercial 
SLY providers to develop new launch vehicles 
and, perhaps, even drives them out of the space 
transportation business. 
ItiilJ#JM Russian excess ballistic missiles 
Although in the United States the use of excess 
ballistic missiles is being tightly controlled, some 
Russian enterprises are promoting a number of 
converted ICBMs and SLBMs for an assortment 
of commercial uses. 156 The Scientific and Tech-
nological Center (STC) of Moscow has begun to 
market surplus SS-25 ICBMs, rebuilt to launch 
satellites. Called the Start-I, the vehicle made a 
demonstration flight from Russia's Plesetsk Cos-
modrome on March 25, 1993. 
The Start-l is a transportable, four-stage boost-
er derived from a road-mobile, solid-propellant 
ICBM, capable of launching small micro gravity 
payloads or small LEO satellites. Last year, CTA, 
Inc. of Rockville, Maryland announced that the 
Start-l was the firm's vehicle of choice to place 
into orbit a commercial remote sensing satellite 
built by CTA for EarthWatch, Inc. 157 According 
to CTA, the Russians offer cheaper SLVs with 
preparation times faster than anything currently 
available in the United States. CTA's decision to 
use the Start-l could change if the Russians do not 
155 HowardTrudeau, Vice President, Engineering, Missile Systems Division, Lockheed Missiles and Space Co., "The Lockheed Launch 
Vehicle Family." Sixteenth Annual Lockheed Technology Symposium, Washington, DC, Nov. 16, 1994, p. 2. 
156 U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of Commercial Space Transportation, Commercial Space Transportation Advisory Commit-
tee (COMSTAq, "Report of the COMSTAC Task Group on Soviet Entry Into the World Space Market," Washington, DC, August 1992. 
157 Boris Feldblyum, "Peace Dividends-Refurbished Russian ICBM To Carry U.S. Imaging Payload," The International Small Satellite 
Organization NeI!sletter 8(2):5-6, ApriVMay 1994. 
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adequately analyze and explain recent failure of a 
Start-1 fifth stage.15S 
The Russians have converted another ballistic 
missile, the SS-19, into a space launch vehicle 
called "Rokot." This vehicle boosted an amateur 
radio satellite into orbit on December 26, 1994. 
The Rokot is a liquid-fueled ICBM developed by 
the Salyut design bureau in Moscow, now under 
the auspices of the Khrunichev Space Research 
and Producing Association. An upper stage of this 
converted missile, however, blew up after placing 
its payload into orbit. 159 
In addition, the Russians are promoting con-
version of the SS-18, the most powerful ICBM 
(largest throw-weight) developed in either the 
FSU or the United States. This two-stage, liquid-
fueled booster could easily provide LEO launch 
services. Australian space officials and Russian 
rocket producers from STC Complex have dis-
cussed converting SS-20 and SS-25 missile 
stages, modified with a more accurate guidance 
system, into SLY s.160 The resulting vehicle 
would launch satellites from Australian launch 
sites near the equator, which would allow the 
SLY s to reach orbit using minimum fuel. 
Russian companies have also unveiled plans to 
develop launch vehicles derived from a number of 
Russian SLBMs. The SS-N-8, -18, and -23 liquid-
fueled rockets have been touted as capable of loft-
ing micro gravity capsules based upon warhead 
reentry vehicle designs. 
Finally, a Ukrainian venture begun in 1990 and 
led by Scientific Production Organization (NPO) 
Yuzhnoye, in conjunction with NPOs Soyuz and 
Iskra, converted the Ukrainian SS-24 into an air-
launched vehicle called "Space Clipper.,,161 Con-
verting this vehicle means retaining its lower three 
solid-fueled stages, and developing a new fourth 
stage and control system. 
The availability of this wide assortment of 
commercial launch assets, all based on converted 
Cold War missiles, requires development and pro-
duction money, as well as commercial customers. 
Whether or not these military missiles of the FSU 
will evolve to true commercial status remains to 
be seen. Nonetheless, if the U.S. government be-
lieves that surplus U.S. ballistic missiles under-
mine our domestic SLY launch providers, then 
Russian ballistic missiles may be seen as an equal, 
or greater, threat. 
I Fundamental Objective #4: The Private 
Sector Role in Space Transportation 
Decisionmaking 
The NSTP's fourth fundamental objective stresses 
expansion of the role of the private sector in space 
transportation R&D in order to meet the govern-
ment's need for assured access to space at an af-
fordable price and improve the international 
competitiveness of the U.S. private-sector space 
transportation industry. 
Fundamental Objective #4 
Provides for an expanded private sector role in the fed-
eral space transportation R&D decision making process. In 
contrast with previous national policy on space transporta-
tion, this policy specifically directs the Departments of 
Transportation and Commerce to identify opportunities for 
government-industry cooperation and to factor these into 
NASA's and DOD's implementation plans. 
The private sector has been included as a criti-
cal element of U.S. space transportation policy for 
158 Sharone Parnes, "Israelis Regroup After Loss of Satellite on Russian Launcher," Space News, Apr. 3, 1995, p. 38; and private commu-
nications with a representative of CTA, Inc. 
159 "Converted Missile Explodes After Launch," Space News, Feb. 6, 1995, p. 2. 
160 Reuters Ltd. Wire Service, "Australia Eyes Russian Missiles for Space Industry," from Canberra, Australia, Feb. 8, 1995. 
161 Chris Bulloch, "Destroy Them or Launch Them?" Inreravia, January 1995, pp. 44-47. The Space Clipper is not carried outside the air-
craft as is the OSC's Pegasus, but is extracted from the rear cargo doors of the Russian AN-124 heavy transport plane. 
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NASA hopes to replace the Space Shuttle with a commercially 
owned and operated RLV, or perhaps privatize the Shuttle. 
several years. One reason often cited for the com-
mercial emphasis is the desire to preserve an im-
portant high-technology, commercial industrial 
sector in the United States. But a more compelling 
reason for the current emphasis on the private sec-
tor appears to be the judgment that, for the foresee-
able future, budget constraints make it unlikely 
that the government will pay the entire cost of de-
veloping and maintaining significantly new na-
tional space transportation capabilities. In this 
fiscally constrained environment, private sector 
financing is viewed by many observers as essen-
tial for NASA's development of a follow-on to the 
Space Shuttle. 162 
Further, there is a perception that the govern-
ment should have less responsibility in areas in 
which the private sector might reasonably be ex-
pected to provide the desired goods and services. 
The privatization of most launch facilities and 
many of the actual launch activities, for example, 
is often considered by many to be necessary if the 
United States is to have a viable space transporta-
tion industry in the future. Greater use of the pri-
vate sector confonns with current DOD and 
National Perfonnance Review acquisition policy 
initiatives that stress increased use of commercial 
products and processes. Under these circum-
stances, increased private sector involvement in 
the R&D decisionmaking process appears not 
only prudent, but absolutely essential. 
Nevertheless, the past experience of govern-
ment research programs has caused some observ-
ers to question the potential for the private sector 
to have meaningful input into the space trans-
portation development process. Discussions with 
industry raise significant questions about the 
conditions under which the private sector (which 
must remain profitable to survive) would be will-
ing to finance the development and building of a 
new space launch vehicle. 
This section outlines government policy and 
implementation plans related to an expanded role 
for the private sector, discusses the potential of the 
implementation plans to meet stated government 
goals for the commercial sector, and identifies is-
sues of potential concern relating to the current 
policy and implementation plans. 
Government-Industry Goals and Policy 
The U.S. government space transportation goal of 
assuring reliable and affordable access to space 
using domestic capabilities subsumes a commit-
ment to a viable and internationally competitive 
U.S. commercial space transportation industry. 
Indeed, the policy directs government entities to 
"encourage the cost -effective use of commercially 
provided U.S. products and services, to the fullest 
extent feasible, that meet mission requirements; 
... [and] ... foster the international competitive-
162 Ivan Bekey, NASA, "A Win-Win Concept for Commercial Development and Operation of a New, Large Reusable Space Launch Ve-
hicle: An "Existence Proof' White Paper," Dec. 21, 1994, pp. 2-3. Bekey reports that NASA concluded that the government was very unlikely to 
proceed into procurement of a new launch system in the future, and that both NASA and the DOD independently concluded that if the next 
generation reusable launch vehicle were to be developed, it would have to be done by the private sector using largely private sector funding. 
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ness of the u.s. commercial space transportation 
industry, actively considering commercial needs 
and factoring them into decisions on improve-
ments in launch facilities and launch vehicles." 163 
Recognizing the need to design for dual or mul-
tiple use to enhance U.S. commercial competi-
tiveness, the policy directs government planners 
to involve the private sector in the design and 
development of space transportation capabilities; 
transfer unclassified, government-developed, 
space transportation information to industry in a 
timely and commercially relevant manner; and 
promote common technical standards for space 
products and services. 
The policy further directs government planners 
to help identify and promote innovative ways for 
the private sector and federal, state, and local gov-
ernments to work together to implement space 
transportation policy; to avoid engaging in activi-
ties that have commercial applications and that 
might deter commercial space activities; and to 
provide industry stable and predictable access to 
appropriate space transportation hardware, facili-
ties, and services. 
The Implementation Plans 
The implementation plans all specifically address 
the role of the private sector in meeting their as-
signed goals, but organizational views on this is-
sue-as expressed in the policy, plans, and 
funding levels-vary considerably. 
Departments of Transportation and 
Commerce Implementation Draft Plan 
The DOT/DOC implementation plan was still un-
der revision during the writing of this report. 
However, the latest available draft advances an 
objective for the U.S. space transportation indus-
try to "capture a dominant portion" of the global 
market for launch services by encouraging the de-
velopment of a more internationally competitive 
launch vehicle fleet and supporting infrastruc-
ture. 164 
The importance and difficulty of obtaining fi-
nancing (private or public) in the space launch in-
dustry has been a matter of concern for several 
years. The NSTP gives DOT and DOC specific re-
sponsibility for identifying opportunities for gov-
ernment-industry cooperation and for promoting 
innovative types of arrangements to implement 
the policy. The DOT/DOC implementation plan 
lists, and briefly discusses, several options for 
stimulating private investment in space trans-
portation vehicle development and infrastructure 
improvements. 165 Some of these options are in-
cluded in table 15. The potential benefits and 
drawbacks of the most important of these options 
are discussed later in the issues section. 
Industry has expressed particular interest in an-
chor tenancy and termination liability. The pri-
vate sector and the government frequently use 
anchor tenancy agreements to support financing 
of new building construction. Such agreements al-
low the building developer to raise funds to 
construct the building. Early leases can result in 
lower rates or other benefits for the anchor tenant. 
Similarly, the government might act as an an-
chor tenant for a space transportation system by 
providing a guaranteed launch market for a specif-
ic period of time to the space transportation pro-
vider. As an anchor tenant, the government would 
provide an income stream and reduce the invest-
ment risk for the private sector during a period in 
which commercial markets are being established. 
For example, the government might negotiate to 
purchase a designated amount of lift capacity 
(with some specified performance and schedule 
minimums) per year to LEO, to make a lO-year 
163 The White House, Office of Science and Technology Policy, op. cit., footnote 3, secs. 1(5) and 1(6). 
164 U.S. Department ofTransportationiU .S. Department of Commerce, "Department ofTransportationiDepartment of Commerce National 
Space Transportation Policy Implementation Plan: Executive Summary," Washington, DC, Apr. 19, 1995 (draft). 
165 Ibid., pp. 8-11. 
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TABLE 15: Options for Financing Launch Vehicle Development 
General option Examples 
Anchor tenancy Government commitment to procure a specified number or percentage of 
goods and/or services over a number of years. 
Termination liability Government commitment to reimburse a contractor for all or part of its 
investment if the government terminates a contract for its convenience. 
Public/private partnerships R&D limited partnerships, in which investors could form a limited part-
nership to conduct cooperative R&D; consortia; space transportation 
corporations; space seNice brokerages; contracted partnerships; and 
government prizes. 
Other financial options Loan guarantees, tax deferments, exemptions, and credits. 
SOURCES: DOT/DOC, "Department of Transportation/Department of Commerce National Space Transportation Policy Implementation Plan" (Draft), 
Nov. 7, 1994, pp. 9-12. H.R. 6135, NASA FY 93 Authorization (Public Law 102-588). H.R. 258, Launch Services Corporation Act of 1995. 
purchase commitment, and to have some potential 
for increasing the commitment. 166 
Termination liability commits the govern-
ment to provide payment to a contractor in the 
event the government terminates a contract for its 
convenience. Advocates argue that, when applied 
to the space transportation industry, this arrange-
ment would protect private sector firms involved 
in endeavors such as multiyear anchor tenancy 
against the government's terminating a contract 
after a firm had made large investments. 
A space transportation corporation might be 
established to provide economies of scale to the 
U.S. space transportation industry by pooling all 
government launches as a central procurement 
agent. It might be quasi-public, chartered by Con-
gress; and modeled on COMSAT.167 The corpora-
tion would work to increase the economic 
exploitation of space and enhance the economic 
competitiveness of the U.S. space transportation 
industry. The corporation might initially have 
some government capital and operate with an an-
chor tenancy arrangement. Whatever the struc-
ture, proponents argue that a corporation would 
operate on business principles and use business 
practices. 
Activities such as R&D limited partnerships 
and consortia would be aimed at leveraging in-
vestments by individual firms as well as the gov-
ernment. Such activities are currently sanctioned 
by the National Cooperative Research Act of 
1984.168 Joint R&D has been used extensively in 
recent years in many fields. 
The DOTIDOC plan also includes the idea of 
offering a government prize for the development 
of a good or service the government desires. This 
concept has been advocated by some in industry as 
an efficient way to entice private sector invest-
ment in space launch. Under this concept, the gov-
ernment might simply award a prize to the first 
competitor meeting the government's perfor-
166 See T.E Rogers, "Toward a New Public-Private Space Transportation Strategy," The Journal of Practical Applications in Space 5( 1): 17, 
1993. Ivan Bekey, op. cit., footnote 162, suggests a five-year, above-market price guarantee to help industry secure initial financing. Industry 
representatives provided OTA with a number of alternative anchor tenancy scenarios. 
167 For one possible structure, see U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, H.R. 258, "Launch Services Corporation Act of 1995," Wash-
ington, DC, 1995 (introduced on Jan. 4). 
168 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Making Things Better: Competing in Manufacturing, OTA-ITE-443 (Washington, 
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1990), pp. 225-226. The National Cooperative Production Amendments of 1993 amended the 
National Cooperative Research Act of 1984 to include joint production activities. 
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mance needs (e.g., a vehicle that could deliver a 
25,000 lbs of payload to the International Space 
Station, have a total launch operations crew of 
fewer than 50 people, and take less than four days 
after return to be ready to launch on a new mis-
sion). A sufficiently large prize, some advocates 
argue, would be a far greater stimulus of innova-
tive developments and new entries into the launch 
business than anchor tenancy or termination li-
ability. 
Loan guarantees, tax deferments, exemptions, 
and credits are among the other financial options 
listed in the DOT/DOC implementation plan. The 
Japanese government, for example, has used suc-
cess-dependent loans (hojokin) to assist risky en-
terprises in selected industries. Repayment for 
these loans can wait for a positive cash flow. 169 
Tax credits and exemptions are more traditional 
U.S. policies. DOD has employed Title III of the 
Defense Production Act to develop production ca-
pabilities in areas deemed essential to national se-
curity. DPA money, for example, is currently 
being used to fund part of the government's Flat 
Panel Display Initiative.170 
The DOT/DOC implementation plan also sug-
gests that significant economic savings might be 
realized through the development of joint-use fa-
cilities. Many observers believe that important 
savings are to be gained from changes in launch 
operations and facilities. The DOD-administered, 
dual-use space launch facility program has funded 
studies of commercial spaceports, initially using 
surplus government facilities. This is discussed in 
more detail later. 
The DOT/DOC implementation plan notes that 
the principal role for federal funds may be as "the 
provider of matching grant funds, venture capital, 
credit capacity, and a 'bankable' stream of reve-
nue to support commercial launches." This view 
of the government as the ultimate source of fund-
ing is a more traditional view of government's 
relationship to the launch industry. It is consistent 
with the findings of the 1994 "Commercial Space 
Transportation Study" (CSTS), whose partici-
pants reported they were unable to prove that the 
foreseeable commercial space market was suffi-
ciently robust to support a completely commer-
cially developed system. The study therefore 
concluded that some level of government finan-
cial participation was essential to attract commer-
cial investment in U.S. space transportation. I71 
Department of Defense 
The DOD implementation plan includes the pri-
vate sector less as a partner in the development of 
new, commercially applicable launch capabilities, 
than as a provider ofless costly launch vehicles to 
meet DOD needs. The Department supports U.S. 
commercial programs indirectly through its 
EELV development and procurements. U.S. firms 
are expected to derive a spinoff benefit from the 
development of a lower cost EEL V that might then 
be offered to the commercial market. 172 The De-
partment's operation and maintenance of much of 
169 u.s. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Competing Economies: American, Europe and the Pacific Rim, OTA-ITE-498(Wash-
ington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 1991), p. 68. 
170 Title III of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 U .S.C. App. 2061) addresses the expansion of productive capacity and supply. Under 
this authority, the President may make purchases, guarantee purchases or guarantee loans to help develop a capability that is viewed as essential 
for national security. 
171 The Commercial Space Transportation Study Alliance, op. cit., footnote 16, p. 13. The CSTS is an examination of potential markets for 
space transportation undertaken by the CSTS Alliance. The Alliance consisted of six firms: Boeing, General Dynamics, Lockheed, Martin Ma-
rietta, McDonnell Douglas, and Rockwell. The study began in March 1993 and reported findings in April 1994. 
172 U.S. Department of Defense, op. cit., footnote 125, p. 8. 
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the national space launch infrastructure is a bene-
fit to the private sector. 
Moreover, DOD reports that it is making efforts 
to design, or redesign its payloads to have more 
"commercial" characteristics.173 One of the prin-
cipal problems, however, is that the national secu-
rity community retains a requirement for a 
heavy-lift capability that is very costly. That capa-
bility is not currently of great use in the commer-
cial market. 
The DOD implementation plan incorporates 
many of the recent DOD acquisition reforms 
aimed at opening the Department to commercial 
developments and commercial business practices. 
Performance specifications and commercial spec-
ifications and standards will be used in lieu of mil-
itary specifications and standards, for example, 
unless there are no practical alternatives. Further-
more, the plan encourages industry to offer alter-
native solutions to the total government mission 
model requirements, rather than to meet detailed 
government specifications.174 As a part of these 
changes, foreign components may also be used, 
"but sole dependence on foreign sources of supply 
will not be permitted."175 
The DOD plan encourages commercial invest-
ment, but with some caution. The plan directs that 
if investment is included, bidders "must identify 
how they intend to recover their investment in the 
EELV recurring cost."176 
NASA 
The NSTP directs NASA to actively involve the 
private sector in planning and evaluating its 
launch technology activities. NASA's imple-
mentation plan envisions a "government-industry 
partnership" aimed at developing and demonstrat-
ing new reusable space transportation technolo-
gies. The Agency believes that these technologies 
have the potential to reduce the cost of access to 
space radically and act as a catalyst for the in-
creased use of space. 
NASA reports that a government-industry part-
nership is essential, because: 
... the private sector could have a significant 
role in managing the development and operation 
of a new reusable space transportation system. 
In anticipation of this role, NASA shall actively 
involve the private sector in planning and evalu-
ating its launch technology activities. 177 
NASA's program objectives for the RLV devel-
opment program include the reduction of techni-
cal risks associated with building and operating a 
reusable system in order to encourage private in-
vestment in the commercial development and op-
eration of the next-generation system.178 The 
Agency's plan describes a concept in which indus-
try might make significant decisions, and "in-
volvement by the government, at industry's 
request, will be in areas where the government's 
technical expertise and assets can be used to their 
fullest advantage. "179 
NASA's implementation plan describes joint 
"government-industry synergy teams" that select 
key technologies, design test programs, and de-
velop evaluation criteria for validating the 
technology in an integrated system with realistic 
operations, maintenance, and flight environ-
173 U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition and Technology, "MED-LITE: A DOD White Pa-
per," Washington, DC, December 1994. This was discussed in detail earlier in the section on fundamental objective #1. 
174 U.S. Department of Defense, op. cit., footnote 125, p. 7. 
175 Ibid., p. 6. This is discussed earlier in the section covering fundamental objective #2. 
176 Ibid. Foreign sourcing of components will be managed so that foreign suppliers cannot deny items to the United States, using stockpiling 
and assuring that alternative sources of supply can be developed. 
177 NASA, op. cit., footnote 29, p. 3. Some skeptics note that the implementation of any partnership may well be challenged by the fact that 
NASA has man-rated space launch requirements, while the commercial industry does not generally need man-rated vehicles. 
178 Ibid., p. 5. 
179 Ibid., p. 4. 
The National Space Transportation Policy: Issues for Congress I 87 
ments. The Agency believes such a program will 
provide practical experience in routine operations 
of reusable systems. I80 
Issues for Congress 
The private sector policy goals and the measures 
outlined to achieve them in the implementation 
plans raise a number of critical issues involving 
the size and nature of the future space transporta-
tion market; the nature of the govemment-indus-
try relationship; the proper balance between risk 
and incentives; launch operations and infrastruc-
ture; and the willingness of the government to ac-
commodate commercial needs in seeking to 
achieve its own goals. These issues are discussed 
below. 
ttiinMb Will the estimated market support 
policy goals? 
The assessment of the size, character, availabil-
ity, and relationship (e.g., potential overlap) of fu-
ture space transportation markets is critical to 
industry's attitude toward new space transporta-
tion development programs and government cost-
sharing schemes. 
Industry sees several different market seg-
ments: U.S. government (defense, intelligence, 
and civil), U.S. commercial, foreign government, 
and foreign commercial. Assuming no significant 
near-term change in the United States' national se-
curity situation, a core market, composed of an-
nounced government and commercial programs, 
is relatively well defined. There is, however, con-
siderable uncertainty about the size and availabil-
ity of the overall potential space transportation 
market. The CSTS, for example, estimated a sig-
nificant increase in the use of space, and therefore 
in commercial launchings-if the cost of putting 
payloads into orbit were greatly reduced. But 
many of the increased uses of space envisioned in 
the CSTS were expected to come in nontraditional 
180 Ibid., p. 6. 
Satellites, such as this HS 601, provide capabilities for air 
traffic control, mobil phone seNice, and television, voice, 
facsimile, and data transmission. 
areas (e.g., tourism and waste disposal). Indeed, 
the study acknowledged that currently projected 
markets are insufficient to attract major invest-
ments, and argued that "to become economically 
viable, a new launch system must generate new 
commercial markets."I8I 
The current industry assessment appears to be 
that: 
• The potential commercial market for MLV s is 
insufficient by itself to entice enough private 
investment to build a future RLV capable of 
meetings NASA's needs. 
• The potential commercial market for small 
payloads may be sufficient to attract enough 
private investment to develop vehicles to meet 
both commercial and government needs for 
small payload delivery. 
181 The Commercial Space Transportation Study Alliance, op. cit., footnote 16, p. I. 
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A Navstar Global Positioning Satellite is prepared for launch 
aboard a Delta II. 
• There is little estimated commercial heavy-lift 
market and the private sector is unlikely to put 
much of its own funds in that area without sub-
stantial government support. 
Such assessments imply that if the government 
wishes to encourage the development of a com-
mercial RLV, it will have to provide a significant 
amount of funding-either through a direct devel-
opment and procurement process or through some 
form of guaranteed business. 
Estimating the Market 
Government and industry planners use "mission 
models" that contain estimates of future space 
transportation needs to help them make invest-
ment decisions. These models may vary depend-
ing on the developer's judgment about the 
likelihood of a particular action occurring (e.g., 
the deployment of one of a number of proposed 
global satellite communications systems). 
Because of the time involved in developing 
new space transportation systems and the large in-
vestments involved, the investment time periods 
of interest are necessarily long-usually 15 to 20 
years. Market projections become progressively 
ill-defined further in the future. The uncertainties 
of these markets raise the financial risks for the 
private sector. These higher perceived risks, in 
tum, cause firms to seek risk mitigation alterna-
tives such as anchor tenancy, termination liability, 
and other arrangements designed to hedge against 
inadequate financial returns. 
The U.S. Defense and Intelligence Market 
DOD payloads have been a major component of 
the global space launch market for U.S. space 
transportation firms. Under any scenario, they 
will continue to be important in the foreseeable fu-
ture. In the absence of a new, major, military 
threat, or a change in defense planning, estimates 
of the U.S. national security market for the next 
decade are fairly well defined. 182 The DOD re-
cently estimated a demand for an average of about 
two small, eight medium, and three heavy 
launches per year between 1995 and 2010.183 As 
noted earlier, the heavy launches consume rough-
ly 80 percent of the Department's space trans-
portation budget and are its principal target for 
EELV savings. (See section on fundamental ob-
jective #1.) 
182 Major new deployments such as a ballistic missile defense could have a significant effect on these estimates. 
183 U.S. Department of Defense. op. cit., footnote 15, p. 11-2. Estimates for commercial medium-class launches have recently increased 
slightly, reducing the government's percentage of that importanImarket segment. In 1994, DOD launched 5 small payloads, 4 medium pay-
loads, and 4 heavy payloads. These 13 launches constituted 48 percent of the 27 total U.S. launches. There was a worldwide a total of 94 space 
launches in 1994. In addition to the United States; Russia launched 49; France launched 8; China, 5; India, 2; and Japan, 2. 
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DOD estimated that government launches will 
likely comprise almost all the of the U.S. HLV ve-
hicle market, from 30 to 40 percent of the U.S. 
market for MLV s (depending on commercial 
communications developments), and from 15 to 
30 percent of the U.S. SLV.184 Most industry esti-
mates agree on the importance of the DOD market 
to any U.S. space transportation business strategy. 
DOD currently provides the principal U.S. ELV 
market and is potentially an important component 
of the future RL V market. 
The Government's Nondefense Market 
The U.S. government's civil space transportation 
market is composed of weather and communica-
tions satellites; deployment and support of the In-
ternational Space Station; and other planned 
scientific missions. NASA relies primarily on the 
Space Shuttle for its manned and scientific mis-
sions, but it also uses ELVs for some additional 
scientific, communications, and Earth observa-
tion missions. The National Oceanic and Atmos-
pheric Administration relies on ELVs. DOD's 
industrial base study estimated the government's 
nondefense launch market at 18 missions per year 
(three small, seven medium, and eight Shuttle). 
NASA has estimated a need for about 15 missions 
per year, principally MLV s and the Shuttle.185 
Industry planning estimates for the civil market 
are generally conservative and are close to these 
government figures, although they agree with the 
findings of the CSTS that significantly lower 
launch costs would probably expand current mar-
ket segments as well as establish new ones. An 
important issue, however, is how much and at 
what rate expansion might occur. In a fiscally 
constrained environment, the government's non-
184 u.s. Department of Defense, op. cit., footnote IS, p. II-3. 
defense market for space transportation may I\ot 
be very responsive (at least in terms of dollcu-s 
spent) to reduced launch costs. 
The Commercial Market 
The size and character of the future commerCial 
market are critical to private business as well as to 
government space transportation decisions. HQw 
large this market segment might grow, and hQw 
fast that growth might occur, will decide the su.c-
cess or failure of many of the government's pOli-
cies involving industry participation. This market 
segment is, however, the most difficult to predict. 
Private sector interest in government guarante~s, 
such as anchor tenancy and termination liability, 
indicates a broad skepticism about the size of 
near-term commercial markets. An exception <\1-
ready noted may be the small payload (under 
2,000 Ibs to LEO) sector, which is widely vieWed 
as having considerable growth potential. 
Since 1990, U.S. launch providers and Ariane-
space have launched an average of23 commercial 
satellites each year (see table 16). The draft 00'1'1 
DOC implementation plan estimates a future 
annual launch rate for the international commer-
cial market of medium-to-large communications 
satellites in the range of 12 to 15. NASA's "Access 
to Space Study" estimated a range of 5 to 14 cOIb-
merciallaunches per year through the year 2030. 
DOD estimated an average of 15 per year throu~h 
2010, excluding recently proposed LEO satellit~s. 
The LEO constellations might be expected to aQd 
4 to 10 medium-to-Iarge launches per year durill ()" 
o 
the currently estimated deployment phaSes 
(1996-98 and 2002-2005), depending on what 
systems are deployed, and some 8 to 12 small Ve-
hicle launches per year.186 
185 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, op. cit., footnote 87. These include 2 Pegasus/Taurus Class, 3 Delta Class. 2 Atlas 
Class, 0.3 Titan IV Class, and 8 Shuttle, p. 5. There were seven Shuttle and three ELV NASA missions in 1994. 
186 Frank C. Weaver, Director, Office of Commercial Space Transportation, U.S. Department of Transportation, "Dear Colleague," letter to 
industry addressing estimated LEO launch services, Mar. 13, 1994. 
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Arianespace developed the heavy-lift Ariane 5 to launch more 
than one small-or medium-sized payload at a time. 
Industry estimates are generally of the same 
magnitude, although industry points out the nega-
tive effects that the variability of the market can 
have on business. Several communications satel-
lites sent aloft about the same time as a part of a 
communications network, for example, will need 
replacement at about the same time, causing antic-
ipated peaks and valleys in the launch business. 
Industry is starting to include in its commercial 
market forecasts some proposed LEO commu-
nication satellite constellations. The proposals in-
clude constellations that range from 12 to 840 or 
more satellites (see table 17). These constellations 
will provide cellular communications from 
space. 187 The more mature LEO communications 
concepts (e.g., Iridium) are going forward in the 
absence of new and cheaper launch systems. 
Commercial launch rate estimates are probably 
fairly accurate out to about five years since they 
are principally based on payloads already in pro-
duction or scheduled for production. Further into 
the future, however, commercial launch needs be-
come much more uncertain and affected by new 
technological developments and new areas for 
market growth. From the U.S. industry viewpoint, 
the market will also be affected by the number of 
launch system providers-the United States, Eu-
rope, Russia, Japan, China, and others. 
The CSTS estimated that the number of 
launches, and the total mass in orbit, would in-
crease sharply iflaunch costs (and launch prices to 
users) were to drop (see figure 2).188 The team ex-
plored three threshold launch prices to LEO: 
$1000/lb (believed to have a high probability of 
being achievable and a price that might double the 
mass in orbit over current levels); $600/1b (where 
new markets such as space business parks and 
hazardous nuclear waste disposal were estimated 
to be created); and $400/1b (where both new and 
old markets might show extensive growth). 
But all three of the launch prices the CSTS in-
vestigated are significantly below most of the cur-
187 The proposals generally call for initial deployment in clusters on MLV s or HLV s. Individual replacement satellites might be launched on 
SLV s. The LEO satellites are expected to have a life span of four to five years as opposed to 10 years for GEO satellites. Satellite replacement will 
require rapid launch responsiveness. Since there are a number of competing systems, launch costs will need to be minimized. See Ralph DePal-
ma, U.S. Department of Transportation, "Responding to the Market," U.S. Commercial Space Launch Industry, 1995. 
188 Cost and price are often confused in the discussion of space transportation systems. Providers look at cost, while users focus on the price 
of launches. Even if launch costs were to be lowered dramatically, if launch prices were only lowered enough to capture much of the available 
market, the expansion of new markets might be very small. 
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TABLE 16: Commercial Satellites Launched by the United States and Arianespace 
u.s. commercial launches Arianespace commercial launches 
European Other European Other 
Year satellites satellites Total satellites satellites Total Grand total 
1977 6 6 12 0 0 0 12 
1978 3 6 9 0 0 0 9 
1979 2 3 0 0 0 3 
1980 0 2 2 2 0 2 4 
1981 1 5 6 2 1 3 9 
1982 0 10 10 2 0 2 12 
1983 9 10 2 3 13 
1984 2 9 11 4 2 6 17 
1985 0 14 14 3 4 7 21 
1986 0 3 2 5 6 
1987 0 1 1 2 3 4 
1988 0 0 0 6 7 13 13 
1989 2 6 4 10 12 
1990 4 7 11 7 9 16 27 
1991 3 3 6 10 5 15 21 
1992 3 5 8 5 8 13 21 
1993 1 4 5 6 11 17 22 
1994a 0 10 10 3 11 14 24 
a Scheduled. 
SOURCE: U.S. General Accounting Office, "National Space Issues: Observations on Defense Space Programs and Activities," GAO/NSIAD-94-253, 
August 1994, p. 26. 
TABLE 17: Selected LEO Communications Systems 
Number of Orbital Projected initial 
Type System Organization satellites location operations 
"Mega" LEO Teledesic Teledesic Corp. 840 LEO 1999 
Big LEO Iridiuma Iridium 66 LEO 1996 
Globalstara Loral/Qualcomm 48 LEO 1997 
Odysseya TRW 12 Medium orbit 1997 
Ellipso Ellipsat Corp. 14-18 Elliptical 1996 
Little LEO Orbcomm Orbital Communications 24 LEO 1994 
Starsys NACLS, Inc. 24 LEO 1996 
Aries Constellation Communications 48 LEO 1995 
a Licensed by the FCC in January 1995. 
SOURCES: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Technology and Policy Implications 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), p.114. Ralph DePalma, U.S. Department of Transportation, "Responding to the Market," 
U.S. Commercial Space Launch Industry, 1995. Frank C. Weaver, Director, Office of Commercial Space Transportation, U.S. Department of Trans-
portation, "Dear Colleague," letter to industry addressing estimated LEO launch services, Mar. 13, 1994. 
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FIGURE 2: CSTS Medium Probability Market Distribution 
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SOURCE: Commercial Space Transportation Study Alliance. "Commercial Space Transportation Study." Executive Summary. 1994. p. 8. 
rent estimates for launch prices to LEO. 189 Thus, 
until a new vehicle can radically lower launch 
costs, the conservative market estimates appear 
appropriate and are supported by government 
findings. DOD's "Space Launch Modernization 
Study," for example, concluded that the commer-
ciallaunch market has little potential for signifi-
cant growth or economies of scale. 190 Long-term 
(15 to 20 years) growth, however, is an open ques-
tion. 
Factors other than price seem to influence the 
market share for U.S. firms. The CSTS identified 
several, including booking time, ability to launch 
on need, ability to launch on schedule, high launch 
rate, high reliability, simplified launch operations, 
and standardized payload interface (see table 
18)}91 
A recent General Accounting Office (GAO) re-
portl92 asked industry representatives why they 
had selected Arianespace over U.S. launchers. 
GAO reported that price was an important consid-
eration, but respondents considered U.S. launch-
ers competitive in price. Other factors considered 
were the aggressive and innovative marketing 
techniques of Arianespace, and the European 
firm's perceived space launch success rate. 
189 U.S. Department of Defense, op. cit., footnote IS, p. 11-10, cites prices to GTO of$12,OOO/lb for a U.S. provider, $8,OOO/lb as the Ariane 
goal, and $4,OOO/lb as the Chinese/Russian possibility. An analysis of several U.S. launch vehicles indicates that, in the best case, they might put 
roughly four times as much weight in LEO as in GTO. These estimates equate to roughly $3,OOO/lb, $2,OOO/lb, and $I,OOO/lb to LEO. 
190 U.S. Department of Defense, op. cit., footnote 19, p. 9. 
191 The Commercial Space Transportation Study Alliance, op. cit., footnote 16, p. 10. 
192 U.S. General Accounting Office, "National Space Issues: Observations on Defense Space Programs and Activities," GAOl 
NSIAD-94-253, Washington, DC, pp. 26-27. The GAO reported that the U.S. commercial launch industry is price competitive with foreign 
launchers and the future launch rnarketappears limited. The report observed that "using requirements of the U.S. commercial launch industry as 
justification for developing a new launch vehicle does not appear warranted." 
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TABLE 18: Factors Employed in Launch Service Decisions 
Factor 
Price 
Reliability 
Insurance rate 
Interest rates 
Expected 
on-orbit life 
Launch 
schedule 
Payment 
schedule 
Stand down 
time after a 
failure 
Source of difference 
For firms basing price on market principles, differ-
ent cost structures will result in different pricing. 
And every bid represents a unique situation. For 
firms operating on non-market principles, cost is 
often unknown and the price can be set indis-
criminately. 
No one is quite certain of the actual reliability of 
launch vehicles. Mostobservers use launch suc-
cess rate as a substitute indicator of actual reli-
ability. 
Varying launch success rates of launch vehicles 
(and other factors) lead the space insurance indus-
try to charge different insurance rates for each 
launch vehicle. 
Interest rates vary with both time and place. 
More station-keeping fuel can be stored on a satel-
lite being launched on a vehicle with higher lift ca-
pacity. Therefore, for a satellite of equivalent func-
tionality, the on-orbit life expectancy of the space-
craft will vary with the launcher. 
Each launch vehicle adheres to a different launch 
schedule. Factors that affect launch schedule in-
clude manufacturing time, payload integration, 
launch licensing, and satellite licensing (in the 
event of export). 
Each launch service provider structures a unique 
payment plan for its customers. 
Varying regulatory policies affect the probable peri-
od of time that a launch vehicle is made to stand 
down after a failure. 
Responsiveness The ability to offer a launch date specified by the 
customer. 
Technical Launch vehicles have different sizes and potential 
payload configurations. 
SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment. 1995. 
Potential influence on decision 
Price is often the primary factor in the ac-
quisition of space launch services. Price is 
affected by international exchange rates and 
the availability of competition. 
The expected value of a service varies with 
the probability of the outcomes. The higher 
the probability of success, the greater the 
value of the service. 
The insurance rate can be thought of as a 
variable rate tax. It directly effects the per-
ceived cost of the launch vehicle. 
High interest rates increase overall launch 
costs, particularly for those with very long 
launch schedules. 
For a commercial satellite, the longer a satel-
lite is in orbit, the greater its revenue stream 
(and hence profitability) will be. For civil and 
military payloads, longer on-orbit life trans-
lates into greater functionality or reduced 
program costs. 
A long launch schedule may translate into 
lost functionality and/or revenues for a com-
mercial satellite owner. Launch schedule is 
especially important when replacing a satel-
lite rendered inoperable or approaching the 
end of its life expectancy. 
A payment schedule that pushes a good por-
tion of the payments off into the future is ad-
vantageous to the customer because the 
customer can, in the meantime, invest the 
resources elsewhere. 
Longer than expected stand down times may 
result in the loss of vital functionality (com-
mercial, civil, or military) and/or significant 
commercial revenues. 
Provider may be selected on the ability to 
launch a satellite in a certain quarter or year. 
Satellite might be launched alone or bundled 
with other satellites. In the latter case, posi-
tion in the stack may be important. 
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The examination of the potential commercial 
market raises a number of issues that might be 
considered in evaluating U.S. policy toward the 
private launch industry. One of the most important 
is to gain a better understanding of the inhibitors 
to U.S. business penetration of the global busi-
ness. If price is a less important factor in customer 
decisionmaking than it is often alleged, then 
changes in design philosophy (e.g., that result in 
reductions in launch personnel) and accommoda-
tion of commercial needs (e.g., responsiveness) 
may be particularly important. 
Overlap of Government and 
Commercial Markets 
Any government-industry partnership is chal-
lenged by the apparent disparity between the mis-
sions and current pay loads of the government, and 
the missions and payloads in the commercial 
market. 
The "Space Launch Modernization Study's" 
description of the often conflicting goals and 
needs of the four major space launch user commu-
nities-defense, intelligence, civil, and commer-
cial-is useful in considering the challenges in 
achieving synergy among space transportation 
systems. The report notes that the defense mission 
demands a launch capability that can lift a mixed 
collection of warning, surveillance, communica-
tions, weather, and navigation satellites into orbit 
in a timely manner. The intelligence community 
needs to lift relatively few payloads, which are 
typically large and very expensive. The nonde-
fense (civil) government market has a special need 
for vehicles that can carry people back and forth to 
space. The commercial market is currently domi-
nated by geosynchronous communications satel-
lites, although the mix of satellites in the 
commercial market may change with the advent of 
new commercial LEO satellite communications 
constellations. 
As noted above, DOD's overall EELV policy 
aims to bring down its overall space transportation 
budget and most of the savings are expected in the 
heavy payload range-not in the commercially 
compatible medium launchers.193 This apparent 
mismatch of focus need not preclude some spinoff 
into the more commercially important sector-
depending on the nature of the modifications 
made. DOD has generally been pursuing lighter 
satellites to meet future needs and thus use me-
dium-lift capabilities, but intelligence satellites 
are still "generally large and expensive so that reli-
able, heavy-lift capability is a top concern."194 
Changing these configurations may be difficult 
and costly, or impossible. But the EELV family 
developed in the DOD program might be designed 
to take less time on the pad, require fewer person-
nel to launch, and be more economical to produce. 
NASA's need for a vehicle that carries people 
complicates the connection with commercial 
space transportation service. Industry has little 
use for such a capability, but the development of a 
space tourism trade might pay for the marginal 
cost of outfitting vehicles to carry humans with 
reasonable safety. 
Gaining the benefits of any synergy that might 
exist among the markets will demand a detailed 
investigation of the nature of the future market and 
the likely phasing of any expanded commercial 
market. A moderate expansion of the commercial 
market might occur with the development of a less 
costly family of EELV, but a greatly expanded 
market depends on reduced costs to orbit that are 
only thought possible with the development of a 
viable RLV or partially reusable launch vehicle. 
Moreover, these reduced costs have to translate 
into reduced prices for space transportation. A 
strategy of significantly reducing costs while only 
reducing prices to the point that a majority market 
share can be gained may not greatly expand the 
193 u.s. Department of Defense, op. cit., footnote 19, figure 11·6, p. 11·10. The bulk of the commercial market is in launching 3,000 to 10,000 
Ibs to GTO-a range covered by the Delta II, Atlas IIA, and Ariane 4. 
194 U.S. Department of Defense, op. cit., footnote 19, p.5. Moreover, these heavy launch vehicles could be made more compatible with 
commercial needs if they were used to launch two to three satellites at a time as is the case with Arianespace launchers. 
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overall use of space. Nonetheless, regardless of 
launch costs and the pricing policy followed, for 
the foreseeable future the government market will 
remain important to any private sector investment 
decision. 
ij.$iUtUI The government-industry 
relationship 
The NSTP and all the implementation plans 
stress the need for closer government-industry 
cooperation. Yet questions remain about how a fu-
ture government-industry relationship can or 
should be structured. The NSTP designates the 
DOT and DOC to be the advocates of increased 
commercial participation, but with little money 
for space transportation and small staffs dedicated 
to space issues, DOTIDOC are unlikely to have 
much real impact. Indeed, although they partici-
pate in interagency discussions,195 they are likely 
to find it difficult to influence relationships that 
NASA and DOD are already negotiating with 
their prime contractors. 
NASA officials, at least at the highest levels, 
appear to support the idea that a strong, interna-
tionally competitive commercial space trans-
portation base is essential not only for 
development of its future space transportation, but 
also to run the United States' future launch infra-
structure. More important, NASA needs substan-
tial private sector investment to build a new RLV 
to replace the aging Space Shuttle. The Agency is, 
therefore, seeking policies that will provide sup-
port for industry and provide incentives for indus-
try to invest. 
DOD, on the other hand, appears less con-
cerned about developing a close partnership with 
industry than is NASA. To be sure, changes are 
occurring in DOD's relationship with industry as a 
result of general DOD acquisition reform, but 
these changes are more in line with developing a 
more efficient way of doing business than with or-
ganizing a development partnership. DOD, in 
contrast to NASA, does not have the same per-
ceived need for a new space launch vehicle to per-
form its missions. Although its current fleet of 
ELV s are considered by the Department to be too 
costly and inflexible, they still perform well 
enough to meet the Department's fundamental 
mission requirements. The EEL V program thus 
has a limited goal of allowing the Department to 
lower costs and gain some increased launch flexi-
bility. 
DOD's recent space launch vehicle industrial 
base assessment concluded that the U.S. space 
launch industry was reasonably profitable, had ad-
equate production capacity, and was capable of 
meeting DOD's space launch requirements for the 
foreseeable future (see box 10). 196 The report con-
cluded that: 
The U.S. space launch industry remains vi-
able and capable of meeting DOD launch re-
quirements. All three prime contractors 
currently supplying ELVs for DOD use are prof-
itable, despite considerable production overca-
pacity in the large and small vehicle industry 
segments. Considerable industry consolidation 
is both inevitable and necessary. Overhead costs 
will be reduced and the Department, and ulti-
mately the U.S. taxpayer, will benefit.l97 
Because current ELV production capacity can 
meet or exceed current demands (see table 19), the 
Department expects to benefit from the antici-
pated industry consolidation that will reduce over-
head costs and prices.198 Thus, while the 
Department generally supports enhanced com-
mercial competitiveness in the space transporta-
tion industry, it sees no reason to provide specific 
financial support to achieve this goal. 
195 U.s. Department of Defense. op. cit., footnote 19, p. 6. DOT chairs the Interagency Coordination Committee on Transportation Research 
and Development. 
196 U.S. Department of Defense, op. cit., footnote 15, pp. ES-8-ES-IO. 
197 Ibid., p. ES-13. 
198 Ibid., p. ES-IO. 
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BOX 10: DOD's Assessment of the U.S. Space Transportation Industry 
DOD recently conducted an assessment of the industrial base that supports space launch vehicles. The 
Industrial Assessment for Space Launch Vehicles is one of several defense technology and industrial base 
studies designed to provide DOD and Congress better insight into the changes that are occurring in the 
defense industry. The studies seek to identify essential capabilities that might be threatened with loss as a 
result of industrial restructuring and provide information for budget and program decisions to preserve 
needed capabilities. DOD's space launch assessment concentrated on domestic capabilities, the portion 
of the industry supporting ELV, prime contractors, and upper-tier subcontractors. The assessment also 
touched on the Space Shuttle base, space transportation infrastructure, and foreign sources of goods and 
services. 
The assessment concluded that the industrial base supporting DOD's space launch needs was ade-
quate to meet the Department's requirements for the foreseeable future. There is sufficient production ca-
pacity to meet DOD's expected demand for launch vehicles. Indeed, there is overcapacity in SLY and HLV, 
as shown in table 19. 
DOD also reported that the four major ELV prime contractors (McDonnell Douglas, Lockheed, Martin 
Marietta, and Orbital Sciences)1 were all profitable. Under the circumstances, DOD plans to let the base 
consolidate and allow the prime and first-tier contractors to ensure the availability of the subtiers since they 
"have all demonstrated an ability to manage the risks associated with a changing vendor base."2 
1 Lockheed and Martin Marietta have since merged into one company called Lockheed Martin. 
2 U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Industrial Affairs), "Industrial Assessment for 
Space Launch Vehicles." Washington. DC. January 1995, p. ES-l0. 
SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1995. 
Industry sources argue, however, that the 
DOD's assessment of the health and profitability 
of the industrial sector is based on periods in 
which government business dominated and gov-
ernment investment and working capital were 
available. In the future, profit margins will have to 
be considerably higher for industry to attract sub-
stantial investment capital. 
While the potential for moderately lowering 
launch costs (enough to achieve a positive return 
on investment in a reasonable period of time) and 
improving access to space might be sufficient to 
prompt government expenditures on new launch 
capabilities (if funds were available), it is not clear 
what levels of launch price reductions might have 
to be achieved to convince industry that signifi-
cant commercial market expansion is likely and 
thus entice significant industry investments. An 
anticipated threefold reduction in cost has 
prompted a $100-million, private sector invest-
ment in the X-34. Commercial firms must evalu-
ate their space transportation investment 
alternatives not only against alternative launch 
systems, but also against alternative investment 
opportunities outside the space industry. 199 
199 Anthony L. Velocci, Jr., "Augustine Identifies Key Operating Themes," Aviation Week and Space Technology, Feb. 20,1995, pp. 44-46. 
Norman R. Augustine, Chairman and CEO of Martin Marietta Corp. states the issue of investment alternatives quite clearly: "All of the U.S. 
companies that are in the launch vehicle business today have other alternatives other than launch vehicles. At Martin Marietta when we have a 
dollar to invest, we can invest it in our crushed rock business or in the business of developing more reliable, more efficient launch vehicles. We 
make those decisions in a fairly analytical business-like fashion. If at any point it looks like the launch vehicle business isn't viable, then we will 
invest our money in our highly profitable crushed rock operation." 
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TABLE 19: U.S. ELV Production Capacities 
Launch Annual Annual Production Excess 
Launch vehicle Annual launch capacity production U.S. over capacity 
vehicle class (CCAFS + VAFB)a capacityb launchesc capacityd factore 
Pegasus Small 12 12-50 6 6+ 2x 
Taurus Small 3 24 3 21 8x 
Delta Medium 12 + 6 12 11 1 Small 
Atlas Medium 10 + 4 8 8 0 None 
Titan IV Large 3-4 + 3-4 10 3 7 3x 
a The maximum number of launches possible. given current facilities and personnel at both Cape Canaveral Air Force Station and Vandenberg Air 
Force Base. based on IDA analysis. 
b Based on IDA analysis of contractor data. Does not include surge capability. 
C Typical annual U.S. launches. 1995-2010. Apportionment of launches to specific vehicles within a launch vehicle class may vary. Includes firm. 
probable. potential. and launch-on-need launches. Launches in an individual year may vary. 
d "Annual Production Capacity" minus "Annual U.S. Launches." 
e "Annual Production Capacity" divided by "Annual U.S. Launches." 
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Defense. Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Industrial Affairs). "Industrial Assessment for Space 
Launch Vehicles." Washington. DC, January 1995. p. ES-10. 
Precisely what return on investment a firm 
might need in order to conclude that a space trans-
portation investment is appropriate is uncertain. 
Estimates discussed with industry during OTA's 
assessment ranged from 20 to 50 percent, depend-
ing on the perceived nature of the market risk. 
What is clear is that the private sector will need to 
be persuaded that there is reasonable potential for 
making a profit before firms will make significant 
investments. In the absence of the potential for 
clearly defined financial returns to industry, a true 
government-industry partnership will probably be 
elusive and remain a customer-provider relation-
ship. 
In an attempt to develop this partnership, 
NASA reports that it has significantly modified its 
management structure for the RLV program. The 
Agency has, for example, centralized the program 
management under a small team at its headquar-
ters. Yet critics argue that the current plan signals a 
less than radical departure from past NASA R&D 
programs, with technologies identified for re-
search, and designated decision points. 
Still, observers note that NASA is able to estab-
lish this fairly detailed research plan because of 
the experience gained earlier during NASP re-
The X-34 coulO ensure me un/teo states ' commuea 
leadership in the SLV market. 
search. Further, these observers argue that NASA 
is now using the accumulated know ledge based on 
past research in an innovative (for NASA) ap-
proach involving greater industry participation 
Indeed, NASA has incorporated some changes in 
its X-33 and X-34 CANs, allowing for-profit 
firms to use independent research and develop-
ment (IR&D) money as part of their corporate 
contributions. The Agency has also announced 
that it will apply the approach that DOD used in 
the DC-X to its management of the RLV program. 
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During development, the DC-X program office consisted of 
only 10-12 managers. 
NASA, according to these observers, is doing 
what it does best-funding research efforts in 
areas of particular relevance to a national need (in 
the case of the DC-XA, propulsion, vehicle struc-
tures, and operations technologies). 
Others, however, argue that there is insufficient 
change and that continuing to run a research 
program in the established way will preclude the 
introduction of innovative technologies.2OO 
NASA's government-industry teams have been 
criticized as potentially diffusing responsibility to 
such a degree that no one can be held responsible 
for development decisions. These teams raise 
questions about technical data rights and the abil-
ity to diffuse technology that is developed. Final-
ly, some argue that NASA may have too many 
programs (including the X-33, the X-34, the DC-
XA, the Med-Lite ELV, and Shuttle upgrades), for 
the money available. Some industry observers ar-
gue that current development programs are inade-
quately funded and will never lead to production 
vehicles. 
Further, the CSTS notes that launch infrastruc-
ture, principal launch assets, and manufacturing 
facilities are all currently under U.S. government 
control. Any new government-industry relation-
ship, therefore, demands fundamental changes in 
ways of designing and operating space launch 
vehicles beyond simply modifying program man-
agement. 
The achievement of large reductions in launch 
prices, however, might by itself radically change 
the government-industry relationship. The reduc-
tions could increase commercial business and re-
sult in significant industry independence from the 
government. For example, although advances in 
commercial electronics have made more electron-
ics technology available to defense, it has also re-
duced DOD's leverage in guiding the direction of 
that industry's R&D and product development ef-
forts. Under similar circumstances, commercial 
launcher design and operation might drift away 
from currently defined defense requirements. Un-
less government planners are able and willing to 
modify their requirements in concert with these 
trends, this reduced leverage might result in great-
er difficulty in meeting the government's goal of 
maintaining access to space. 
200 Some in industry complain that NASA will simply reject proposals as "nonresponsive" if they do not conform to NASA's preconceived 
concepts. 
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ij.$i'l'M Risk management-striking the 
proper balance 
Many in industry argue that an anchor tenancy 
arrangement is essential to entice private sector in-
vestment in space transportation. By providing a 
guaranteed market for a specific period, anchor 
tenancy would reduce investment risk for the pri-
vate sector while commercial markets are being 
established. Government purchases of semicon-
ductors and computers played an important role in 
the development of these U.S. industries.201 In 
some of those cases, however, both development 
funding and initial large purchases came from the 
government. In general, the U.S. government's 
track record in improving manufacturing compet-
itiveness-as either the first customer for a new 
product or an important customer for established 
products-is viewed as weak.202 
As noted earlier, anchor tenancy is often used to 
finance construction of buildings in the private 
sector and is sometimes used by the General Ser-
vices Administration (GSA) for buildings that the 
government will subsequently occupy under 
lease. Legislation allows the GSA to enter long-
term (up to 20 years) lease arrangements and to 
score the lease payments against its budget each 
year. 
In the commercial world, aircraft firms usually 
also look for firm orders before making major in-
vestments in new aircraft models. This has recent-
ly occurred in commercial space launch, too, 
when McDonnell Douglas announced it will de-
velop a new rocket (Delta III) with its own funds, 
but based on a firm commitment by the Hughes 
Telecommunications and Space Co. for 10 
launches. Steven Dorfman, President of Hughes 
Telecommunications and Space noted that, "[b]y 
being the anchor customer for the Delta III we en-
courage McDonnell Douglas to make the invest-
ment to upgrade its highly reliable Delta to the 
Delta III class. "203 
But an anchor tenancy arrangement may be 
contentious. For example, both congressional and 
executive branch agencies with responsibility for 
examining the budget process have criticized the 
GSA leasing arrangements. They argue that such 
leases cost the government more than outright 
purchases because the private sector's cost of cap-
ital is always higher than the government's cost of 
capital. Moreover, critics204 point out that show-
ing outlays over time fails to capture the fiscal ef-
fect of the government's commitment, which occurs 
in the first year, not over the entire lease period. 
In accordance with this view, many believe that 
anchor tenancy for space transportation would 
have to be considered a "lease-purchase" arrange-
ment under the existing rules developed to record 
the effects on the budget of enacted and pending 
legislation ("scorekeeping rules"). Such arrange-
ments are recorded in the budget as if the govern-
ment had purchased the asset outright. The 
discounted present value of the expected costs of 
space launch services would be recorded as budg-
et authority when the contract was signed. Outlays 
would be scored in proportion to construction ac-
tivity on the launchers as if the government were 
201 The government used early commercial computers for the Veteran's Life Insurance Program. This not only provided a market for the 
hardware, but also demonstrated a use that was subsequently adopted by commercial industry. u.s. Department of Commerce, personal com-
munication, April 1995. 
202 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, op. cit., footnote 169, p. 70. 
203 Hughes Space and Communication Co., "Hughes Buys 10 Launches as First Delta Customer," press release, Los Angeles, CA, May 10, 
1995. 
204 See James L. Blum, Deputy Director, Congressional Budget Office, "CBOTestimony on the Lease-Purchase Scorekeeping Rule," testi-
mony presented at hearings before the Subcommittee on Legislation and National Security, Committee on Government Operations, House of 
Representatives, U.S. Congress, Washington, DC, Sept. 20, 1994; and Alice Rivlin, Acting Director, Office ofManagernent and Budget, "Testi-
mony on Hearing on H.R. 2680," testimony presented at hearings before the Subcommittee on Legislation and National Security, Committee on 
Government Operations, House of Representatives, U.S. Congress, Sept. 20, 1994. 
100 I Office of Technology Assessment 
building the system. A forthcoming Congression-
al Budget Office report examines this financing is-
sue in detail. 205 This approach would make the 
use of anchor tenancy problematic if the sole ob-
jective of seeking private financing was to deal 
with current fiscal constraints in the NASA 
budget. 
Other observers, however, argue that there is a 
need for new thinking on the anchor tenancy con-
cept as it applies to high-technology systems. 
They note that this is particularly true in a period 
in which the government is slated to be less in-
volved in the development of goods and services 
that the private sector might reasonably be ex-
pected to provide. Furthermore, they view GSA 
building lease practices as poor examples for what 
might work in space transportation, and argue that 
the development of new space transportation sys-
tems might be used to test alternative anchor ten-
ancy concepts. 
Advocates suggest several criteria for judging 
the appropriateness of anchor tenancy. They argue 
that anchor tenancy is inappropriate ifthere is sig-
nificant technological risk. It should also not be 
used if it is simply a way to make a commitment 
outside the budget (concern over this is the reason 
for viewing anchor tenancy as a lease purchase). 
But, they believe that anchor tenancy might be 
successfully used if the situation is one in which 
there is little technological risk, the contractor is 
taking the risk of performance, the contractor is fi-
nancing the project, and the contractor has design 
control. This situation would require competitive 
bidding to help determine what the financial mar-
kets believe to be an acceptable risk. 
The competitive aspects might be handled in a 
number of ways. One observer has suggested de-
veloping an Access to Space Service Market 
(ATSSM) "open to commercial and government 
customers, and anchored by U.S. government de-
mand."206 The ATSSM would coordinate the 
needs of space launch users with current and fu-
ture capabilities of space launch providers. Space 
launch contracts might be sold as firm contracts or 
convertible options promoting the development 
of a robust market for space transportation ser-
vices. To develop sufficient demand, "the ATSSM 
must not be tailored for highly specialized de-
mand such as high security or manned pay-
loads."207 In the end, however, it is possible that 
the investor's view of the current space transporta-
tion market might make it impossible to use an-
chor tenancy to develop a vehicle that would meet 
both unique government requirements and com-
mercial needs. 
Whatever type of anchor tenancy arrangement 
might be fashioned, it may be difficult to work out 
the details rapidly enough to support the govern-
ment's current plan for RLV development. Indus-
try analysts argue that the agreement will need to 
be executed before April 1996, when industry 
must begin to commit significant funds toward the 
development of the X-33 technology demonstrator. 
Advocates argue that termination liability is es-
sential for reducing the risk to the private sector of 
entering into a long-term agreement with the gov-
ernment. They cite the importance of risk reduc-
tion in drawing private sector investment. 
Skeptics, however, have argued that such arrange-
ments amount to providing a "risk-free" environ-
ment for U.S. business. Still, termination liability 
is often a part of commercial and government con-
tracts, but the liability usually only provides for 
money already spent, not for loss of future reve-
nue, nor the cost of financing. Thus firms continue 
to carry some risk even if compensation for some, 
or all, of the funds already spent is guaranteed. 
Using a large government prize to attract pri-
vate sector funding of development is one of the 
most controversial ideas for financing a future 
RL V. Proponents argue that a prize would be a 
205U.S. Congress, Congressional Budget Office, The Budgetary Treatment of an Option To Finance the Development of a New Launch 
System, forthcoming, May 1995. 
206 Charles W. Polk, "Buying Access To Space Rather Than Procuring a Space Transportation System," information paper, May IS, 1995. 
207 Ibid. 
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great stimulus to investment and innovation, with 
many potential commercial spinoffs. Further, they 
argue that no government money would actually 
be spent until success is achieved.208 Critics, 
however, argue that the uncertain market for space 
transportation, combined with the risk of losing 
such a contest, would scare away potential inves-
tors. And even if the contest proceeded, there 
might not be a winning result, or at least not soon 
enough to replace the Space Shuttle. NASA 
would have much less insight into the progress of 
the contestants, and its ability to meet civil space 
goals might be compromised should all fail to 
meet the stated objective. A further complication 
is determining the size of the prize that might en-
tice bidders to the program without seeming ex-
travagant to taxpayers.209 
A space launch corporation is viewed by many 
as a potentially good management tool. This type 
of organization could deal directly with space 
transportation users and operate on business prin-
ciples. The Moorman report, however, argued that 
it was unnecessary at this time unless there is a 
major breakthrough in the commercialization of 
space.210 Further, DOD officials have expressed 
concern that a commercially focused corporation 
would concentrate on developments in more com-
mercially useful MLVs and ignore the HLVs that 
are currently DOD's more costly problem. 
Finally, some firms will make space transporta-
tion investments without any government guaran-
tees. McDonnell Douglas' investment in the Delta 
III is one example. Boeing Corp. has announced it 
is joining with a European shipbuilder and two 
aerospace firms from the FSU to form SEA 
Launch-to launch satellites from a pad in in-
ternational waters in the Pacific Ocean. And Kis-
tler Aerospace has reported that it is planning to 
build a reusable rocket without government 
funds.211 Such investments could result in further 
investments by competitors. Daniel Tellep, Chair-
man and CEO of Lockheed Martin Corp., has 
stated that the Delta III will cause Lockheed Mar-
tin to consider responses in its Atlas program.212 
If such commercial activities succeed, they could 
well lead to radical changes in government-indus-
try relations. 
*tiiUfU Launch operations and infrastructure 
Many analysts argue that significant launch 
cost savings might be realized through changes in 
launch operations and infrastructure.213 Efficient 
launch operations are key competitive advantages 
for both Ariane and Russia, and launch infrastruc-
ture design is an additional positive factor for Ari-
ane. But important launch cost reductions214 are 
unlikely unless launch operation engineers and fa-
208 Although the money might not be spent, it would have to be authorized by Congress and become a budget item, possibly appropriated 
into an escrow account. A variant that is discussed uses anchor tenancy as the prize. 
209 Some proponents of government prizes have suggested a range of about $10 billion to $12 billion for a cheap, reusable demonstrator. 
They believe that a large prize would bring new players into the space transportation business. 
210 U.S. Department of Defense, op. cit., footnote 19, p. 6. 
211 Warren Ferster, "NASA Picks Three Teams for Phase 1 Design," Space News, Mar. 13,1995, pp. 4, 36. 
212 Daniel Tellep, Chaiman, Lockheed Martin Corp., remarks at the Aerospace and Defense Financial Conference, Lionheart Research, 
New York, NY, May 10, 1995. 
213 See Bruce D. Berkowitz, "No Free Launch: Updating Space Infrastructure," Issues in Science and Technology Policy 10(2):76-81, win-
ter 1993. 
214 Launch operations can be divided into several overlapping steps, including: processing and integration of the vehicle, processing and 
integration of the payload, launch management and control, post launch activities, and logistics. In the past, launch operations have been esti-
mated to account for about 15 percent of Shuttle recurring costs and about 20 percent of Titan IV costs per flight. For an extended discussion of 
reducing launch costs through changes in launch operations, and infrastructure investments, see U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assess-
ment, Reducing Launch Operations Costs: New Technologies and Practices, OTA-TM-ISC-28 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, September 1988), pp. 3, 13. 
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Modern, automated launch facilities in Kourou, French Guyana are a key factor in the commercial success of Arianespace. 
cility managers have a greater role in the design of 
future launch systems. 
In an attempt to capture some of these potential 
savings, the NSTP and the implementation plans 
address launch operations, infrastructure, and 
ground activities. All the current government 
space transportation programs include actions di-
rected at improvements in these areas. The X-34 
program, for example, includes vehicle health 
monitoring systems and ground operations/rapid-
tum-around studies. The X-33 program includes 
launch operations as a key element. And the DOD 
implementation plan includes a description of 
over $1 billion in investments in infrastructure 
modernization and upgrades to be completed by 
FY 2004. Government seed money has supported 
the development of commercial spaceports. Mod-
est government funding at the California Space-
port, for example, was followed by significant 
corporate investment by ITT and others.215 
How future space transportation systems will 
operate, and how such operations will save money 
in comparison with current operations, might be 
key oversight issues for Congress. While govern-
ment seed money appears to have been successful 
in drawing additional investment, the government 
may want to be careful not to create overcapacity 
through its use of funds. Facilities that are being 
developed will need to be designed to accommo-
date future space transportation needs. 
Space transportation infrastructure includes a 
broader range of industries than simply those 
directly involved in the physical development, 
production, and servicing of vehicles. The avail-
ability of insurance at a reasonable and predictable 
cost is critical to commercial space ventures. Al-
most no company is willing to bet that its $200 
million spacecraft will be safely placed into the in-
tended orbit and will properly operate once there, 
without being protected by insurance. Insurance 
rates over the last decade have fluctuated between 
6 and 30 percent, depending on the perception of 
risk and the availability of funding to support it. 
Maximum values capable of being insured have 
ranged from $100 million to $410 million, 
depending on market conditions. The cost and 
volatility of rates can be a barrier to the continued 
development of the U.S. commercial space in-
dustry. 
Some of this volatility might be reduced if the 
pool of insured launches were expanded to allow 
government launches on commercial vehicles to 
215 The Spaceport, located at Vandenberg Air Force Base, CA, expects to be operational in 1996. 
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Space Launch Complex 6 at Vandenberg Air Force Base in 
California is being converted into a commercial spaceport. 
be underwritten by the insurance industry. The 
government and public would benefit from a 
quantified and limited cost associated with the 
risk of physical loss of hardware. The commercial 
space industry would benefit from a healthy and 
reliable space insurance market. This larger insur-
ance pool could be developed through procure-
ments that require performance requirements for 
the operation of a launch vehicle or a satellite in 
orbit. Insuring government payloads, however, 
would be an added cost to the government, at least 
in the near term. 
*?iilJ:tm Accommodating commercial needs 
The NASA and DOT/DOC implementation 
plans include extensive discussions of the partner-
ship between government and industry to achieve 
future goals, yet there is no clear indication that 
the government is willing to compromise on its 
stated requirements in order to make use of more 
commercially responsive systems. Thus, one of 
the key questions is the e:xtent to which its space 
transportation programs will be driven by rigid 
government space launch and payload require-
ments that provide minimal overlap with com-
mercial space launch competitiveness issues. 
For example, despite the rhetoric of govern-
ment-industry partnership, NASA's program may 
216 U.S. Department of Defense, op., cit., footnote 126, p. 6. 
be best structured to produce an RLV that will 
serve the U.S. government's space transportation 
needs first, rather than producing a commercially 
viable vehicle that will also meet government 
needs. One of the problems noted by industry is 
that NASA's development plans do not incorpo-
rate the means for industry to put payloads in 
GEO. To deal with this shortcoming, some indus-
try officials have suggested developing, from the 
beginning, a medium-lift RLV that is capable of 
accommodating strap-on solid rocket motors and 
housing larger, heavier payloads in its payload 
bay. This option would allow designers to opti-
mize the RLV for commercial use and still meet 
the government need to launch large and heavy 
payloads and service the International Space 
Station. 
The recent NASA Med-Lite RFP is cited by 
some in industry as an example of an inability, or 
unwillingness, of the government to accommo-
date commercial operations. The RFP exceeded 
325 pages. Industry argues that reducing govern-
ment paperwork and unnecessary oversight is a 
major challenge that must be overcome if price 
competitive launch vehicles are to be developed. 
The DOD EEL V program is designed so that 
the "competition will encourage commercial in-
novation to expedite development and encourage 
cost saving."216 But such savings are focused on 
development of a vehicle that will meet DOD re-
quirements, not on a launch vehicle design opti-
mized for commercial use. Further, while the 
DOD hopes to reduce space transportation costs 
significantly, these savings will probably be con-
centrated in the HLV range, where the majority of 
the DOD's funds are spent. While this concentra-
tion makes sense to DOD, it may do little to in-
crease the ability of the U.S. space transportation 
business to compete internationally. 
Still, DOD does report that it is applying ad-
vanced technology to reduce the size of its pay-
loads and requirements for costly HLVs. It is also 
examining ways to reduce the costs associated 
1041 Office of Technology Assessment 
NASA plans on delivering crews and cargo to the International Space Station until, and possibly beyond, 2012. 
with launching heavy payloads, which cannot be 
reduced to fit on SLVs or MLVs, so that it can le-
verage the competitive commercial market in or-
der to reduce launch costs.217 
As noted earlier, DOD has a detailed set of ac-
tions (that it views as useful to industry) to achieve 
its objectives. These include: a Titan IV program 
to ensure heavy launch capability; improving At-
las reliability; and upgrading Delta flight safety 
and avionics. ELV infrastructure is also being up-
graded. 
I Additional Issues for Congress 
As the previous sections discuss, the NSTP and its 
implementation plans cover a wide variety of is-
217 U.S. Department of Defense, op., cit., footnote 19, p. II-II. 
sues of importance to the long-term health of the 
space transportation technology and industrial 
base. In this section, OTA identifies two issues of 
importance to Congress that were not addressed in 
either the policy itself, or the implementation 
plans .. 
ItiilJ¥W Preservation of long-range ballistic 
missile capabilities 
One critical component of the space transporta-
tion industry not addressed in either the policy or 
the implementation plans is the long-range ballis-
tic missile segment of the space transportation 
technology and industrial base.218 This omission 
may demonstrate just how far space launch ve-
218 OTA intends to investigate the technological and industrial overlap between ballistic missiles and space transportation systems more 
fully in the main report of this assessment. 
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hicles have diverged from their ballistic missile 
roots, or it may be the result of a narrowly formed 
policy. In either case, failure to investigate pos-
sible connections between the development of 
long-range ballistic missiles and the development 
of launch vehicles risks overlooking policy op-
tions that could meet both government and com-
mercial needs. 
Originally, the military's requirement for long-
range ballistic missiles created the space trans-
portation technology and industrial base. The 
modern Atlas and Titan ELVs both evolved from 
early ICBMs, while the original Delta ELV used 
components from three ballistic missile.219 Over 
time, these two segments of the technology and 
industrial base diverged, as ballistic missiles were 
optimized for round-the-clock readiness and 
quick launch which led to the development of sol-
id rocket motors and required precision guidance. 
Launch vehicles, on the other hand, were modi-
fied to lift ever larger payloads into Earth orbit. 
Still, considerable overlap between these two 
segments remains, particularly at the lower indus-
trial tiers. For example, the new Lockheed Launch 
Vehicle (LLV) takes advantage of Trident II D5 
technologies. Both the LLV and OSC's Taurus use 
the Thiokol Castor 120 solid rocket motor, which 
is derived from the Peacekeeper ICBM first stage. 
As a result of nuclear arms control treaties and 
the end of the Cold War, the development and pro-
duction oflong-range ballistic missiles has almost 
halted. The Navy's Trident II D5 missile will con-
tinue to be produced into the next century at the 
rate of about 12 per year, with all production 
scheduled to stop in the year 2005. The Air Force 
is not currently producing any new missiles, but 
plans to modernize the Minuteman III by produc-
ing new motors and upgrading systems and mate-
Production of the Trident /I 05 missile-the only long-range 
ballistic missile in production-is scheduled to stop in 2005. 
rials. In addition, the Air Force plans to sustain the 
guidance and reentry vehicle industrial base.220 
The requirement to maintain the capability to 
design, test, and produce long-range ballistic mis-
siles will continue as long as the United States de-
pends on these missiles for part of its strategic 
deterrence. Eventually, the deployed missiles in 
the current forces will become obsolete and need 
to be replaced. Furthermore, new arms control 
treaties may compel the United States to deploy 
new single-warhead missiles, just as Russia is cur-
rently doing. 
Both the Navy and the Air Force recognize the 
difficulty of maintaining production capability 
without producing anything. In the past, the Navy 
often had three ballistic missile programs running 
simultaneously. Both the Navy and the Air Force 
have instituted a series of programs to maintain 
what they consider the most critical elements of 
their mis siles (e.g., guidance and reentry sys-
219 Eugene M. Emme (ed.), The History of Rocket Technology: Essays on Research, ~evelopment, and Utility (Detroit: Wayne State Univer-
sity Press, 1964). 
220 William J. Perry, Secretary of Defense, "Annual Report to the President and the Congress," Washington, DC, February 1995, p. 90. 
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tems). OTA's past work on preserving industrial 
base capabilities, however, suggests that main-
taining ballistic missile design and production 
teams may require new development and produc-
tion opportunities.221 Without these opportuni-
ties, scientists, engineers, and other workers may 
begin to seek challenges in other fields. 
Under current designs, the U.S. long-range bal-
listic missile fleet depends on the production of 
solid rocket motors. A liquid-fueled EELV family 
and RLV follow-on to the X-33 could greatly re-
duce the demand for solid rocket motors, as could 
replacing the Shuttle's SRBs with liquid-fueled 
boosters. In that case, active production related to 
long-range ballistic missiles might be limited to 
the currently low-volume Taurus and LLV, as well 
as a few solid-rocket strap-on boosters, tactical 
missiles, or perhaps antiballistic missile intercep-
tors.222 
ItiiVD The invisible lower industrial tiers 
Current policy and implementation plans ap-
pear to be principally directed at, and influenced 
by, the large prime contractors (e.g., Lockheed 
Martin, McDonnell Douglas, Rockwell Interna-
tional, and Orbital Sciences), yet there is far more 
to the industry than just those firms. The U.S. 
space transportation industry also includes the 
providers of components subsystems, such as 
Rocketdyne, Aerojet, and UTC-P&W for liquid-
fueled engines; Thiokol, Hercules, UTC-CSD, 
and Aerojet for solid rocket motors; and hundreds 
of other lower-tier providers of goods and ser-
vices. In fact, for each dollar spent on the procure-
ment of space transportation services, roughly 
half flows down to second and lower tiers.223 
An OTA workshop focused on activity in the 
space launch industry's lower tiers found great 
skepticism among many firms about the current 
government space transportation R&D programs. 
Participants from a wide spectrum of supporting 
industries reported that they: 1) doubt the govern-
ment's commitment to build new space trans-
portation systems (they believe the programs are 
too seriously underfunded to produce a vehicle), 
and 2) doubt that much of the R&D money will fil-
ter past the prime contractor level. Lower-tier 
firms that are highly dependent on space launch 
business are pessimistic about their survival. 
Those that are less dependent on the space trans-
portation business plan to devote little effort to the 
current programs because few returns are antici-
pated. 
Some representatives of the large, prime as-
semblers believe that the subcontractors will be 
there if the business is there. This mayor may not 
be the case. Iflittle or no money is available for the 
lower-tier firms in future development, those 
firms might shift their business elsewhere or cease 
to exist. Congress may wish to consider the possi-
bility that key elements of the space transportation 
industrial base might be lost, just as other indus-
trial sectors have lost important elements in the 
·past (e.g., large diesel engines in the shipbuilding 
industry). 
221 u.s. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Redesigning Defense: Planning the Transition to the Future U.S. Defense Industrial 
Base, OTA-ISC-500 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1991); U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Build-
ing Future Security: Strategies for Restructuring the Defense Technology and Industrial Base, OTA-ISC-530 (Washington, DC: U.S. Govem-
mentPrinting Office, June 1992); and U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Assessing the Potentialfor Civil-Military Integration: 
Technologies, Processes, and Practices, OTA-ISS-611 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1994). 
222 OTA will examine both the preservation of long-range ballistic missile capabilities and the invisible lower tiers as part of its on-going 
assessment of the space transportation technology and industrial base. 
223 OTA analysis of the most recent (1987) unpublished U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis input-output table. 
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Appendix: 
Clinton AdDlinistration 
Policy StateDlent 
and Fact Sheet 
THE WHITE HOUSE 
Office of Science and Technology Policy 
August 5, 1994 
STATEMENT ON 
NATIONAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION POLICY 
The White House today released a new National Space Transportation Policy document, as devel-
oped by the National Science and Technology Council and approved by President Clinton. The 
policy sets a clear course fQr the nation's space program, providing a coherent strategy for supporting 
and strengthening U.S. space launch capability to meet the growing needs of the civilian, national 
security and commercial sectors. 
The policy commits the nation to a two-track strategy of: (1) maintaining and improving the current 
fleet of expendable launch vehicles as necessary to meet civil, commercial, and national security 
requirements; and (2) investing R&D resources in developing and demonstrating next generation 
reusable space transportatiQn systems with the potential to greatly reduce the cost of access to space. 
The new policy accomplishes four fundamental objectives: 
1) Establishes new national policy for federal space transportation spending. consistent with 
current budget constraints and the opportunities presented by emerging technologies. Under 
the new policy, DoD will assume the lead responsibility for modernization of the current 
expendable launc h vehicle fleet. NASA will assume the lead responsibility for research and 
development of next generation reusable systems. NASA will focus their investments on 
technologies to support a decision no later than December 1996 on whether to proceed with 
a flight demonstration program. This program would, in tum, provide the basis for deciding 
by the end of the decade whether to proceed with a new launch system to replace the aging 
Shuttle fleet. I 107 
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2) Establishes policy on federal al:encies' use of foreil:n launch systems and components. With 
the end of the Cold War, it is important for the U.S. to be in a position to capitalize on 
foreign technologies - including Russian technologies - without, at the same time, 
becoming dependent on them. The policy allows the use of foreign components, technolo-
gies and (under certain conditions) foreign launch services, consistent with U.S. national 
security, foreign policy, and commercial space guidelines in the policy. 
3) Establishes policy on federal agencies' use of excess U.S. ballistic missile assets for space 
launch. to prevent adverse impacts on the U.S. commercial space launch industry. Under 
START, these assets may be used in certain circumstances for civilian space launch. A 
serious concern in developing the policy was the possible impact that widespread govern-
ment use of these assets could have on U.S. commercial launch companies. The policy 
obliges the government to fully consider commercial services as part of the decision making 
process and imposes specific criteria on the use of excess assets to avoid "flooding" the 
commercial market. 
4) Provides for an expanded private sector role in the federal space transportation R&D 
decision making processes. In contrast with previous national policy on space transportation, 
this policy specifically directs the Departments of Transportation and Commerce to identify 
opportunities for government-industry cooperation and to factor these into NASA's and 
DoD's implementation plans. 
These steps will help keep America at the forefront of space transportation technology, while 
ensuring that we have a robust and reliable expendable launch vehicle fleet. 
Attachment: 
National Space Transportation Policy fact sheet. 
The National Space Transportation Policy: Issues for Congress 1109 
THE WHITE HOUSE 
Office of Science and Technology Policy 
For Immediate Release August 5, 1994 
FACT SHEET 
NATIONAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION POLICY 
Introduction 
The United States space program is critical to achieving U.S. national security, scientific, technical, 
commercial, and foreign policy goals. Assuring reliable and affordable access to space through U.S. 
space transportation capabilities is a fundamental goal of the U.S. space program. In support of this 
goal, the U.S. Government will: 
(1) Balance efforts to sustain and modernize existing space transportation capabilities 
with the need to invest in the development of improved future capabilities; 
(2) Maintain a strong space transportation capability and technology base, including 
launch systems, infrastructure, and support facilities, to meet the national needs for 
space transport of personnel and payloads; 
(3) Promote the reduction in the cost of current space transportation systems while 
improving their reliability, operability, responsiveness, and safety; 
(4) Foster technology development and demonstration to support future decisions on the 
development of next generation reusable space transportation systems that greatly 
reduce the cost of access to space; 
(5) Encourage the cost-effective use of commercially provided U.S. products and 
services, to the fullest extent feasible, that meet mission requirements; and 
(6) Foster the international competitiveness of the U.S. commercial space transportation 
industry, actively considering commercial needs and factoring them into decisions 
on improvements in launch facilities and launch vehicles. 
This policy will be implemented within the overall resource and policy guidance provided by the 
President. 
I. Implementation Guidelines 
To ensure successful implementation of this policy, U.S. Government agencies will cooperate to take 
advantage of the unique capabilities and resources of each agency. 
This policy shall be implemented as follows: 
(1) The Department of Defense (DoD) will be the lead agency for improvement and 
evolution of the current U.S. expendable launch vehicle (ELV) fleet, including 
appropriate technology development. 
(2) The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) will provide for the 
improvement of the Space Shuttle system, focusing on reliability, safety, and 
cost-effectiveness. 
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(3) The National Aeronautics and Space Administration will be the lead agency for 
technology development and demonstration for next generation reusable space 
transportation systems, such as the single-stage-to-orbit concept. 
(4) The Departments of Transportation and Commerce will be responsible for identify-
ing and promoting innovative types of arrangements between the U.S. Government 
and the private sector, as well as State and local governments, that may be used to 
implement applicable portions of this policy. U.S. Government agencies will 
consider, where appropriate, commitments to the private sector, such as anchor 
tenancy or termination liability, commensurate with the benefits of such arrange-
ments. 
(5) The Department of Defense and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
will plan for the transition between space programs and future launch systems in a 
manner that ensures continuity of mission capability and accommodates transition 
costs. 
(6) The Department of Defense and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
will combine their expendable launch service requirements into single procurements 
when such procurements would result in cost savings or are otherwise advantageous 
to the Government. A Memorandum of Agreement will be developed by the 
Agencies to carry out this policy. 
II. National Security Space Transportation Guidelines 
(1) The Department of Defense will be the launch agent for the national security sector 
and will maintain the capability to evolve and operate those space transportation 
systems, infrastructure, and support activities necessary to meet national security 
requirements. 
(2) The Department of Defense will be the lead agency for improvement and evolution 
of the current expendable launch vehicle fleet, including appropriate technology 
development. All significant ELV technology-related development associated with 
medium and heavy-lift ELVs will be accomplished through the DoD. In coordination 
with the DoD, NASA will continue to be responsible for implementing changes 
necessary to meet its mission-unique requirements. 
(3) The objective of DoD's effort to improve and evolve current ELVs is to reduce costs 
while improving reliability, operability, responsiveness, and safety. Consistent with 
mission requirements, the DoD, in cooperation with the civil and commercial sector, 
should evolve satellite, payload, and launch vehicle designs to achieve the most 
cost-effective and affordable integrated satellite, payload, and launch vehicle 
combination. 
(a) ELV improvements and evolution plans will be implemented in cooperation 
with the Intelligence Community, the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration and the Departments of Transportation and Commerce, 
taking into account, as appropriate, the needs of the commercial space 
launch sector. 
(b) The Department of Defense will maintain the Titan IV launch system until a 
replacement is available. 
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(4) The Department of Defense, in cooperation with NASA, may use the Space Shuttle 
to meet national security needs. Launch priority will be provided for national 
security missions as governed by appropriate NASNDoD agreements. Launches 
necessary to preserve and protect human life in space shall have the highest priority 
except in times of national emergency. 
(5) Protection of space transportation capabilities employed for national security 
purposes will be pursued commensurate with their planned use in crisis and conflict 
and the threat. Civil and commercial space transportation capabilities identified as 
critical to national security may be modified at the expense of the requesting agency 
or department. To the maximum extent possible, these systems, when modified, 
should retain their normal operational utility. 
III. Civil Space Transportation Guidelines 
(1) The National Aeronautics and Space Administration will conduct human space flight 
to exploit the unique capabilities and attributes of human access to space. NASA 
will continue to maintain the capability to operate the Space Shuttle fleet and 
associated facilities. 
(a) The Space Shuttle will be used only for missions that requires human 
presence or other unique Shuttle capabilities, or where use of the Shuttle is 
determined to be important for national security, foreign policy or other 
compelling purposes. 
(b) The National Aeronautics and Space Administration will maintain the Space 
Shuttle system until a replacement is available. 
(c) As future development of a new reusable launch system is anticipated, 
procurement of additional Space Shuttle orbiters is not planned at this time. 
(2) The National Aeronautics and Space Administration will be the lead agency for 
technology development and demonstration of next generation reusable space 
transportation systems. 
(a) The objective of NASA's technology development and demonstration effort 
is to support government and private sector decisions by the end of this 
decade on development of an operational next-generation reusable launch 
system. 
(b) Research shall be focused on technologies to support a decision no later than 
December 1996 to proceed with a sub-scale flight demonstration which 
would prove the concept of single-stage-to-orbit. 
(c) Technology development and demonstration, including operational 
concepts, will be implemented in cooperation with related activities in the 
Department of Defense. 
(d) It is envisioned that the private sector could have a significant role in 
managing the development and operation of a new reusable space trans-
portation system. In anticipation of this role, NASA shall actively involve 
the private sector in planning and evaluating its launch technology activities. 
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IV. Commercial Space Transportation Guidelines 
(1) The United States Government is committed to encouraging a viable commercial 
U.S. space transportation industry. 
(a) The Departments of Transportation and Commerce will be responsible for 
identifying and promoting innovative types of arrangements between the 
U.S. Government and the private sector, as well as State and local govern-
ments, that may be used to implement applicable portions of this policy. 
(b) The Department of Transportation will license, facilitate, and promote 
commercial launch operations as set forth in the Commercial Space Launch 
Act, as amended, and Executive Order 12465. The Department of Trans-
portation will coordinate with the Department of Commerce where 
appropriate. 
(c) U.S. Government agencies shall purchase commercially available U.S. space 
transportation products and services to the fullest extent feasible that meet 
mission requirements and shall not conduct activities with commercial 
application that preclude or deter commercial space activities, except for 
national security or public safety reasons. 
(d) The U.S. Government will provide for the timely transfer to the private 
sector of unclassified Government-developed space transportation technolo-
gies in such a manner as to protect their commercial value. 
(e) The U.S. Government will make all reasonable efforts to provide stable and 
predictable access to appropriate space transportation-related hardware, 
facilities, and services; these will be on a reimbursable basis. The U.S. 
Government reserves the right to use such facilities and services on a 
priority basis to meet national security and critical civil sector mission 
requirements. 
(f) U.S. Government agencies shall work with the U.S. commercial space sector 
to promote the establishment of technical standards for commercial space 
products and services. 
(2) U.S. Government agencies, in acquiring space launch-related capabilities, will, to 
the extent feasible and consistent with mission requirements: 
(a) Involve the private sector in the design and development of space transporta-
tion capabilities and encourage private sector financing, as appropriate. 
(b) Emphasize procurement strategies that are based on the use of commercial 
U.S. space transportation products and services. 
(c) Provide for private sector retention of technical data rights, limited only to 
the extent necessary to meet government needs. 
(d) Encourage private sector and State and local government investment and 
participation in the development and improvement of U.S. launch systems 
and infrastructure. 
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V. Trade in Commercial Space Launch Service 
(1) A long term goal of the United States is to achieve free and fair trade. In pursuit of 
this goal, the U.S. Government will seek to negotiate and implement agreements 
with other nations that define principles of free and fair trade for commercial space 
launch services, limit certain government supports and unfair practices in the 
international market, and establish criteria regarding participation by space launch 
industries in countries in transition from a non-market to a market economy. 
(a) International space launch trade agreements in which the U.S. is a party 
must allow for effective means of enforcement. The range of options 
available to the U.S. must be sufficient to deter and, if necessary, respond to 
non-compliance and provide effective relief to the U.S. commercial space 
launch industry. Agreements must not constrain the ability of the United 
States to take any action consistent with U.S. laws and regulations. 
(b) International space launch trade agreements in which the U.S. is party must 
be in conformity with U.S. obligations under arms control agreements, U.S. 
nonproliferation policies, U.S. teChnology transfer policies, and U.S. 
policies regarding observance of the Guidelines and Annex of the Missile 
Technology Control Regime (MTCR). 
VI. Use of Foreign Launch Vehicles. Components. and Technologies 
(1) For the foreseeable future, the United States Government payloads will be launched 
on space launch vehicles manufactured in the United States, unless exempted by the 
President or his designated representative. 
(a) This policy does not apply to use of foreign launch vehicles on a no-ex-
change-of-funds basis to support the following: flight of scientific instru-
ments on foreign spacecraft, international scientific programs, or other 
cooperative government-to-government programs. Such use will be subject 
to interagency coordination procedures. 
(2) The U.S. Government will seek to take advantage of foreign components or 
technologies in upgrading U.S. space transportation systems or developing next 
generation space transportation systems. Such activities will be consistent with U.S. 
nonproliferation, national security, and foreign policy goals and commitments as 
well as the commercial sector guidelines contained in this policy. They will also be 
conducted in a manner consistent with U.S. obligations under the MTCR and with 
due consideration given to dependence on foreign sources and national security. 
VII. Use of U.S. Excess Ballistic Missile Assets 
(1) U.S. excess ballistic missile assets that will be eliminated under the START 
agreements shall either be retained for government use or be destroyed. These assets 
may be used within the U.S. Government in accordance with established DoD 
procedures, for any purpose except to launch payloads into orbit. Requests from 
with the Department of Defense or from other U.S. Government agencies to use 
these assets for launching payloads into orbit will be considered by DoD on a 
case-by-case basis and require approval by the Secretary of Defense. 
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Mindful of the policy's guidance that U.S. Government agencies shall purchase 
commercially available U.S. Space transportation products and services to the fullest 
extent feasible, use of excess ballistic missile assets may be permitted for launching 
payloads into orbit when the following condition are met: 
(a) The payload supports the sponsoring agency's mission. 
(b) The use of excess ballistic missile assets is consistent with international 
obligations, including the MTCR guidelines and the START agreements. 
(c) The sponsoring agency must certify the use of excess ballistic missile assets 
results in a cost savings to the U.S. Government relative to the use of 
available commercial launch services that would also meet mission 
requirements, including performance, schedule, and risk. 
VIII. Implementing Actions 
(1) Within 90 days of approval of this directive, United States Government agencies are 
directed to prepare the following for submission to the Assistant to the President for 
Science and Technology and the Assistant to the President for National Security 
Affairs: 
(a) The Secretaries of Defense, Commerce, Transportation, and the Administra-
tor of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, with appropriate 
input from the Director of Central Intelligence, will provide a report that 
will include a common set of requirements and a coordinated technology 
plan that addresses the needs of the national security, civilian, and commer-
cial space launch sectors. 
(b) The Secretary of Defense, with the support of other agencies as required, 
will provide an implementation plan that includes schedule and funding for 
improvement and evolution of the current U.S. ELV fleet. 
(c) The Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 
with the support of other agencies as required, will provide an implementa-
tion plan that includes schedule and funding for improvements of the Space 
Shuttle system and technology development and demonstration for next 
generation reusable space transportation systems. 
(d) The Secretaries of Transportation and Commerce, with the support of other 
agencies as required and U.S. industry, will provide an implementation plan 
that will focus on measures to foster an internationally competitive U.S. 
launch capability. In addition, the Secretaries will provide recommendations 
to the Department of Defense and the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration that promote the full involvement of the commercial sector 
in the NASA and DoD plans. 
